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 Personal stories are always told in the context of broader cultural narratives.  
Thus, in the contemporary U.S., stories of personal experience of illness and 
disability are usually informed by Western notions of health and illness, and a binary 
classification system of normative/non-normative bodies and behaviors.  The 
emerging field of disability studies represents a socially progressive attempt to 
interrogate and reconfigure discourses that pathologize and medicalize non-normative 
bodies, challenging medical discourses with an alternate framework of evidence that 
emphasizes the personal experiences of individuals who have experienced disability 
or illness and who conceive of these experiences in different ways. 
 Whose Story Is It Anyway? is an interdisciplinary examination of how the 
cultural authority of medicine compresses a range of individual experiences into 
narrow, standardized narratives of the experience of depression, for instance, or other 
phenomena classified as illness.  Specifically, my study makes a three-part argument: 
  
first, that biological psychiatry has eclipsed psychoanalysis and that medical 
definitions of mental illness have become the culturally dominant way of determining 
what kinds of physical or psychological phenomena are classified as bad, e.g., 
pathological.  Second, these definitions then inform and shape stories of personal 
experience with such phenomena, enough so that standard narrative formats emerge 
for describing “individual” experiences of both physical disability and 
madness/mental illness.  The personal stories of madness/mental illness then become, 
in essence, universalized narratives of illness and recovery that reinforce notions of 
pathology.  Third, this standardization of the personal story often aligns with medical 
narratives in a way that reflects the storytellers’ disempowered position in the medical 
industry, in that telling the “right” story positions them to receive the benefits of 
working within the medical system, and telling the “wrong” story becomes an act of 
political activism.  Such  de facto coercion has substantial implications for intellectual 
projects, such as disability studies, that rely heavily on the articulation of personal 
experience as evidence for the need for change.  Finally, this study argues for a re-
examination of experience-based, identity-focused activism, and for an invigorated 
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 When I began this study, I intended to address the comparative invisibility of 
madness/mental illness in the contemporary U.S. English-speaking disability 
rights/disability studies project.  I perceived the de-medicalization of disability as one 
of the primary goals of the disability rights movement, and I saw this study as an 
opportunity both to make an argument for disability rights to take a more inclusive 
approach to issues of madness/mental illness and to address an understudied area in 
disability studies.  It was clear at the time that the social/cultural construction of 
pathology would figure as a central concern in my research, because the approach to 
both the definition and treatment of mental illnesses had shifted so dramatically in the 
last fifty years from an emphasis on psychoanalysis to an almost exclusively 
biologically-based approach.   I also wanted to address what I saw as a mis-match 
between the diagnostic criteria (focused more on measurable standards of socially 
acceptable behavior rather than on internal states) and suffering.  Suffering, too, had 
its own kind of disappearing act: suffering is hardly ever mentioned in contemporary 
disability studies except as the result of the pathologization of disability.1  It seemed 
to me that somehow suffering must have been at the historical root of the idea of 
pathology, and perhaps it would be possible to re-link suffering and pathology in a 
more productive theoretical way, one that would require the application of the idea of 
pathology to be more attentive to suffering and less focused on the “objective” 
                                                 
1 Suffering is often mentioned as a result of the social-cultural consequences of disability, but almost 
never as a product of what is sometimes distinguished as an “impairment.”  In other words, one 
frequently finds references to people having suffered through childhood surgeries to make them appear 
more “normal,” or to people having suffered employment discrimination or similar prejudice.  But it is 




diagnostic criteria, which are focused on the kinds of behavioral criteria that comprise 
a “productive” citizen (e.g., the ability to get up on time to go to a job, to maintain the 
“appropriate” social relationships, etc.).  I hoped to provide the disability 
rights/disability studies project with a way to expand the demand for self-
determination in health care, but in a way that recognized that some illnesses and 
disabilities do involve suffering, and that these experiences need a disability 
rights/disability studies project that encompasses, rather than denies, suffering.  
 It was clear even several years ago, however, that madness/mental illness 
would not again be producing a significant civil rights-style movement on its own.  
The anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the related Mad Pride 
movement of the 1990s have largely dwindled out.  Organizations such as 
MindFreedom International still exist, usually run by consumer/survivor/ex-patient 
(C/S/X) volunteers who advocate for increased consumer control and who provide 
services such as the MFI Shield, described as an “underground railroad” to allow 
individuals to escape court-ordered psychiatric drugging or electroconvulsive 
therapy.2  However, this residual C/S/X movement simply doesn’t have the critical 
mass that the (physical) disability rights movement has, and probably never will, 
because things have changed.  The increasing array of pharmaceutical options has 
resulted in the discontinuation or decreased use of approaches to treatment (e.g., the 
induction of diabetic comas or the use of electroconvulsive therapy) that looked brutal 
and gave the movement some purchase on human rights grounds.    Organizations 
such as the National Alliance on Mental Illness have attempted to remove the stigma 
of mental illness by portraying it exclusively as a physiological problem—akin to 
                                                 
2 MindFreedom International, Mind Freedom International Website ([cited September 20 2009]). 
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diseases such as diabetes—with considerable success.  Local public health agencies 
and service providers rarely have the funds available to impose mental health services 
widely on those who do not want to receive them, and it has often been suggested that 
prisons have replaced asylums in terms of keeping troubled individuals out of the 
public eye.  Though isolated abuses may still occur, people are not usually now 
hospitalized as mentally ill on the basis of homosexuality.  The advent of direct 
advertising of pharmaceuticals in television and magazines caused some to hope that 
a meaningful consumer movement might develop—e.g., one in which the commercial 
maxim of “the (paying) customer is always right” might be applied to “patients,” 
thereby increasing accountability in mental health care—but this kind of movement 
never materialized. For whatever reasons, C/S/X activism has not coalesced in the 
same way that the physical disability movement has done.  While there is certainly 
some activity in the spirit of the physical disability rallying cry of “Nothing About 
Us, Without Us,” any nascent radical social movement rejecting the pathologization 
and medicalization of madness has been trampled underfoot by the viewpoint that 
mental illness is a physiological disease, which can and should be treated with drugs 
to address the “chemical imbalance” in the brain.     
 I thus find myself obliged to make quite a different argument about strategy.  
Although I fervently believe that the issue of suffering should be the most important 
question in determining what constitutes a “pathological” state, I now see this 
particular question, unfortunately, as a moot point.  The disability rights/disability 
studies project will need to approach the construction of pathology with more 
concrete, measurable, and politically leverage-able ammunition than a general 
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complaint of injustice if the desired outcome is material change.  If scholarship is to 
better understand the cultural construction of pathology and the ways in which it is 
deployed to the disadvantage of people with disabilities, it will need to address how 
pathology functions in tangible and material ways, which may be quite different than 
the ways that people with disabilities feel that it functions. For better or worse, the 
disability rights/disability studies project is one with a strong grassroots base.  The 
“nothing about us, without us” principle has placed great emphasis on the personal 
experience of people with disabilities, a philosophy-strategy that is clearly necessary 
on an individual basis to permit people with disabilities to retain control over their 
lives.  However, I have come to understand that emphasis on personal experience, and 
the contemporary scholarly preoccupation with identity, as diverting attention from 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Hundreds of Harvard Medical School students and faculty 
members have joined forces to expose ties between industry and 
researchers that they believe may be tainting the work being done in 
Harvard's classrooms, laboratories, and 17 affiliated teaching hospitals 
and institutes, news sources reported last week. 
 "Before coming here, I had no idea how much influence companies 
had on medical education," David Tian, a first-year medical student, 
told The New York Times. "And it's something that's purposely meant 
to be under the table." 
 A fourth-year student, Matt Zerden, said he felt "violated" when he 
learned that a professor who was describing the benefits of cholesterol 
drugs during a first-year pharmacology class was also a paid 
consultant to 10 drug companies. Five of those made cholesterol drugs. 
 The medical school has appointed a 19-member committee to re-
examine the school's conflict-of-interest policies. David Korn, a 
former Stanford University medical dean and Harvard's vice provost 
for research, who last year helped the Association of American 
Medical Colleges draft a conflict-of-interest policy for medical 
schools, will advise the group. 
 School officials point out that corporate support is vital to faculty 
research at a time when the value of Harvard's endowment has shrunk 
22 percent since last July and charitable giving is down. Yet concerns 
about undisclosed industry ties have prompted federal agencies and 
Congress to call for a crackdown. 
 The National Institutes of Health, which has been criticized for 
failing to adequately police such conflicts, has recently frozen some 
payments to universities whose researchers have questionable ties. 
- from the Chronicle of Higher Education3   
 In the contemporary U.S., madness or mental illness—as a subcategory of 
disability—is largely unlike most other categories used in humanities scholarship. Its 
boundaries are clearly delineated by an identifiable authority, and regulated and 
maintained through explicit processes in the form of diagnostic criteria established by 
the American Psychiatric Association and implemented through clinical use of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision 
                                                 
3 Katherine Mangan, "Harvard Medical Students and Faculty Members Work to Expose Conflicts of 
Interest," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 3 2009. 
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(DSM-IV-TR).4   Although certain kinds of cultural definitions can continue to haunt 
the popular imagination long after their influence on social policy has waned (such as 
the “one drop” rule for defining black racial identity), there are few other cultural 
categories for which the boundaries are so explicitly, rigidly, and comprehensively 
regulated by a single kind of authority as the category of illness, (inclusive of 
disability and particularly madness or mental illness).  Whereas understanding the 
ways in which the systems of gender or race work to subjugate women or people of 
color requires a complex understanding of diffuse and subtle workings of power, 
understanding how the category of mental illness functions to establish a binary of 
normal/sick is much more straightforward.  These boundaries have already been 
defined, as clearly as the American Psychiatric Association could make them, and 
published and distributed as extensively as possible.    
 Yet this rather obvious point seems to get lost in scholarship.  Disability 
studies has often focused on identity and representation—what one might call the 
diffuse workings of power—as opposed to more explicit operations such as the DSM-
IV.  Disability studies, as a field, has not yet really intersected with what might be 
called “science studies” in any consistent way.  Though numerous scholars have 
identified the medicalization of disability, the argument usually seems to stop once it 
identifies that a performative normal/abnormal binary system is dependent upon the 
medicalization of illness/disability.  In part, this may reflect the dominance of 
humanities disciplines within the disability studies project, and the tendency of some 
scholars to take for granted that a humanities-style social justice agenda is both 
                                                 
4 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR), Fourth Edition, Text Revision. (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
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universally transparent and uncontroversial.  However, this seems to me to be an 
obviously incomplete argument, and one that imposes severe limitations on the 
argument’s efficacy in the long term. If medicalization is part of a performative, 
normal/abnormal power system, and if these kinds of power systems are hegemonic 
by nature, then there is little reason to think anything will change without some 
specific additional steps to clearly identify medicalization as undesirable and to 
intervene in that portion of the process.      
 I will argue that the next step, clearly, is to deconstruct how this process of 
medicalization works, and to that extent, to discredit the medical industry’s virtually 
unfettered authority and privilege in assigning pathology.  Medicine enjoys the 
authority of truth usually attributed to science, and the truths of science are still 
popularly understood as being somehow more true than the truths of the humanities—
an issue having to less to do with incontrovertible evidence than the popular 
perception that medicine works exclusively through incontrovertible evidence.  There 
is some popular understanding that Big Pharma is about Big Dollars, but that popular 
understanding seems limited to the major drug companies as companies, not as 
entities with the apparatus to strongly inform cultural norms of health and illness.  
There is very little evidence of any popular understanding that these corporate entities 
are also directly related to the formation of diagnostic criteria, to medical school 
training, and to medical practice.  It would surely be more accurate to speak of the 
“medical industry” rather than the “medical profession,” yet aside from outrage at the 
costs of health care, there seems to be little popular inclination for a serious review of 
how the practice of medicine is conceptualized.  Any serious scholarly or activist 
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interrogation of medicine as an industry will have to contend with several deeply-held 
popular convictions: (a) that research in science (and medicine, specifically) is 
necessarily objective and true in an absolute sense, and (b) that clinical medicine (and 
psychiatry, specifically) is the application of scientific knowledge.  In other words, 
the popular understanding of medical knowledge is that it is “discovered,” rather than 
“produced.” 
 This study is part of a larger project posing a direct challenge to the narrative 
of linear scientific progress.  Specifically, it is an interrogation of how the 
pathology of madness/mental illness is constructed; how it is reproduced (by the 
people who are most directly affected by it, in particular), and how this 
pathologization of experience is naturalized and made invisible.  I seek to 
interrogate the ways in which pathology is created from both inside and outside its 
formal system.  I do not seek to prove or disprove the validity of any particular 
classification of disease, which would necessitate working within the functional and 
theoretical classification systems of medicine, or to define what depression, for 
instance, “really” is; rather I seek to interrogate the system itself.  Clearly there is a 
something (for example, what we presently call schizophrenia) that causes some 
people to experience the world very differently than most other people.  It seems to 
have existed through at least most of recorded human history, and obviously causes 
great suffering to at least many of the people who have experienced it.  Equally 
clearly, however, the medical-scientific enterprise is able to identify as pathological 
some phenomena that do not meet the traditionally narrow sense of the term as 
indicating demonstrable, physiological deterioration in tissue.  Homosexuality, only 
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removed from the DSM in 1980, is perhaps the best example of “modern” medicine 
having framed an experience or phenomenon as medically pathological, purely on 
social and cultural grounds.5 
 But pathology is not defined exclusively by the medical establishment, though 
in many ways such “official” designation remains the one with the greatest practical 
impact.  The disability rights movement represents a direct challenge to the authority 
of medicine to issue absolute decisions on what is or is not pathological, yet 
madness/mental illness has not been a part of that project in the same way that 
physical disability has.   Most obviously, the pathology of mental illness is not 
generally now contested in the same way that the pathologization of other 
impairments often is.6  A blind person might reject the pathologization of his 
blindness on the grounds that he is neither in pain nor experiences any special 
difficulties other than the attitudes of sighted people.  Likewise, a person who is Deaf 
may not consider herself disabled but rather a member of a cultural and linguistic 
minority.  People who receive a diagnosis of mental illness have themselves often 
sought out or instigated some kind of care or treatment, an action that can be 
reasonably understood as indicative of some sort of distress or suffering.  Yet even 
extreme suffering is not automatically the basis for a diagnosis (e.g., a judgment of 
                                                 
5 Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987). 
6 I use the term “impairment” cautiously.  Some in the disability rights movement have used this term 
to draw a distinction between physical phenomena (the impairment of spina bifida) and the socially 
constructed disability that results from an environment inhospitable to wheelchair users.  In some 
ways, madness/mental illness may indeed be an impairment that can’t merely be redefined away 
inasmuch as people may suffer from something more than social discrimination.   At the same time, I 
am seeking to illustrate that the definition of the category is unstable and what is deemed pathological 
in one place and time may not be in another.  Unfortunately, I fear the impairment/disability model can 
be easily misused as a more subtle or “polite” way to reinscribe the impairment as pathological.  
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pathology), nor is it necessarily the central criteria for diagnosis.7  As I will show, the 
“subjective” and “objective” criteria for madness/mental illness may overlap, but they 
do not always align.  One of the major concerns of this study is to address the ways in 
which the supposedly “objective” criteria (e.g., those set by the medical industry) 
essentially hide behind medical authority, and the ways in which those criteria are 
made to appear as though they are the indisputable, rational conclusions of a neutral 
and disinterested expert.  A related concern is to examine why and how these criteria 
are so readily accepted and even reproduced by the very people who, according to a 
disability rights-style social justice agenda, could be expected to object.   
 Another major concern is to clarify what kinds of scholarly approaches 
identify the most productive kinds of questions to ask, and equally, what sorts of 
questions to leave alone.  Determining the terms that govern inquiry into the range of 
phenomena that have been classed as “madness” or “mental illness” at various times 
and in various places is no small thing, as it determines a default conceptual position.  
Whether alcoholism, for instance, is classified as an illness or a moral failing 
determines whether the subsequent dialogue is framed around treatment or 
punishment.   In a context informed by a “scientific” biological psychiatry, the default 
inquiry thus tends to become something like “is multiple personality disorder real?”  
As J.L. Austin points out, a better question would be, “is it a real what?”  One can’t 
examine a disorder identified by the DSM or ICD as a disorder without granting both 
the terms of discussion and the parameters of what is possible to medical discourse.  
My response in this study is to focus my inquiry not on any one classification of 
                                                 
7 Despair and anguish over the death of a loved one, for instance, is considered normal and explicitly 
excluded from the diagnostic criteria for depression, unless it extends to an abnormal duration.   
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experience but to try to look at the process of pathologization from several angles, 
and in a way that does not privilege medical epistemology or discourse. 
 Determining the most politically efficacious approaches is also part of 
identifying the most productive scholarly approaches. I offer a critique of the 
disability studies project’s continued preoccupation with identity and representation 
(especially in the form of memoir), which, I argue, have ceased to offer substantial 
new insight.  I am concerned that the field’s emphases identity and representation 
may ultimately come to serve more as distractions from (rather than contributions to) 
either the development of new directions in theory or the advancement of efficacious 
activism. Although I appreciate that the construction or positioning of disability as 
another category of identity or a category of analysis is precisely what has made it 
intelligible to the broader scholarly community, I have some concerns (a detailed 
discussion of which lies outside the scope of this study) that identity-based theory and 
practice in general may have serious limitations both theoretically and practically.8  
 Disability studies, as a field, has intentionally positioned disability as a 
category of identity, so that it could first be detached from medicalized discourses of 
deformity or deviance, and then examined through the current major theoretical 
models of normativity and power.  Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, for instance, a 
tremendously important scholar in the establishment the field of disability studies, 
concludes her influential Extraordinary Bodies with an explicit call for disability to 
                                                 
8 Briefly put, I am concerned that identity is too often used too crudely, so that an idea cannot be 
understood as valid unless it can be proved to be common across an ever-increasing list of specificities. 
More importantly, however, I see it as a comparatively conservative way of thinking that tends to 
foreclose more radical possibilities.  In terms of theory, I worry that it may be too closely aligned with 
neoliberal ideas of individualism, precluding other kinds of models.  In terms of activism, I worry that 
it can inadvertently promote politics that are too localized and cosmetic at the expense of more 
materially significant kinds of reforms. 
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be understood alongside race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and class.9  This formalizes 
disability as a category of analysis, which on the one hand elevates awareness of 
disability, but on the other, tends to creates a functional practice model in the 
humanities that requires scholars to go down a checklist of identity categories to 
make sure that all the appropriate categories are at least acknowledged.  Identity can 
also become somewhat prescriptive in that certain kinds of identities become 
simplistically associated with certain kinds of ideas or politics.  The fact that a model 
is often crudely or rotely applied doesn’t mean that it’s a bad model, but it does make 
one wonder whether other alternatives might ultimately be more fruitful.  
 This inquiry thus calls for a redirection of scholarly attention to the 
construction of the health/illness binary, as well as to the construction of the authority 
of medicine and science, a project that will require the humanities to re-engage much 
more actively with other fields.  In other words, this study argues for an dynamic, 
invigorated humanities project that actively engages the sciences and the popular 
understanding of science.  Such a project would serve as a needed balance to the 
popular perception that science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) 
activities produce forms of knowledge that are both infallible, uniformly desirable, 
and of comparatively greater practical use to society than the humanities. The 
humanities may not presently have adequate theoretical apparatus for addressing 
these kinds of issues of disciplinary structuring, but I argue that new models of 
humanities practice are desperately needed.  This study is an attempt to begin an 
                                                 
9 Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American 
Culture and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 135. 
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examination of new ways to find practical means of applying the insights of 
humanities scholarship, especially science studies, in a broader fashion. 
Points of Departure – A Short History and Historiography of Psychiatry 
 
 This study begins in the context of the current popular and medical/scientific 
predisposition to accept contemporary biological psychiatry as the latest step in a 
linear, if somewhat erratic, development of medical science.  The term “biological 
psychiatry” refers to an approach to madness/mental illness as physiological disorder 
in the brain. As currently applied, it focuses on psychopharmacology as the primary 
form of treatment, with psychotherapy considered to be a potentially useful, but 
decidedly secondary, complementary tactic.  The widespread acceptance of the 
legitimacy of biological psychiatry—by the medical establishment, the general public 
and by consumers themselves—makes the arena of madness/mental illness 
fundamentally different from other forms of illness or impairment more visible within 
the disability rights movement. (The physical disability rights movement had at least 
one constituency that categorically rejected the pathology of physical disability, and 
that was the people who had the disabilities.) 
 Situating this study in the context of biological psychiatry requires a revision 
of the popular narrative of the history of psychiatry.  Psychiatry’s own account of 
itself is the metanarrative of medical progress, a story which is curiously able to 
acknowledge and include difficult parts of its history at the same time that it can 
distance itself from it. The metanarrative of scientific progress allows psychiatry to 
distance itself from therapies now perceived as barbaric or primitive, such as insulin 
coma therapy or the cold, wet sheet wrap-packs described in I Never Promised You a 
 10 
 
Rose Garden.10  In fact, prior barbarity tends to enhance the appearance of dramatic 
progress, as the juxtaposition serves to make the “now” appear very humane and 
rational indeed.  At the same time, however, the inclusion of this kind of history also 
serves to establish psychiatry as a field with a substantial lineage.   
 This study, however, is predicated upon a more scholarly and complicated 
understanding of the history of psychiatry in the U.S.  The process of assembling a 
scholarly understanding of psychiatry requires drawing from sources that are often 
contradictory, and it is generally not possible to resolve the contradictions in a 
methodical, empirical way and still reach a conclusion.  In many ways, these 
contradictions are disciplinary scuffles, and unless one has an investment in 
maintaining disciplinary boundaries, the resolution of the conflicts can be a red 
herring.  The impossibility of proving some sorts of questions can effectively result in 
paralysis (including not asking certain kinds of questions) unless one cultivates both 
the ability to establish provisional assessments and enough tolerance of uncertainty 
for such assessments to be merely provisional.11 Thus, it should be understood that 
my primary concern with the history of psychiatry is not really historical at all, in the 
sense of being focused on any specific prior period, but is better described as a kind 
of myth-symbol analysis located somewhere between political and practical—
                                                 
10 Joanne Greenberg, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden (New York: Holt, 1964), 54-55. 
11 Andrew T. Scull, Social Order/Mental Disorder: Anglo-American Psychiatry in Historical 
Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 5.  Scull, a medical sociologist focusing 
on the history of psychiatry, has repeatedly called historians of psychiatry to task for refusing to draw 
conclusions—in effect, for refusing to make history useful to people other than historians.  He notes, 
“…historians shy away from making their theoretical assumptions and interpretive frameworks explicit 
and regard comparative statements with ill-concealed suspicion and distaste—as if attending to such 
matters might contaminate the attempt ‘to understand the past on its own terms.’”   Scull also notes the 
difficulties posed by having so much work in the history of psychiatry written by psychiatrists-turned-
historians or historians who have spent so much time working with psychiatrists that they develop a 
sympathetic bias.   Such criticisms serve to illustrate the significance of disciplinary perspectives and 
what ways of thinking are both enabled and foreclosed by them. 
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establishing that alternatives to the metanarrative of scientific progress do exist, and 
that the contradictions between these narratives are in fact useful beyond serving to 
advance historical study.    
 So, to acknowledge the specific circumstances that have led to contemporary 
constructions of pathology, as well as to frame the initial terms of discussion, I offer a 
contextualization that engages historiography equally with history.  I emphasize the 
historiographical component because, for my purposes, how people assess the 
significance of what happened is as important as what actually happened. My history 
of psychiatry portrays the field as shaped by the fits and starts of research, by the 
limits of the social tolerability of certain diagnoses, by the impact of major historical 
influences such as social movements and war, and perhaps most important, by the 
incentive for economic gain.  My very brief synopsis of the history and 
historiography of American psychiatry from 1840 to the late 1980s is intended to 
provide context in which to understand contemporary biological psychiatry, other 
than through the metanarrative of scientific progress.  Multiple disciplinary 
perspectives on the history of psychiatry—e.g., histories written by historians, 
sociologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric epidemiologists, and others—all note marked 
shifts in the conceptualization of what phenomena could be categorized or interpreted 
as a psychiatric problem, though there is some variation in how these shifts are 
described.  
 By 1840, the idea of the asylum as a (potentially) therapeutic institution was 
firmly established in the U.S., yet by 1900, asylums had effectively become 
warehouses and physician’s hope of being able to cure inmates was dwindling as 
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rapidly as the number of inmates was increasing.12 The increase in the number of 
inmates is attributable to a combination of the relocation of mad people from family 
homes to asylums, as well as an actual change in the epidemiology of psychiatric 
illness, including neurosyphilis, alcoholism and schizophrenia.13   
 According to historian Edward Shorter, the need to understand changes in 
epidemiology helped prompt what he refers to as the “first biological psychiatry,” a 
term I will also employ as a useful way of recognizing that the understanding of 
psychiatric illness as physiological is not an invention of the late 20th century and 
therefore should not be understood as part of the contemporary narrative of 
progress.14 Nineteenth century psychiatry identified that there were both biological 
and hereditary components to major mental illness; yet given the large gaps in 
understanding the relationships between bodily phenomena and mental symptoms, 
there were limitations as to what this research provided in terms of practical clinical 
help.  This early research predictably produced a number of false starts, so to speak, 
                                                 
12 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 46. 
13 Ibid., 48-49 and 55. Ian Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental 
Illnesses (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1998).  Unfortunately, the shifts in 
epidemiology are largely beyond the chronological parameters of this study, though I use the paradigm 
shift from melancholy to depression as a point of reference.  Some epidemiological changes may be 
easily attributable to social changes, such as the increase in alcoholism.  But Shorter’s assertion of the 
increase in schizophrenia—a disorder currently understood to be completely biologically-based—
poses a fascinating question when considered alongside Ian Hacking’s work on fugue states and the 
“traveling illness”.   Shorter refers specifically to increases in neurosyphilis, alcoholism, and 
schizophrenia, and describes a distinct increase in the epidemiology of these conditions. Neurosyphilis 
refers to two specific kinds of manifestations of late-stage syphilis affecting the central nervous 
system, with distinctly psychiatric symptoms, which only began to be described by physicians around 
1780. 
14 Shorter’s history of psychiatry is probably the most mainstream and widely cited overview of its 
kind, and represents a very traditional approach to the history of medicine, e.g., a narrative 
emphasizing the “discoveries” of individuals in a narrative of scientific progress, only somewhat 
disturbed by other kinds of stories.  He is precisely the kind of historian that Andrew Scull criticizes as 
having a sympathetic bias towards psychiatrists.  However, being effectively at the center of the field 
of the history of psychiatry, I think Shorter provides the most appropriate and accessible starting point 
for this work. 
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in terms of scientific research, but the identification of a hereditary component to 
major mental illness also formed much of the basis for the public support for 
eugenics.  The fear of and social stigma of insanity was so great that it prompted what 
Shorter refers to as a diagnostic “fig leaf,” in the form of a discourse of illness that 
emphasized variations on the theme of “nerves” as a more useable approach to less 
severe forms of madness/mental illness.15  While severely ill individuals were still 
hidden away in asylums, middle class individuals diagnosed with “neurasthenia” and 
the like were treated by “neurologists,” in private offices and spas.  Practicing 
psychiatrists—those treating the inmates of the asylums—enjoyed little respect, 
essentially being charged with containing severely ill people more than helping them 
in any meaningful way. 
 Yet the basis of the biological psychiatry seen today emerged from the study 
of psychoses in the asylum, not neuroses seen in private offices.  Of particular note 
for this study is the formation of the “modern” classification of psychiatric illness 
according to prognosis, effectively fostered by asylum psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin in 
the 1890s, drawing from the earlier work of Karl Kahlbaum.  This classification 
represented a major change from previous practice, and in Shorter’s view, a 
significant step forward: 
…A half-century of research in neuroanatomy and neuropathology had 
produced almost nothing in the way of concrete utility to clinical 
psychiatry beyond a picture of neurosyphilis.  The biological 
psychiatrists had spawned a sprawl of clinical disease labels, each 
based on the particular circumstances associated with an illness, 
(“masturbatory insanity,” “wedding-night psychosis”) or on the 
particular combination of symptoms (“chronic delusional disorder”), 
with almost no correlation to brain pathology.  Multi-infarct dementia, 
                                                 
15 Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac, 113. 
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neurosyphyilis, thyroid deficiency, and the like were the only 
exceptions.16  
Kraepelin had kept data cards on each patient, noting conditions upon admission and 
discharge that over time showed patterns.  Based on specific features of the onset of 
symptoms, etc., he began to be able to detect a likely prognosis.  Kraepelin’s 
classifications of dementia praecox (what later came to be called schizophrenia) and 
manic-depressive illness as distinct and separate types of illnesses were first 
published in the sixth edition of his psychiatric textbook in 1899, and prefigured the 
basic taxonomy of the DSM-I when it was first published in 1952. 
 Shorter describes the rise and fall of psychoanalysis as a “hiatus” in the 
history of psychiatry, a characterization that is technically accurate though it also 
reflects a dismissive attitude towards psychoanalysis as not quite “real” psychiatry.  
Shorter’s portrayal of Freud as merely an opportunist looking for a way to establish a 
niche market and boost his practice is perhaps overly harsh—not that an economic 
incentive wasn’t there, but an economic incentive is always there,  to single out Freud 
for criticism in the whole modern history of psychiatry seems quite hilariously ironic.  
More reasonable, in my estimation, is sociologist Allan Horwitz’ description of 
“dynamic psychiatry” and its focus on the identification and articulation of feelings as 
a response to an exceedingly repressive social structure. When psychoanalysis 
became popular among the middle classes, the practice of psychiatry effectively 
moved from the asylum to Main Street, and expanded to include neuroses (along with 
psychoses) as its main concern.  Historian Elizabeth Lunbeck, among others, argues 
that this expansion represented a blurring of the ideas of “normal” and “abnormal” 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 103. 
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and the beginning of the expansion of psychiatry into the realm of what had 
previously been considered normal.17  Psychoanalysis was not intrinsically 
incompatible with biological psychiatry, because it focused on treatment rather than 
causation.    Shorter notes: 
 Although there was no good reason why nonphysicians could not 
do analysis just as effectively—there being nothing intrinsically 
medical about plumbing the unconscious mind—American medical 
psychoanalysts had a horror of lay competition.  And from their 
viewpoint, rightly so.  Given that psychoanalysis had been 
psychiatry’s ticket out of the asylum, the last thing the American 
analysts wanted was to break their monopoly by sharing it with 
psychologists and social workers avid to have a go at analysis 
themselves.18 
Shorter attributes the popularity of psychoanalysis to a multitude of social factors, 
among them the positive effects of feeling cared for by a physician, but asserts that it 
had been discarded as an effective avenue of treatment by physicians by the mid-
1990s, a position perhaps more widely held by researchers than by clinicians who 
continued to recommend therapy in conjunction with pharmacological treatment, 
even if they don’t propose to administer such therapy themselves.19   
 Meanwhile, in the asylums, some psychiatrists had persisted with research 
theorizing that the major mental illnesses had a biological component.  In the 1920s 
and 1930s it was discovered that extended sleep, fever, and electric current could 
                                                 
17 Elizabeth Lunbeck, The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, Gender, and Power in Modern 
America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).  Lunbeck places less of an emphasis on a 
distinction between “psychiatrist” and “psychoanalyst,” and focuses instead on the blurring of the 
normal and the pathological.  This results in her placing the expansion of the scope of psychiatry rather 
earlier (1900-1930) than do those who define “psychiatrist” more narrowly.  
18 Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac, 163. 
19 While I take Shorter's point that psychiatry as a distinct field has now returned to being almost 
exclusively biologically based, to speak of psychoanalysis as a kind of detour obscures its impact on 
contemporary mental health care as a whole, which is quite obviously far more dependent on 
psychologically-based therapy than it would have been without psychoanalysis.  Shorter's 




have a positive impact on major mental illness.  Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and  
insulin coma therapy came into regular usage as a means of managing severely ill 
patients.  Psychiatrists in asylums conducted all kinds of experiments to find ways to 
improve shock and coma therapies.  In 1949, a French navy surgeon began 
experimenting with synthetic antihistamine compounds to block the autonomic 
mechanisms involved in shock, thereby improving the chances for success in surgery.  
Later moved to a physiology unit, he continued these experiments, but with a new 
phenothiazine compound replacing the synthetic antihistamines, and discovered that 
in addition to having the desired effect surgically, it also had a profoundly calming 
effect.  Laborit cajoled several psychiatrists to try it on their patients, and by May 
1953, it was in use in wards across France.  Brought to North America in 1953, 
chlorpromazine (Thorazine), was hailed as a psychiatric miracle drug, and a slew of 
related compounds followed quickly.  This “discovery,” combined with studies of the 
role of genetics in major mental illness, became the basis for what Shorter describes 
as the “second biological psychiatry.” 
 At this point, the history becomes more complicated.  Psychiatrist turned 
historian David Healy presents the development of chlorpromazine quite differently, 
emphasizing the importance of corporate economic interest rather than portraying the 
development as a series of discoveries by individual doctors.20 Healy identifies a 
series of discoveries in organic chemistry that led to the commercial development of 
dyes, particularly the discovery of methylene blue in Germany in 1876.  These dyes 
were found to be able to stain certain kinds of bacteria and later, certain kinds of cells 
                                                 




(in the case of methylene blue, the mycobacterium responsible for causing 
tuberculosis, the parasite responsible for malaria, and later, nerve cells).  They gave 
rise to the idea of the “magic bullet,” a drug which would act on only a specific kind 
of organism or tissue.21   Because methylene blue acted on nerve cells, and because of 
the late 19th century (mis)understanding of “nerves” as being the biological 
underpinning of psychiatric troubles, the substance was tried as a cure, and indeed it 
did seem to calm psychotic agitation to some degree. However, Healy notes, it 
generally was replaced after 1903 by the barbiturates, which worked better in support 
of the “sleep therapy” that involved putting patients to sleep for days or even weeks 
“to give their nervous systems a chance to stabilize,” and which actually seemed to 
cure catatonic schizophrenia.22 
 The rationale for the use of methylene blue is an important point to Healy, 
relative to chlorpromazine, because he finds it illustrative of how much the practice of 
psychiatry is influenced by factors other than science.   He notes the “better than 
average reason for its [methylene blue’s] use” but notes that its disappearance in 
clinical practice had to do with timing; first, with the timing of the discovery of 
barbiturates, then with the timing of the discovery of convulsive therapies.  However, 
he argues that the scientific rationale for the use of methylene blue remained 
unchallenged, and again in the 1970s research studies showed methylene blue to be 
have prophylactic properties for manic-depressive (bipolar) disorder.  Yet, he 
observes,  
“Needless to say, no one uses methylene blue for this purpose today.  
The reason is not competing therapies, although there were many, but 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 39-40. 
22 Ibid., 44. 
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that patents had been obtained on newer agents and no drug company 
would market an old drug even if it worked.   In all three instances, 
then, there were competing therapies or interest groups likely to make 
more money out of other therapies than they would from methylene 
blue.  In no case, however, was there any greater theoretical rationale 
for the use of these other therapies.”23 
Healy emphasizes that chlorpromazine first became widely used because it was an 
effective sedative, and it was effectively marketed.  He continues,  
“Methylene blue and other antihistamines had proved to have uses in 
addition to sedation, and chlorpromazine was to make even more 
obvious these nonsedative benefits.  These benefits, along with 
commercial support, in due course helped to generate a theoretical 
rationale for the use of chlorpromazine: the dopamine theory of 
schizophrenia.”24 
Healy’s point is that the theoretical rationale came after clinical usage had been 
established for reasons entirely different from the basis of the rationale; i.e., financial 
opportunity. 
 It would be inappropriate for me to ignore entirely the antipsychiatry 
movement in this narrative, though as mentioned in the preface it has a tendency to be 
eclipsed from public memory.  The abuses of the asylum and the antipsychiatry 
movement are woefully understudied areas in the history of medicine; there is 
relatively little documentation of either in scholarship and even less consensus on the 
impact or meaning.  Both Shorter and Healy acknowledge that psychiatry became 
very complicated as drugs were administered involuntarily and at large doses to 
individuals exhibiting merely deviant behavior, rather than traditionally psychotic 
behavior.  Shorter, even as he acknowledges the excessive dosages of drugs as a 
mistake, treats the antipsychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s as an unfortunate 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 45-46. 
24 Ibid., 46. 
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reaction of misguided lay people overreacting to popular media such The Snake Pit or 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, or such lofty and theoretical academic arguments 
as Foucault’s Madness and Civilization.25   Healy frames antipsychiatry activism 
more appropriately, in my estimation, as a response in part to the abuses of 
psychopharmacology and psychosurgery, and in part to a general social upheaval with 
regard to other social justice movements.  Healy identifies texts such as Erving 
Goffman’s Asylums, Thomas Szasz’s The Myth of Mental Ilness, and Franz Fanon’s 
Black Skin, White Masks as some of the means by which people came to understand 
the expansion of the psychiatric enterprise in a social context.26 
 What both Shorter and Healy agree on, however, is that the discovery of 
chlorpromazine began to change psychiatry as an enterprise, to blur the distinctions 
between the psychoses of the asylum and the neuroses of the analyst’s couch.  
Chlorpromazine was considered a tranquilizer at the time, as was Miltown, 
introduced in 1955.  Although the two drugs worked so differently that a distinction 
was established between “major’ and “minor” tranquilizers, together they represented 
a substantial change in both the scope of psychiatry (now inclusive of less severely ill 
people) and the approach to treatment (primarily pharmacological.)  The expansion of 
the scope of psychiatry is a critical point to a number of scholars: to Shorter, for 
whom it represents a boundary issue as to who is included in the category of 
“psychiatrist”; to Healy, for whom it represents a new market for both psychiatrists 
                                                 
25 Anatole Litvak, in The Snake Pit (U.S.A.: 1948)., Milos Forman, in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's 
Nest (U.S.A.: 1976)., Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965). 
26 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961)., Thomas Stephen Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: 
Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, Rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974)., Frantz 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967). 
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and drug companies; to Lunbeck, for whom it represents a blurring of the ideas of 
normal/abnormal and was a means for addressing changing ideas of gender;  to 
Gerald Grob, for whom it was an important part of the mental hygiene movement in 
the early part of the century.  Though scholars interpret and label the specifics of the 
expansion in different ways, the important points for my purposes are that over the 
course of the 20th century, psychiatry expanded considerably in terms of who it might 
reasonably encompass, and that the particular instances of expansion occurred quite 
rarely as an altruistic response to new scientific discoveries, but quite frequently in 
response to other kinds of socio-cultural concerns. 
 Likewise, Shorter and Healy—as well as others—generally frame the 
publication of the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
as marking a codification of an approach to psychiatry that did several very important 
things: it established psychiatric illness as being fundamentally within the scope of 
medicine; it established psychiatrists as the (only) professionals having the 
appropriate expertise to oversee treatment; and it provided a standardized scheme for 
classifying psychiatric illness.   The initial 1952 publication and its successor caused 
relatively little commotion, but the revisions leading to publication in 1980 of the 
DSM-III were fraught with controversy.  Although the public rhetoric for the 
classification system was to improve the scientific rigor by aligning psychiatry more 
closely with evidence-based medicine, multiple scholars concur that psychiatry’s 
prestige within medicine (or rather, the lack thereof) was also a motivating factor in 
the shift towards the classification scheme.  Whereas in the early part of the 20th 
century, the alliance with medicine had served to increase psychiatry’s prestige, in the 
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middle and later parts, comparison with more biologically-based areas of medicine 
made the field of psychiatry look almost comic.   Multiple scholars have argued that 
the inability of psychiatry to provide both consistent definitions of disease entities and 
a capacity for measurement exposed psychiatry to ridicule within medicine.27  
 To the contemporary reader accustomed to the rhetoric of biological 
psychiatry, the idea of a standardized classification scheme with measurable 
diagnostic criteria may sound like an appropriate step towards increasing the 
scientific and intellectual rigor of psychiatry.  That, however, is precisely the 
difficulty: the rhetoric sounds good, but in fact merely mimics scientific rigor rather 
than actually assuming responsibility in that role.  One of the intents of this study is to 
complement and support the scholarship aimed at deconstructing this rhetoric.    
 David Healy’s work, for instance, effectively calls biological psychiatry on its 
bluff and exposes it for complicated tangle of motivations that it is.  Healy’s critique 
of biological psychiatry is multi-pronged but is aimed primarily at the way that drug 
companies have manipulated the slightest ambiguities for financial gain, to put it 
mildly.  Healy takes particular offense at the way that supposedly objective measures, 
such as randomized, controlled trials (RCT), have been used in decidedly non-
objective ways, i.e., to obscure or replace clinical observation that may help clarify 
how a drug works, because RCT studies show associations, not causal relationships.  
For example, he writes: 
                                                 
27 Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis, Nathan G. Hale, The 
Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Healy, The Creation of Psychopharmacology, Allan V. 
Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), Shorter, A History of 
Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac. 
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“Focusing on the RCT evidence that SSRIs can help treat depression, 
OCD, post-traumatic stress disorder, social phobia, panic disorder and 
generalized anxiety disorder throws more light on what is actually 
happening.  These positive responses can lead to two hypotheses.  One 
is that there is something wrong with the serotonin system in all these 
states and that drugs that act on the serotonin system are magic bullets.  
This is the favored view of pharmaceutical companies.  The alternative 
is that SSRIs heal patients by reducing emotional reactivity, a serenic 
effect that cuts across a range of nervous conditions.  If this is the case, 
some patients would be expected to respond to such a serenic effect, 
while others would not respond, with the degree and frequency of 
response sufficient to distinguish the compound from a placebo.  This 
is exactly the state of affairs that best characterizes trials with SSRIs, 
which have been shown to have a modest treatment effect across this 
range of conditions, with striking clinical efficacy in some patients.  
The clinical trial results are not compatible with the idea of a serotonin 
lesion or a magic bullet effect in any of these disorders.”28 
Healy also takes aim at the selective distribution of information and the way that 
insight can be buried: 
Consider the classic magic bullet language of main effects and side 
effects.  By convention the main effect of antidepressants is taken to 
be on mood; other effects, for example on sexual functioning, are 
designated side effects.  But in fact, sexual functioning may be more 
reliably affected by an SSRI than mood.  Where up to two hundred 
patients may be needed to demonstrate a treatment effect for an SSRI 
in cases of depression, as few as twelve patients may be needed to 
demonstrate its efficacy in treating premature ejaculation.  Companies 
kept the evidence of the potentially beneficial effects of SSRI’s on 
aspects of sexual functioning—useful for treating premature 
ejaculation—out of the public domain for two decades.  This example 
should make it clear that deciding which is the main effect of a 
compound is essentially an arbitrary decision, related to company 
economics and far from value free.29 
 The bulk of Healy’s work has been directed at what he see as the gross misuse 
of information with regard to SSRIs, most notably with regard to the expansion of 
disease categories to create new markets, such as the marketing of fluoxetine 
                                                 
28 David Healy, The Antidepressant Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 313. 
29 Healy, The Creation of Psychopharmacology, 323. I take some issue with Healy here as he does not 
address that framing of the SSRIs’ dampening effect on sexual functioning as a “side effect” also 
downplayed the efficacy of this phenomenon in other populations.     
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hydrochloride both as an antidepressant under the trade name Prozac, and as a 
treatment for pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) under the trade name 
Sarafem.  Healy’s central concern is that it is drug companies, not clinicians, who are 
now driving medicine, through comprehensive marketing to both the public and 
doctors, by effectively controlling the research agenda, and by constructing as 
“pathological” some phenomena that had previously been understood merely as 
“problems.”30 
 In some ways, this project continues Healy’s interrogation of the factors other 
than a scientific rationale that lead to certain phenomena being pathologized, 
diagnosed, and treated as illness.  But it is equally concerned with how those 
processes become entrenched and naturalized, and how pathology is not only 
produced but also reproduced and reinforced through other kinds of discourses. 
 As I outline in Chapter Two, the academic literature review, this project is 
best understood as situated between science studies, trauma studies and other 
concerned with the meaning of experience, and disability studies.  A disability rights 
consciousness certainly informs the study’s intent and purpose, but through the course 
of the investigation, I have come to see the intellectual concerns of science studies 
and a certain body of literature focusing on epistemologies of personal experience as 
being of equal or perhaps greater importance in shaping the questions I address.  In 
this chapter I argue that there is an intellectual benefit to focusing on ideas of the 
process of the construction, consumption and reproduction of knowledge rather than 
becoming overly preoccupied with the specific historical or categorical circumstances 
                                                 
30 Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985). 
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to which such ideas have been applied.  Because my project is primarily concerned 
with opening up new avenues of work in disability studies, it is necessary to avoid 
subjecting this study to the same kinds of constraints from which the field suffers.31  
In other words, to expand disability studies, I am looking beyond its existing borders. 
 In Chapter Three, I compare two approaches to conceptualizing the 
experience of depression.   I contrast Peter Kramer’s Against Depression, an 
argument for considering depression to be exclusively a biological illness, with 
Joshua Wolf Shenk’s study of Abraham Lincoln’s depression, Lincoln’s Melancholy.  
This juxtaposition, at its most obvious level, addresses the absence of madness or 
mental illness in the disability rights/disability studies literature, and introduces a 
disability rights-style alternative to the dominant medical model approach that 
presumes experiences such as depression as solely pathological.  Examining the 
particular characteristics of Lincoln’s melancholy and finding them to be as much 
asset as liability, Shenk argues that Lincoln would not have been the man who 
became President without his depression.  Not only is this a more holistic approach to 
interpreting a life, it also counters the contemporary (and infuriating) proclivity to 
ponder how much more he might have accomplished if only Prozac had been 
available to him. Chapter Three also introduces a related argument developed more 
                                                 
31 Much of the best scholarship on disability has been done by scholars in the humanities, and has 
focused on representations of disability or theorizing how the category of disability has functioned 
alongside race and gender, for instance, in systems of power.  Though such works represent some 
extraordinarily fine scholarship, the field as a whole suffers the absence of a “next step” for translating 
these insights into application.  Lennard J. Davis, ed., The Disability Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), Paul K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky, The New Disability History: American 
Perspectives, The History of Disability Series (New York: New York University Press, 2001), Robert 
McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: New York University 
Press, 2006), David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses 
of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), Sharon L. Snyder and David T. 
Mitchell, Cultural Locations of Disability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), Rosemarie 
Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and 
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
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fully in the Chapter Five, a revival of Thomas Szasz’s 1961 contention that the 
diagnostic criteria for mental illnesses are not based on an appropriate definition of 
“pathology”—e.g. demonstrable physiological deterioration of tissue—and reflect at 
best a well-meaning but intellectually sloppy understanding of these phenomena as 
“illnesses.” 
 In Chapter Four, I examine what Nancy Mairs has called the “literature of 
personal disaster,” meaning memoirs on the subject of illness and disability, and 
identify the major ways in which accounts of physical disability are constructed and 
function differently from accounts of mental illness.  Using ten representational 
examples, I track differences in how the stories are told to create very different kinds 
of meanings that are made of the experiences.  The five memoirs of mental illness 
share a narrative downspin of worsening illness (or alternately, a progressive 
deepening of the author’s understanding), followed by a crisis in which some sort of 
therapeutic agent is introduced (psychological therapy, antidepressants, etc.), and the 
author is ultimately restored to health.  Even when the restoration to health is 
portrayed as an ongoing struggle, the narrative works to identify the experience of 
illness as pathological and yet simultaneously also works to distance the author from 
that pathology by positioning him or her as cured (and therefore as a credible witness 
to the pathological experience).   
 The five memoirs of physical disability are also structured as journeys, but of 
a very different kind.  In these, management of the author’s impairment usually plays 
a minor role, and the central journey is a psychological process of coming to terms 
with the oppression faced by people with disabilities, as well as meditation on the 
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appropriate role to take to resist disabling social and cultural attitudes. Of particular 
concern in this chapter is how these meta-narratives (of illness and recovery, and of 
oppression and struggle) are in fact extremely limiting in the range of possible 
meanings that they present.  I question the ways in which the publication market—
e.g., the need for published books to sell—may also serve to limit the range of the 
kinds of stories that end up being published into standardized (and possibly also 
sanitized) narratives, and in turn, also limit the range of possibilities for cultural-level 
narratives of illness and disability.   
 Chapter Five more directly interrogates both the intellectual legitimacy and 
social justification of diagnoses made on criteria based on social and cultural values –
specifically, Gender Identity Disorder (GID), the “illness” with which (self-
identified) transgender individuals must be diagnosed in order to obtain legal access 
to FDA-regulated hormones or sex reassignment surgery.  Unlike many other illness 
or disabilities, Gender Identity Disorder is a “top-down” definition; transgendered 
individuals may often identify as a “trans woman” (or “trans man), as “men” or 
“women” without a prefix, as “transgendered,” or perhaps even “queer,” or “gay.”  
Despite the plethora of terms and localized meanings, what is easy to see is that these 
identifications are overtly political and drawn along lines of gender, not diagnosis.  
Yet the American Psychiatric Association includes in the DSM several different types 
of gender identity disorders and diagnostic criteria for each.    
 More specifically, this chapter examines the Standards of Care for Gender 
Identity Disorders (6th version), published in 2001 by the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association (now known as the World Professional 
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Association for Transgender Health).  These standards are the clinical guidelines used 
by many doctors to determine to whom and how hormones and surgery should be 
made available.  In addition to an examination of the content of the standards, my 
examination includes a consideration of the professional composition of the 
committee that authored the sixth version of the Standards.  It also includes an 
assessment of the Standards as a text-object that has a life of its own, owing to its role 
as the gate through which most transgendered people seeking hormones or surgery 
must pass to obtain legal supplies and services.   
 As such, I argue, this very top-down definition of a mental illness offers many 
interesting opportunities to consider how personal stories relate to the pathologization 
of the experiences categorized as mental illness.  Most obviously, there is the 
question of whose stories “count” as true: both doctors and patients tell stories about 
what they see happening in the patient’s life, but the doctor’s story “counts” in a way 
that the patient’s story does not.  There are also stories told in more oblique ways 
about the larger questions of what is being defined and pathologized as mental illness, 
about the process of making such decisions and who is authorized to make them, and 
stories told about how to resist and remodel other stories.  This chapter reflects my 
observations and concerns that while the telling of the personal story may have some 
usefulness in certain ways, it also has substantial limitations, and in circumstances 
such as GID, the limitations can raise questions of truthfulness, both in terms of 
unconscious influence and of outright lying.   
 The disability rights movement’s rallying cry of “nothing about us, without 
us” made sense, in that at the time of its genesis, it represented a popular demand, in 
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the 1960s and 70s spirit of direct pickets, sit-ins and boycotts.  It insisted on 
meaningful inclusion of people with disabilities in the decision-making process, and 
especially emphasized de-medicalizing aspects of disability or illness that did not 
actively require medical care.  But now, when “activism” is more likely to consist of 
writing a book, a blog, or otherwise “telling one’s story,” I question whether this is 
still the most useful approach either for a political disability rights project concerned 
with the advancement of social justice, or an intellectual project concerned with any 
sort of anthropological or philosophical inquiry.   
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Chapter 2: Creating a Context: Interdisciplinary Studies of Science, 
Experience, and Disability 
 
 This chapter outlines a scholarly context for my inquiries into the construction 
of pathology of madness/mental illness. It examines the scholarly literature that has 
informed my thinking on the subject and, to a much lesser degree, describes the 
multiple scholarly contexts in which this study takes place, with a particular eye 
towards disability studies.   
  Although people often assume that such an inquiry would begin with the kinds 
of literature most frequently associated with the topic (e.g., psychology, psychiatry, 
perhaps the history of medicine), my concern in this review is instead on that very 
process of association between the signifier of the phenomena we call madness or 
mental illness and the signified category or idea of insanity, and how that association 
determines the sort of stories that can be told about the experience.  This chapter 
functions as both an intellectual genealogy, connecting the overall project of inquiry 
to its diverse scholarly roots, and equally, supports one of the project’s major threads 
of argument, that social justice-based humanities projects are strengthened 
considerably by engaging other types of scholarship (and conversely, are weakened 
when they do not.)  
 As befits a question of such an interdisciplinary nature, there are three distinct 
kinds of scholarly literature from which this project draws.  Most important is the 
scholarly literature in what has come to be called “science studies,” the examination 
of how ideas about what science is or does are of equal importance to what science 
actually is or does, and how one might be able to imagine the difference.  Second, 
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there is a very loose body of literature concerned with the representation of certain 
kinds of experience, such as physical sensation or emotion, that are particularly 
difficult to translate to or “capture” in language.  Third, in lieu of a field of “madness 
studies,” there is the literature of disability studies.  This literature is predominantly 
concerned with the experience of physical disabilities, such as polio or blindness, but 
which nevertheless offers a robust and perhaps the only currently viable socio-
cultural model for reassigning the association of disability or illness with medicine.    
Because this project has its roots in such disparate areas, I will focus on an 
examination of the scholarly work with the greatest bearing on this project—not 
always the same as an examination of the most pivotal works within the context of 
each field. 
 It is important for me to note that these texts and the others cited in this 
chapter are primarily those that are pivotal in my own understanding of my project.  
The assembly of these diverse topics into a coherent whole and an identification of 
their relationship to my project is necessary both to explain my argument and to 
clearly justify my logic and rationale.  It is more relevant than a literature review of 
the current work in each discrete area, and reflects a broad argument made in 
different ways by a number of studies reviewed here, namely that knowledge is 
always contextual and is constructed in part through the particular situation of the 
scholar.32  
 I encourage the reader of this chapter to make use of Katie King’s idea of 
“lacquered layerings,” which she defines as “layerings of instance, of political 
                                                 
32 This idea is engaged indirectly by a number of works here, but is argued most directly by Donna 
Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges.” 
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meanings constrained in particularity, lacquered over so finely that they are 
inseparable and mutually constructing while distinct.”33  The term emerged from 
King’s efforts to tease apart the ways in which some kinds of words and ideas 
developed vastly different meanings and applications in different contexts in U.S. 
women’s movements, particularly over time.  This approach to feminist 
“conversations,” as she calls them, is intended to preserve complexity and 
ambiguities as much as possible, and prevent the term “women’s movement” from 
being compressed into an oversimplified, monolithic idea that privileges the best-
funded and most widely distributed perspectives. “Lacquered layerings” is thus a 
useful technique for holding several differing ideas in mind at once.  This project 
faces similar political challenges—particularly in terms of who understands what as 
“pathological” and for what reasons—but the idea of “lacquered layerings” is also a 
way to tolerate uncertainty and contradiction when insisting on a single, fixed 
definition would prematurely foreclose other intellectual options. 
The Construction of Knowledge and the Practice of Science 
 
 Science studies is the body of literature most pertinent to this project because 
it focuses on an examination of the processes by which the idea of science (inclusive 
of medicine) has become understood as an enterprise that deals with “objective” 
knowledge, and by which “objective” knowledge has become understood to be more 
true than other kinds of knowledge.  Science studies considers issues such as the 
                                                 
33 Katie King, Theory in Its Feminist Travels: Conversations in U.S. Women's Movements 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 2. 
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process of classification, the valorization of objectivity, and ways in which “science” 
has come to have rhetorics and practices that are distinct from each other.34     
 Most fundamentally, this study draws from and expands on the ideas 
suggested by Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star in Sorting Things Out: 
Classification and its Consequences, in which the authors in turn expand on ideas 
introduced in Foucault’s The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge.35  
Bowker and Star explore how classifications and standards work invisibly to order 
and structure human interaction, examine how these categories work in the context of 
the human-built environment (especially in terms of information technology), and 
consider how the work of such classification is often rendered invisible.   
 Bowker and Star distinguish between “classifications” and “standards,” noting 
that they are related but not identical.  Classification systems are defined as “a set of 
boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of 
work—bureaucratic or knowledge production.”36  Classification systems are 
described as having three properties:  1) there are consistent, unique classificatory 
principles in operation; 2) the categories are mutually exclusive, and overlap is not 
                                                 
34 Several distinctions need to be made here.  I’ve heard science studies described as the difference 
between what scientists say that they do and what they actually do.  But equally important to this study 
is that there is also a difference between what scientists say that they do (and actually do) and what 
other people think that they do.   Generally speaking, this study is concerned with the latter, inasmuch 
as medical authority is a complicated social negotiation.   One of the challenges in this project is to 
retain the understanding that these layers do in fact have some separate characteristics, yet also are 
conflated in some ways.   In other words, I don’t think that very many serious research scientists would 
themselves be quite as cavalier about asserting certainty in their work as non-scientists tend to be.   
35 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, 
Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970). 
36 Bowker and Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, 10. 
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permitted; and 3) the system covers the entire world it describes.37   They note, too, 
that classifications can become standardized. Standards, in turn, are defined as: 
1. A “standard is any set of agreed-upon rules for the production 
of (textual or material) objects.   
2. A standard spans more than one community of practice (or site 
of activity).  It has temporal reach as well in that it persists over 
time. 
3. Standards are deployed in making things work together over 
distance and heterogeneous metrics. ...   
4. Legal bodies often enforce standards, be these mandated by 
professional organizations, manufacturers’ organizations, or 
the state. … 
5. There is no natural law that the best standard shall win—
QWERTY, Lotus 123, DOS and VHS are often cited as 
examples in this context. … 
6. Standards have significant inertia and can be very difficult and 
expensive to change.38 
  Bowker and Star’s meditations on how classifications and standards work is 
useful and interesting in its entirety, but their work on the International Classification 
of Diseases—used as a major example throughout the book—is of particular 
importance, and suggests the kind of approach that I will take in my examinations of 
the DSM-IV’s definitions of depression and the WPATH Standards of Care for 
Gender Identity Disorders.  One of the most important insights that Bowker and Star 
offer is of the ways in which such classification systems and standards create multiple 
and sometimes conflicting lines of pressure on individuals, a process they call 
“torque.”  This idea of torque permits them to trace, in detail, the path from the 
classification system or standard to its impact on actual lives.      
 Bowker and Star’s work, although in many ways unique (and, ironically, not 
easily classified in a literature review focusing on classification), also fits in with a 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 10-11. 
38 Ibid., 13-14. 
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larger body of scholarship that examines “science” as object of cultural construction.  
They acknowledge this connection, aligning their work with science studies, and 
specifically Bruno Latour’s central argument in We Have Never Been Modern.39  
Bowker and Star interpret Latour as arguing that “we can either look at what 
scientists say they are doing (working within a purified realm of knowledge) or at 
what they actually are doing (manufacturing hybrids of nature-culture).”40   While 
I’m not sure that this is the most faithful summary of Latour’s argument, it certainly 
makes the point that words and deeds are not the same, and sets the stage for Bowker 
and Star’s own central thesis that there are circumstances in which a system’s 
description of reality is able to change the world in such a way that the description 
becomes true.   
 Like Bowker and Star, Donna Haraway makes a general argument that cuts 
across many topics of scientific inquiry in Modest_Witness@Second Millennium. 
FemaleMan©Meets_OncoMouse™: Feminism and Technoscience.41  Haraway’s 
argument about “situated knowledges” begins with the example of Robert Boyle’s 
experiments with an air pump in 17th century Scotland.  She explicates the idea of 
scientific objectivity, noting that the ability to stand up as a “modest witness” in the 
attestation of the results of scientific experimentation was limited to men, owing to 
women’s social status as “covered” persons.42   Because it was socially inappropriate 
for women to take the public role required in the witnessing and attestation of 
scientific experimentation, women were effectively foreclosed from participation in 
                                                 
39 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
40 Bowker and Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, 48. 
41 Donna Jeanne Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.Femaleman©Meets_Oncomouse™: 
Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
42 Ibid., 27. 
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science, and this foreclosure was rendered invisible and natural in that cultural 
context.   
 Haraway uses this example to frame her rich central argument about “situated 
knowledges,” which contends that science is what it is, in part, through the 
construction of gender (and other markers of identity), and vice versa.  “Situated 
knowledges” is a way of addressing the idea that knowledge production does not 
occur in a vacuum, and that the issue of who is doing the asking, as well as what 
questions are asked and answered, shapes what will be known as “science.”  
Ultimately, Haraway’s point is that such issues are not only about the historical 
exclusion of women from science, for instance, but about a process of the production 
of knowledge that excludes certain kinds of questions altogether, and that without an 
understanding of all knowledge as situated within a particular context, a truly 
reflexive scientific enterprise (or “technoscience”) is severely limited.  Consideration 
of the political context of the production of knowledge, she argues, is an essential part 
of a robust idea of science. 
 Sorting Things Out and Modest_Witness are part of a scholarly metanarrative 
that argues that processes and outcomes in science are political, and anything but 
absolute.  A similar argument, but focused specifically on contemporary biological 
psychiatry, can be found in Pharmaceutical Reason: Knowledge and Value in Global 
Psychiatry, in which Andrew Lakoff maps the globalization of biological 
psychiatry.43 He examines how a French biotechnology company offered an 
impoverished Argentine hospital $100,000 for 200 DNA samples from patients 
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diagnosed with bipolar disorder, unaware that the dominant therapeutic model in 
Argentina is psychoanalysis, and that the diagnosis of bipolar disorder is made 
infrequently there.  In the samples, the French biotechnology company was hoping to 
find genetic markers suggestive of bipolar disorder, with the intent of developing a 
drug tailored very specifically to that condition.  As Lakoff observes:  
The new biomedical psychiatry seeks to find organic correlates for 
behavioral disorders and hone targeted pharmaceutical interventions 
whose efficacy can be tested through clinical research.  Its goal is to 
restore normal psychic functioning by linking intervention—typically, 
but not exclusively through drug therapy—directly to specific brain-
based disorders.  The norm that guides intervention is one of 
“specificity” of effect: thus, for example, “depression” should be 
treatable by an “anti-depressant.”  However, since both the putative 
effects of a given medication and the characteristics of its target illness 
population are subject to interpretation, the achievement of specificity 
involves a process of mutual adjustment between illness and 
intervention.  Illness comes gradually to be defined in terms of that to 
which it “responds.”44   
The conflict between the French biotechnology company’s biological psychiatry and 
the Argentine hospital’s psychoanalytically-based psychiatry thus represented a 
challenge to the idea that medical or scientific knowledge is universally valid: how 
valid can a biologically-aligned model of pathology be if it completely disappears in a 
different cultural context?  
 Similar questions are raised in Ian Hacking’s 1998 Mad Travelers:  
Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness, in which he examines the 
curious historical phenomenon of dissociative fugue states around the turn of the 20th 
century, in which urban, working-class men would lose all memory of their regular 
lives and go traveling around Europe for months at a time before “waking up.”45  
                                                 
44 Ibid., 7. 
45 Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses. 
 37 
 
Hacking, a philosopher, is interested in how the idea of what he calls “transient 
mental illnesses” are logically possible, and in considering how to move the 
discussion beyond the simplistic “real” vs. “socially constructed.  His Rewriting the 
Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, published in the same year, 
examines the debates over the diagnosis of multiple personality disorder (now more 
frequently known as dissociative disorder) with an eye towards the constitution of the 
real in a formal philosophical sense.46   
 Turning away from psychiatry and to medicine more generally, there are 
several important studies in recent years that examine various forms of medical 
surveillance and the processes by which those observations are imbued with meaning.  
Joseph Dumit’s 2004 Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity 
examines the way that PET scans of the brain come to be understood as signs of 
disease or disorder to be regulated.47  Lisa Cartwright’s 1995 Screening the Body: 
Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture remains one of the strongest studies of visual 
surveillance of the body, examining how various sorts of visual imaging techniques 
from X-rays to film have been used as evidence to “prove” disease or disorder.48 
Likewise, Anne Fausto-Sterling’s 2000 Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the 
Construction of Sexuality confronts a wide range of ways in which bodies are 
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“sexed,” starting from external physical characteristics sexualized into the binary of 
male/female, and working inwards to similar processes at the cellular level.49 
The Meaning of Experience 
 
 The second area of relevant literature also focuses on ways that meaning is 
produced, but takes as its subject personal experience.  This grouping explores a 
range of questions about experience, from the ability to represent or understand 
another person’s pain to the importance of establishing scholarly practices for 
representing and dealing with emotion.   Ontological questions also figure 
prominently here, with a substantial emphasis on the recent literature exploring 
experiences of trauma.   
 Elaine Scarry’s 1985 The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the 
World examines the experience of physical pain and what she contends to be the 
unknowability of another person’s pain.50  Scarry’s focus is on how pain can 
“unmake” a sufferer’s world by taking that person to a state of mind without control 
of language, and in so doing, she argues, effectively dismantling the sufferer’s link to 
any consciousness other than of the experience of pain.  Scarry sees the physical, 
sensory experience of pain as unrepresentable, without fixed points of reference, and 
therefore understands the pain of another person to be fundamentally unknowable.   
Scarry’s influence on this project is considerable, as I have spent considerable time 
struggling with her thesis despite my recognition that I begin with the same 
assumptions that she does.   I disagree with Scarry to some extent: her conception of 
                                                 
49 Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, 1st ed. 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000). 
50 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
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“knowledge” is a very Western one rooted in Enlightenment thinking, and I do not 
want to completely foreclose other kinds of conceptualizations of knowledge—even 
as I find myself imagining the situation with a similar Western idea of knowledge at 
the center.  However, Scarry’s points about the difficulty of communicating 
something complex when language becomes unavailable, or the difficulty of applying 
language to phenomena that are “prior” to language, are well taken, and are one of the 
challenges in describing the suffering that can be part of madness/mental illness.  I 
also disagree with Scarry on her distinction between emotional and physical pain, 
again an issue in which she takes a traditional Western approach with a mind/body 
split, when perhaps there are other models better capable of representing the 
simultaneous differentiation and overlap of mind and body.   
 More recently, a body of literature has grown up around memory and trauma.  
What is particularly interesting about this literature is that it does not always try to 
make a firm separation between the experience, and the representation of the 
experience.  In fact, this literature tends to linger on that difficult and unknowable 
place between experience and representation (including memory) and this approach 
allows new kinds of questions to be asked.51    
 Kalí Tal’s polemic but fascinating study of “the literature of trauma” includes 
the writings of Holocaust survivors, women and children surviving sexual abuse, and 
Vietnam-era veterans.  She examines three strategies of “cultural coping”: 
mythologization, medicalization, and disappearance: 
                                                 
51  Cathy Caruth’s work is usually cited as foundational, but I have found other texts to be more useful 
and relevant. Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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Mythologization works by reducing a traumatic event to a set of 
standardized narratives (twice- and thrice-told tales that come to 
represent “the story” of the trauma) turning it from a frightening and 
uncontrollable event into a contained and predictable narrative.  
Medicalization focuses our gaze upon the victims of trauma, positing 
that they suffer from an “illness” that can be “cured” within existing or 
slightly modified structures of institutionalized medicine and 
psychiatry.  Disappearance – a refusal to admit the existence of a 
particular kind of trauma—is usually accomplished by undermining 
the credibility of the victim.  In the traumas I examine, these strategies 
work in combination to effect the cultural codification of the 
trauma.52 
Tal’s description of “mythologization” prefigures my own assessment of the way that 
narratives of disability and illness come to be standardized, an issue that is the focus 
of Chapter Four.  She asserts that “Once codified, the traumatic experience becomes a 
weapon in another battle, the struggle for political power.”53  Tal uses the metaphor of 
a battle to describe the struggle for the ability to define the meaning of traumatic 
experience, and this is a fair description of the kind of crusade that the disability 
rights/disability studies project has embarked upon. 
 However, to speak of illness and disability as trauma is one of the public 
relations conundrums of disability studies: on the one hand, the kinds of experiences 
we call “madness” or “mental illness” are often of a nature that involves considerable 
suffering, and the idea of “trauma” on the basis of those experiences is not, to my 
mind, at all far-fetched.  On the other hand, this practice reinforces the association of 
disability with medicine—exactly as Tal describes in the cultural coping strategy of 
“medicalization”—the eradication of which is one of the major emphases of the 
disability rights/disability studies project.   
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 Tal focuses on the relationships between personal stories and community-
level stories (e.g., of Jews in the Holocaust), especially the urge to “bear witness” and 
the process by which testimony becomes political action: 
Each of the traumas discussed has as its victims a certain group of 
persons definable by characteristics of race, sex, religion and/or 
geographical location.  If the members of a persecuted group define 
themselves as a community, as part of a common plight, then (and 
only then) will the urge to bear witness be present.  If a trauma victim 
perceives herself as suffering alone, and has no sense of belonging to a 
community of victims, she will remain silent, imagining that her pain 
has no relevance to the larger society.54 
Assuming that a survivor of a traumatic experience can imagine herself as part of a 
larger community, the impulse to bear witness materializes in the literature of trauma.  
Noting that “survival literature” tends to appear at least ten years after the traumatic 
experience occurs, Tal argues: 
 As the years pass and the immediacy of the event fades into 
memory the process of revision begins to occur in the mind of each 
survivor.  The dislocation of trauma, which removed meaning from the 
world, is gradually replaced by new stories about the past that can 
support a rewritten personal myth.  The survivor’s perception of 
community is a crucial element in the shaping of her new myth.55 
In Tal’s description of the rewritten personal myth, however, I hear an echo of 
Andrew Lakoff’s notion of the gradual adjustment of the idea of illness becoming 
defined by that to which it “responds,”—a gradual, constantly cycling adjustment of 
meaning.  However, I also hear questions hearkening back to Elaine Scarry’s 
observations about the difficulty of representing the experience of physical pain.  Tal 
also notes:  
But the task of the traumatized author is an impossible one.  For if the 
goal is to convey the traumatic experience, no second-hand rendering 
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55 Ibid., 125. 
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of it is adequate.  The horrific events that have reshaped the author’s 
construction of reality can only be described in the literature, not 
recreated.  Only the experience of trauma has the traumatizing effect.56  
Taken at face value, this is probably true, to some extent at least, in describing most 
kinds of experiences.  An exceptionally fine writer may be able to craft a story that 
allows the reader to feel as though he or she were there—but, as Scarry notes, there is 
a difference between empathy and knowing.  But what happens when “meaning” is 
partially pre-ordained through a diagnosis?  If, as will be discussed throughout this 
project but especially in Chapter Three, biological psychiatry decrees the suffering 
associated with experiences of madness/mental illness meaningless, then it also 
forecloses the process of political awareness and empowerment through bearing 
witness.  If, however, the suffering or trauma can be aligned with certain practices 
and named, then the seeds of community have been sown.   
 Tal observes, “On a social as well as an individual psychological level, the 
penalty for repression is repetition.”57  To suggest a relationship between suffering as 
it is often felt in madness/mental illness (e.g., anxiety, or post-traumatic stress 
disorder, in which sufferers relive traumatic experiences) and the proverb that those 
who do not learn history are doomed to repeat it is provocative to me.  While perhaps 
not a completely defensible theoretical principle for scholarship, it is an interesting 
idea in considering how political projects based on identity-related issues may want to 
formulate and deploy their arguments and activities, an idea to which I will return in 
the conclusion.   
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 Other feminist scholars dealing with trauma of various kinds have grappled 
with the complex challenges of using the representation of experience as scholarly 
evidence in a way that is both respectful and productive.  Wendy Hesford and Wendy 
Kozol’s essay collection, Haunting Violations: Feminist Criticism and the Crisis of 
the “Real,” focuses on the challenges of teaching about profoundly traumatic events, 
such as rape, in a way that neither re-traumatizes the victim by asking her to relive 
her experience in the retelling of her story, nor erases her perspective altogether by 
requiring positivist, “objective” evidence.  The act of representation thus becomes a 
central focus, and they note: 
Contributors to Haunting Violations are concerned with how subject 
positions are constituted through and within historically located 
discourses.  The emphasis on history stems from the belief that the 
“real is not a fixed essence but a historically formulated epistemology 
that responds to localized needs and expectations.  Much attention is 
therefore paid to the material body, which is one of the most privileged 
sites for the production of reality claims because of the presumption 
that one is one’s body, that identity is expressed through the body.  
Thus definitions of experience and authenticity frequently presume a 
coherence between subjectivity and the material body.  This is most 
apparent at moments of crisis, for pain occurs not in the abstract but on 
or in particular bodies. “Haunting violations” refers to both the 
belatedness of trauma and how representation recasts those 
violations.”58  
What is useful here is the idea that the act of representing a physical experience 
assumes coherence between subjectivity and the material body, and that the act of 
representation “recasts” those relationships.  Recall Scarry’s assertion of the 
incommunicability of pain (which I extrapolate here to include other kinds of bodily 
sensation); recall Tal’s and Lakoff’s assertion of stories gradually changing in the 
telling of them.  What we are left with is a “hot mess,” so to speak—a provocative 
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and intriguing intersection of assumptions and assertions that refuse tidy resolutions 
or conclusions.  Put another way, this constellation of issues (the challenges of 
communicating bodily knowledge, the complicated relationship of body to identity, 
and the way in which that relationship necessarily changes over time in response to a 
multitude of factors), means that using personal experience (especially that in which 
the body figures prominently) as evidence is extremely complex and challenging.  
 Also writing in the context of feminist theory, Joan W. Scott acknowledges 
the necessity and desirability for historians to find ways to incorporate the 
perspectives of those who have traditionally been excluded from history, and the 
utility of the incorporation of such perspectives and narratives of experience.  
However, Scott contends, there are serious problems with the tendency to treat 
experience as uncontestable evidence: 
…The evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor 
of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, 
reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems—those that 
assume the facts of history speak for themselves and, in the case of 
histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or 
established opposition between sexual practices and social 
conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality.  
Histories that document the ‘hidden’ world of homosexuality, for 
example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of 
those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression 
and exploitation. But the project of making experience visible 
precludes the critical examination of the workings of the ideological 
system itself, as categories of representation 
(homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed 
immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean 
and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause. 59 
Scott observes that experience tends to have a “foundational” status in terms of its 
access to authority, by establishing a “prediscursive authority” and “indisputable 
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authenticity,” but that this authenticity is established in a logical action that serves to 
universalize the category of identity and to legitimize the link between the personal 
and the political.  Scott sums up her logic: 
“Subjects are constituted discursively, experience is a linguistic event 
(it doesn’t happen outside established meanings), but neither is it 
confined to a fixed order of meaning.  Since discourse is by definition 
shared, experience is a collective as well as individual.  Experience is a 
subject’s history.  Language is the site of history’s enactment.  
Historical explanation cannot, therefore, separate the two.”60 
Instead, Scott suggests a more “literary” reading of personal experience, one that 
constitutively links the fact of the experience with the telling of it—a suggestion that 
would seem like a curious sort of déjà vu, were it not that “experience” has in fact 
become so uncontestably authoritative.   
 However, the utility of Scott’s point—for my purposes, anyway—lies in her 
identification of the way that the authority of experience has been understood as 
epistemologically transparent, and that the elision of the role of discourse is a 
function of the political work that the evidence of experience must do.  Disability 
studies, like the women’s studies project of which Scott writes, has an investment in 
establishing the authority of experience as incontrovertible evidence, and like Scott, I 
am concerned that the political utility is allowing a lack of interrogation of the terms 
under which the evidence of experience comes into being.  Although it is tempting to 
allow what could be described as a lack of rigor to pass undisturbed in the service of 
an undeniably well-intentioned project, to do so ultimately reduces the intellectual 
integrity of the project and, for those comfortable enough with postmodernism to be 
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untroubled by this as an ethical issue, can also produce unintended consequences with 
potentially deleterious effects for disability studies.   
Disability Studies 
 
 The third major body of literature that informs this project is disability studies, 
which can be defined officially as scholarship concerned with the explication of 
dis/ability and non/normative bodies as a category of analysis alongside gender, race, 
etc.  Equally important to a functioning definition, however, is understanding the 
pronounced activist motivation behind much of the enterprise, a feature certainly 
evident within the formal scholarship but which reveals itself best in the textures of 
informal conversations and discussions in the hallways at the Society for Disability 
Studies annual conference.61  This makes for something of a difference between the 
scholarship of disability studies—which I see, generally speaking, as larger and more 
inclusive of studies of illness, and often written by scholars (e.g., Sontag) who have 
not explicitly identified themselves as disabled or part of a disability studies 
community—and the disability studies project, which tends to operate, politically 
speaking, in much smaller circles and have a much more explicitly activist agenda.62   
 There is certainly much common ground, but there are intellectual differences 
as well, primarily attributable to the activist agenda.  For example, Sander Gilman 
prefaced Difference and Pathology, which could be understood as one of the early 
works in the scholarship of disability studies, with an observation that “every group 
has laws, taboos, and diagnoses distinguishing the ‘healthy’ from the “sick.  The very 
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concept of pathology is a line drawn between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad.’”63  Gilman 
sought to explain how stereotypes of particular kinds of sexuality and race become 
associated with or understood as pathological. While Gilman clearly has an 
investment in examining injustice, the study is better described as an intellectual 
history of the process by which these kinds of categories are constructed and 
reproduced.  In contrast, Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability, 
written by an equally fine historian, Paul Longmore (and lavishly praised on the back 
cover by Gilman), is built around an argument that scholars have an ethical obligation 
to perform scholarship explicitly in support of social justice activities, culminating in 
an essay describing a protest in which Longmore burned his own tenure book.64 
 There is a small body of (contemporary) work that is explicitly concerned 
with handling issues of madness/mental illness in a disability studies project 
framework.65   Stuart A. Kirk and Herb Kutchins co-authored two early examples of 
studies on the expansion of psychiatric authority.  The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric 
of Science in Psychiatry, published in 1992, is a compelling study of how the 
administrative need to measure and code the diagnostic categories of mental illness 
shaped the DSM.66   While it remains a very clear explanation of how standardization 
in diagnosis has replaced individual autonomy in assessment, it is also dated 
inasmuch as it represents a 1970’s antipsychiatry mindset and does not really engage 
                                                 
63 Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness, 23. 
64 Paul K. Longmore, Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability, American Subjects 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
65 There are a good many other interesting and useful studies on the topic of madness/mental illness 
that do not take an explicitly disability studies-style approach.  However, because it is the urgency and 
the coherence of the activist disability studies agenda that really shaped this inquiry, it is appropriate to 
recognize the contours of the field and not reproduce associations simply by subject matter. 
66 Stuart A. Kirk and Herb Kutchins, The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of Science in Psychiatry (New 
York: A. de Gruyter, 1992). 
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the biological psychiatry that has become the standard today.  The pair again analyze 
the psychiatric authority in their 1997 Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible 
and the Creation of Mental Disorders, and in this volume focus on the ways in which 
diagnostic criteria work to expand the category of mental illness along the lines of 
normative identity, e.g., particularly for women, people of color, non-heterosexual 
people, etc.67  The central argument of the book is that the pathologization of 
behavior mirrors certain demographic positions—true enough, but again feeling 
somewhat dated because the argument is rooted in a very civil rights era-style 
assumption that the mere identification of such inequities is adequate to spur action. 
 In 2000, Dwight Fee’s edited collection of essays, Pathology and the 
Postmodern: Mental Illness as Discourse and Experience, explicitly engaged the 
difficulties of pursuing postmodern conceptualizations of madness as hegemonic 
oppression in the face of the (modernist?) practical problems of illness.  Although the 
essays are somewhat uneven, Fee’s examination of Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac 
Nation (which I too will discuss in Chapter Four) is a serious engagement with the 
ontology of depression.68  Fee also identifies the difficulties of constructing personal 
stories in a context in which expectations of what such stories should look like have 
already been established, and discusses this in terms of the problem of reflexivity.  
Likewise, in another essay, Vivien Burr and Trevor Butt consider the 
“pathologization of everyday life,” specifically with the “psychologization” inherent 
in the process.  Burr and Butt are interested in defending the potential usefulness of 
                                                 
67 Herb Kutchins and Stuart A. Kirk, Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation 
of Mental Disorders (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
68 Dwight Fee, "The Project of Pathology: Reflexivity and Depression in Elizabeth Wurtzel's Prozac 
Nation," in Pathology and the Postmodern: Mental Illness as Discourse and Experience, ed. Dwight 
Fee (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2000). 
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therapeutic practices against what they believe a strictly Foucauldian social 
constructionist perspective would require, namely that the “psy-complex” (of 
psychology, psychiatry, etc.) as be understood exclusively as a disciplinary project.  
As neither psychology nor psychiatry seem to be in any danger of imminent eclipse 
by social constructionism, their concern may be overstated, but their insight that the 
problems of everyday life are increasingly pathologized at an individual level is 
important.  Burr and Butt argue: 
“We are now used to feeling and expressing doubt about our 
performance as parents, as lovers, as workers, and we scrutinize our 
thoughts and feelings for signs of some developmental flaw, 
perversion, or personal inadequacy.  …An important feature of this 
process of pathologizing is its inherent ‘psychologization’—that is, the 
casting of difficulties and problems into psychological frameworks and 
therefore locating them at the level of the individual.”69   
Overall, the volume represented one of the first efforts to try to engage a disability 
studies project-type approach to mental illness. Although the volume seems to have 
faded from view a bit, to my mind it remains an important collection because it 
seriously engaged (and then ultimately illustrated) some of the problems with trying 
to approach madness/mental illness in the same ways as physical disabilities, e.g., the 
difficulty in simply identifying the “problem” as socially constructed, because it 
demonstrated that this kind of approach would be plagued by problems of defining 
the “real.”70   
                                                 
69 Trevor  Butt and Vivien Burr, "Psychological Distress and Postmodern Thought," in Pathology and 
the Postmodern: Mental Illness as Discourse and Experience, ed. Dwight Fee (London; Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2000), 186. 
70 Of course I do not mean to imply that “socially constructed” problems are not “real.”  But there are 
some kinds of problems (stairs, for instance) that have fairly simple solutions (requiring wheelchair 
ramps).  In contrast, the phenomena of madness/mental illness can cause difficulties for those who 
experience them that are far more difficult to reject exclusively as prejudiced and discriminatory. 
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 Emily Martin’s 2007 Bipolar Expeditions examines mania as a component 
both of bipolar disorder (formerly known as manic-depressive disorder) and 
contemporary culture in general.71  She argues that mania, though as significant a 
component of bipolar disorder as depression, has a dramatically different cultural 
meaning.  Martin argues that mania is closely associated with ideas of financial and 
personal success—i.e., sleeping very little, thinking at a breakneck speed, and having 
grandiose ideas are considered desirable traits in corporate executives—and that such 
behaviors (and a manic style) are actively cultivated as desirable characteristics. She 
notes:  
“Peter Kramer warns us not to romanticize depression as a form of 
‘heroic melancholy,’ but instead treat it as a disease we can cure.  …I 
want to call attention to the socially based reasons why we want to 
eliminate some moods but keep others.  Kramer exempts mania and 
hypomania from elimination because ‘they drive productivity in many 
fields.”  Once again, mania is valuable because of its association with 
motivation and productivity.”72 
Whereas depression is pathologized precisely because its features typically make it an 
undesirable characteristic in a capitalist society, Martin argues that mania is valued 
precisely because of its support of capitalist culture. 
 Martin’s examination of mania’s “good reputation” in cultural terms provides 
a compelling (and refreshing) counterpoint to the usual argument that  X, Y, or Z set 
of characteristics is pathologized through systematic and intentional discrimination.   
The characterization of mania as a “style,” the evidence of the cultural preference for 
manic behavior, and the description of the substantial lengths to which people must 
                                                 
71 Emily Martin, Bipolar Expeditions: Mania and Depression in American Culture (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
72 Ibid., 190.  Martin cites Peter D. Kramer, "There's Nothing Deep About Depression," New York 
Times Magazine, April 17 2005. 
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go to maintain firm distinctions between the “healthy” and the “sick” certainly serves 
as compelling evidence that this medical diagnostic category is deeply informed by 
cultural and capitalist values.  But it also is a useful reminder that sometimes a 
reverse direction—in this case, looking at what considered “healthy” in cultural 
terms—is just as useful in establishing the contours of what is considered “sick.” 
 One of Martin’s most methodologically useful insights is in how people who 
have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder themselves use the medical discourse—or 
don’t.  She was surprised and disappointed to find that many of the individuals she 
met in bipolar support groups used “standard medical terms without further 
elaboration, frustrating my hopes of finding a rich, individually and culturally 
nuanced language about interior states.”73  Eventually Martin realized that people 
were not describing their emotional states experientially but rather drawing from the 
conventional discourse.  She realized that “the pervasive use of the DSM categories 
might work to prevent people from realizing the social importance of exploring their 
inner states”—and, one might add, the importance of seeing their diagnosis as 
culturally constructed.74 
A chart on a Web site published by Jinnah Mohammed includes large 
amounts of information about his particular life, undercutting the 
depersonalized and abstract qualities of most charts.  The more 
specific his information is, the less readily it can be reduced to a 
number and compared to information from others.  Jinnah’s chart also 
separates measures of mood from measures of functionality, opening 
multiple axes on which he can compare different aspects of his 
condition.  The additional axis has the potential to increase the 
surveillance over Jinnah’s life, but at the same time it opens the 
possibility of challenging how standard DSM categories link moods 
and productivity.  In the DSM, moods on either end of the manic 
depression scale are abnormal.  By charting functionality as well as 
                                                 




moods, Jinnah discovers that he can be functional while his moods are 
abnormal, thus opening the possibility that he could reject the DSM’s 
assumptions.  However, he does not go this way.  Instead, he 
concludes that he is never normal: “I have used the charts to show my 
family that when they thought I was normal (i.e., functional), I wasn’t 
emotionally stable.  It came as quite a shock to them often because 
they couldn’t detect anything wrong with me… [The chart allowed 
me] to realize I had no periods of normality.”75 
The idea of the existence of a hegemonic discourse that prevents alternate 
interpretations is nothing new, but Martin makes a very helpful contribution in 
recording her surprise, clarifying the expectation that interior states would be 
described experientially and in terms that would provide a discursive resistance.  
Martin’s surprise at Jinnah Mohammed’s chart is also interesting; her expectation is 
that his chart would provide a space of discursive resistance by challenging the 
assumption that mood and functionality are parallel.  She sees his response as a 
failure to resist the DSM’s assumptions.  Within the context of a disability studies 
sensibility, this is certainly a reasonable argument to make, but I think it exposes a 
tendency among those inculturated in disability studies (and its counterparts in other 
social justice projects) to see things in terms of a binary of the authoritative discourse 
or resistance to it.  I would instead propose that Jinnah’s chart be seen as a site in 
which the meanings of “normal” (and “pathological”) are in contest, but also one in 
which “authority” and “resistance” are in play. 
 Moving beyond madness/mental illness to illness more generally, Lisa 
Diedrich also explores ways in which our understanding of the “experience” of illness 
becomes indistinguishable from the narrative in which it is represented.  Diedrich’s 
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Treatments, which teases apart the differences between experience, identity and 
representation, questions how memoirs, specifically autobiographical and 
biographical accounts of illness, are read, and how those readings become common 
cultural meanings.  Diedrich explicates several illness narratives in considerable 
detail and identifies ways in which specific narratives reinforce or complicate the idea 
of the (singular) “experience of illness” by examining how such experiences are also 
shaped by race, class, gender, and sexuality.  Overall, Diedrich is concerned with the 
ways in which the narrative boundaries between “illness” and “the rest of life” 
become blurred. However, one particular example effectively illuminates the gist of 
her insight and argument.  She describes critic Arlene Croce’s emphatic 
condemnation of Bill T. Jones’s dance piece on the subject of AIDS, Still/Here, 
which she refers to disparagingly as “victim art.”  Diedrich notes that Croce slips 
from talking about reviewing a performance into talking (literally) about reviewing a 
person.   Diedrich contends that this slippage is revealing of at least one way in which 
meanings can be compressed in the mind of the reader, so to speak.  She argues that 
the slippage shows the layers of illness, identity, and a particular form of 
representation being compressed into one entity, at least in Croce’s mind.   
 Diedrich provides compelling arguments for complicating the cultural and 
literary expectations of what an “illness narrative” should look like.  Her purpose is to 
identify and map the meanings of illness inscribed by the authors of illness 
narratives—something suggestive and yet distinctly different from identifying and 
mapping the meanings that readers take from them.  Diedrich’s explication of how 
illness narratives could be read in a more complicated way is helpful, yet is also 
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distinctly limited.  Diedrich certainly presents compelling evidence for the idea of an 
illness narrative form to be understood as perpetuating itself even as its authors 
complicate what we can understand illness to be.  However, aside from the 
Croce/Jones example, without getting outside the world of the illness narrative, she 
can offer little evidence of how these narratives shape larger cultural forces.   
 Other important work in the scholarship of disability studies has focused on 
the meaning of illness, and specific cultural meanings of specific illnesses.  Susan 
Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors, which is often praised for 
unpacking the accusatory subtext of medical discourse, also suggested to me that if 
illnesses could have specific kinds of metaphors that worked to give the illness 
specific kinds of cultural meanings, then perhaps all discourses about illness would be 
constrained in these ways as well, regardless of the intent of the writer.76  For 
instance, to use an example outside of medicine: practically no American reader 
could read a novel that uses the date of September 11, for any reason (for a first kiss, 
the day a cure for cancer is discovered, for any event, no matter how wonderful) 
without making some sort of reference to the events of September 11, 2001—even if 
the novel predated 2001.  September 11 might be seen as being used in “reverse,” in 
an intentional effort to replace the meaning of the date, but it will not be free from the 
association for a very long time.    
 Annemarie Mol uses a similar tactic in the “pivoting” of the meaning of 
illness in her ethnographic study of the meanings of atherosclerosis in a Dutch 
university hospital.  Alongside her ethnography of patients, doctors and others, she 
includes a parallel meditation on relevant scholarly work, an approach that while 
                                                 
76 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor; and, AIDS and Its Metaphors (New York: Picador USA, 1990). 
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distracting to read is interesting for the ways in which it interrupts one’s line of 
thought in productive ways.  Mol’s contribution, as pertains to this project, is a short 
discussion about the idea of distinguishing the “normal” and the “pathological,” in 
which she reviews the relevant scholarly literature that documents a shift away from a 
“where does it hurt?” framework to a “what is your problem?” framework, meaning 
that the patient has become a participant in the identification of pathology inasmuch 
as only the patient can articulate whether a particular phenomenon is a problem in the 
context of the patient’s life, clearly a completely subjective assessment.77  Mol 
concludes that this shift does not replace but rather coexists with previous 
conceptions of pathology, which were based on both quantitative deviance and 
qualitative judgments.  This is not a lengthy meditation, and it is perhaps too general 
to interrogate very seriously, but the differences in the ways that pathology is 
constituted in atherosclerosis vs. madness/mental illness are interesting.78   
 While several scholars, most notably Georges Canguilhem and Lennard 
Davis, have discussed the relationship between the notions of statistical deviance and 
pathology, the most recent and most comprehensive major study on how notions of 
difference and pathology became so embedded in a pseudo-scientific discourse was 
done by Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell in Cultural Locations of Disability, 
published in 2006.79   One of the central arguments in this study of eugenics is that 
talking about disability in terms of a social model is inadequate because it fails to 
                                                 
77 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Science and Cultural Theory 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 120-28.  
78 On the one hand, biological psychiatry could be seen to contest this shift as it places authority with 
the doctor to treat a biological illness; on the other, the pathologizing of everyday life discussed 
elsewhere could be argued to be as much a “bottom-up” phenomenon as a “top down” phenomenon. 
79 Snyder and Mitchell, Cultural Locations of Disability. 
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address the ways in which the idea of disability is produced and constructed not only 
through discursive practices of documentation and surveillance but also through 
medical practices such as sterilization and other kinds of “public hygiene” activities.  
What is particularly relevant to this project is their nuanced treatment of how 
comprehensively eugenics-based thinking became embedded in “scientific” practice 
and naturalized; it is useful to consider in reference to the ways in which 
madness/mental illness is pathologized through biological psychiatry now.  It also 
represents the kind of engagement with “science”—albeit an engagement with a 
specific historical moment—that I have argued is so essential to a vibrant humanities 
project.  
 Obviously, this study engages disability studies very broadly and engages 
scholarly conversations beyond those specifically described in this chapter.  Among 
these, there are several studies that stand out as important texts in shaping the field of 
disability studies as I understand it, including (in chronological order): Disability 
Studies Reader, edited by Lennard Davis (1997); Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring 
Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature, by Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson (1997); Diagnosis: Difference: The Moral Authority of Medicine, by Abby 
Wilkerson (1998); The New Disability History: American Perspectives, edited by 
Paul Longmore and Lauri Umanski (2001); Disability Studies: Enabling the 
Humanities, edited by Sharon Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann and Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson (2002); Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability, 
by Robert McRuer (2003); and Desiring Disability: Queer Theory Meets Disability 
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Studies (special issue of GLQ), edited by Robert McRuer and Abby Wilkerson 
(2003).80 
                                                 
80 Davis, ed., The Disability Studies Reader, Longmore and Umansky, The New Disability History: 
American Perspectives, McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability, Robert 
McRuer and Abby L. Wilkerson, "Desiring Disability: Queer Theory Meets Disability Studies," GLQ: 
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies (special edition) 9, no. 1-2 (2003), Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo 
Brueggemann, and Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities (New 
York: Modern Language Association of America, 2002), Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: 
Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature, Abby L. Wilkerson, Diagnosis: 
Difference: The Moral Authority of Medicine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 58 
 
Chapter 3: Depression and the Instability of Pathology 
How many legs does a dog have, if you call the tail a leg?  Four.  
Calling the tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg. – Abraham Lincoln* 
 
[*Note: Lincoln never said this.  He liked a similar, more long-winded 
anecdote about a cow, but the dog version?  Nope.  Still, the quote is 
credited to Abe on some 11,000 different Web pages, including quote 
resources Brainy Quote and World of Quotes…] 
 
 - From a feature story about truth in The Washington Post81 
 
 In 1621, Robert Burton first published The Anatomy of Melancholy, under the 
pseudonym Democritus Junior and with the impressive full title of The Anatomy of 
Melancholy, What it is: With all the Kinds, Causes, Symptomes, Prognostickes, and 
Several Cures of it. In Three Maine Partitions with their several Sections, Members, 
and Subsections. Philosophically, Medicinally, Historically, Opened and Cut Up.  
Burton’s purpose was nearly as ambitious as his title; he sought to understand 
melancholy, and to figure out how control might be regained over an unruly mind and 
soul.  He portrays melancholy as an surreptitious misery, one which gradually seeps 
into all aspects of his consciousness, displacing all other thoughts and feelings.  
Burton’s description of melancholy is surprisingly similar to contemporary 
descriptions of the experiences of depression: 
…When I lie waking all alone, 
Recounting what I have ill done, 
My thoughts on me then tyrannise, 
Fear and sorrow me surprise, 
                                                 
81  Monica Hesse, "Truth: Can You Handle It?  Better Yet: Do You Know It When You See It?" The 
Washington Post, April 25 2008. 
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Whether I tarry still or go, 
Methinks the time moves very slow.82 
Burton’s references to insomnia (“waking all alone”), feelings of worthlessness or 
guilt (“things ill done”), depressed mood (“fear and sorrow”) and a loss of interest or 
pleasure (“the time moves very slow”), if experienced frequently enough, would be 
quite sufficient to earn him a diagnosis of depression by the current DSM criteria for 
depression (cited in their entirety later in this chapter).  Yet the melancholy of which 
Burton wrote is not entirely interchangeable with the contemporary concept of 
depression as a biological illness.  Burton’s melancholy was surely an affliction, but it 
was not so clearly an “illness”—nor Burton so clearly a “doctor” in the contemporary 
sense of the term either, for that matter, as he was a scholar and cleric who held the 
post of librarian at Christ’s Church College, Oxford.  Rather, Burton’s melancholy 
might be better thought of as one of the “wicked problems” of his day, suitable for 
contemplation using the entire range of intellectual tools available.  Philosopher 
Jennifer Radden, who compiled an anthology of writings on melancholia covering a 
time span of more than two thousand years, notes that “The subject of melancholy in 
Western traditions is one whose appeal reaches well beyond any particular 
disciplinary division, and indeed, the study of melancholy long antecedes the study of 
such disciplinary boundaries.”83  
 Melancholy might be thought of as a “wicked problem” in this study, too, as it 
poses a thorny question.  Burton’s description of melancholy remains immediately 
                                                 
82Robert Burton, "The Author's Abstract of Melancholy," in The Anatomy of Melancholy (New York: 
New York Review Books, 2001).   
83 Jennifer Radden, Moody Minds Distempered: Essays on Melancholy and Depression (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Jennifer Radden, The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to 
Kristeva (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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recognizable, but it is not the same; context, meaning, nearly everything is different, 
just as “melancholy” was a substantively different thing to Galen, Avicenna, and 
Burton. Yet to insist on examining “melancholy” and “depression” only in historical 
specificity is to miss the intellectual opportunity to take a longer view of a vexing 
kind of human experience, and effectively to limit the imagination of “depression” to 
the current conceptualization of the experience as purely a disease.  As will be 
discussed extensively in the following chapter, there really is no active practice in re-
imagining the pathology of depression in the contemporary disability rights/disability 
studies project; instead, activities have focused primarily on providing 
accommodations (such as flexible work hours) and access to services. 
 Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to try to imagine what a more productive 
overall view of the experience of depression might look like.  The reimagining of 
physical disability as part of the spectrum of human variation has yielded not only a 
promising approach in terms of social justice concerns, but has also spawned some 
extremely interesting, to my mind at least, studies in intellectual history.84  This 
chapter is a “what happens if…” experiment in trying on a model of depression that 
de-pathologizes the experience; it seeks to determine whether de-pathologizing 
depression might be a viable goal or strategy for the disability rights/disability studies 
project, and it seeks to determine what sorts of epistemological insights, if any, might 
be gained in doing so. 
                                                 
84 For instance, see Lennard Davis’ discussion of the manipulation of statistics to reflect judgment.   
Lennard J. Davis, "Constructing Normalcy:  The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention of the 
Disabled Body in the Nineteenth Century," in The Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis 
(New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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 However, it isn’t easy to re-imagine an idea as deeply ingrained as the model 
of depression-as-illness.  For help,  I turn to Avery Gordon’s twin concepts of 
“haunting” and of  “complex personhood,” which she uses to describe both lingering 
traces of historical forces and social figures and the continuing effects of their 
influences in the production of knowledge.85  Gordon’s concept of haunting is similar 
to King’s notion of “lacquered layerings,” in that both ideas are ways of trying to deal 
with complexity and the simultaneous presence of consistency and contradiction.  
Gordon’s description of complex personhood is useful as a way of imagining 
lacquered layerings in a dynamic form, as an active process in the experience and 
representation of a person’s life.  Gordon states: 
Complex personhood means that all people (albeit in specific forms 
whose specificity is sometimes everything) remember and forget, are 
beset by contradiction, and recognize and misrecognize themselves 
and others.  Complex personhood means that people suffer graciously 
and selfishly too, get stuck in the symptoms of their troubles, and also 
transform themselves.  Complex personhood means that even those 
called “Other” are never never that.  Complex personhood means that 
the stories that people tell about themselves, about their troubles, about 
their social worlds, and about society’s problems are entangled and 
weave between what is immediately available as a story and what their 
imaginations are reaching toward…  Complex personhood means that 
even those who haunt our dominant institutions and their systems of 
value are haunted too by things they sometimes have names for and 
sometimes do not.  At the very least, complex personhood is about 
conferring respect on others that comes from presuming that life and 
people’s lives are simultaneously straightforward and full of 
enormously subtle meaning.86   
Complex personhood inspires my use of the term “depression” in this chapter despite 
its linguistic ambiguity because the most often suggested alternative—
“melancholy”—feels too mild and too removed in its contemporary usage, and too 
                                                 
85 Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
86 Ibid., 4-5. 
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hard to imagine as being the same kind of experience.  “Melancholy” is complicated, 
not only because is it many different things in historical context, but also because the 
word lingers on today with a peculiarly anachronistic flavor, e.g., it conjures up 
images of heartbroken heroines in movies based on Jane Austen novels.  Equally, 
however, I have tried to replace the word “depression” with the phrase “the 
experience of depression” to try to detach it from the objectifying clinical perspective 
and resituate its primacy as an experience constituted through a variety of factors.  
Where I have used the word on its own, it should be understood to refer to the broader 
sense of the term except where it is explicitly or contextually indicating the narrow, 
clinical sense. Such complications exist at every stage of the process of knowledge 
production: there are conflicts in the conception and representation of the experience 
by the person who experiences it, in the valuation of the experience by others, and in 
the (presumptive or consequent) placement of the experience in one philosophical 
framework or another.87 
 Overall, for my purposes, “complex personhood” offers a provisional 
methodology that will allow me to discuss the experience of depression as an entity 
that exists reasonably consistently across different cultural contexts, yet also in 
historical specificity.  Its ability to “create” a kind of depression/melancholia that can 
exist reasonably consistently across different cultural contexts is important, because it 
allows a comparison of different cultural meanings in the different contexts, and that 
comparison of different cultural meanings forms the focus for this chapter. 
                                                 
87 Throughout this chapter, I often refer to “the experience of depression” in the singular.  This 
linguistic construction is in no way intended to erase differences in experience relating to differences 
in social location. 
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 Specifically, this chapter will establish a conversation between two trade press 
nonfiction books with opposing views on the meaning of depression: Peter D. 
Kramer’s Against Depression and Joshua Wolf Shenk’s Lincoln’s Melancholy: How 
Depression Challenged a President and Fueled His Greatness.88  I have chosen these 
two volumes as representatives not because they are the most typical, but because 
they are very clear embodiments of their respective theoretical approaches, and make 
the intellectual architecture easily visible.   Against Depression represents the medical 
model of depression as a biological illness, the dominant understanding of depression 
in both the general public.  Lincoln’s Melancholy, while not necessarily written and 
certainly not marketed explicitly as part of the explicit disability studies project, is 
consistent with praxis often found in (physical) disability studies and represents a 
cultural studies approach that envisions the phenomenon as inherently shaped by its 
historical, social and cultural contexts.  
 I have chosen volumes that are easily available in bookstores, are aimed at an 
educated general public, and were at the time of publication reasonably visible.  Both 
volumes were published by major trade presses (Against Depression by Viking and 
Lincoln’s Melancholy by Houghton-Mifflin) in 2005, and both have received 
considerable mainstream media attention in the form of reviews, newspaper articles 
and author interviews. Kramer’s 1993 book, Listening to Prozac, was successful and 
well-known, and he now hosts a weekly public radio show, The Infinite Mind.89  
Although Shenk is less well known, Lincoln is a popular subject matter and Lincoln’s 
                                                 
88 Peter D. Kramer, Against Depression (New York: Viking, 2005), Joshua Wolf Shenk, Lincoln's 
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Melancholy has also received considerable mainstream media attention, including the 
2005 notable book lists of the New York Times and Washington Post, a slew of 
reviews, and an interview on NPR’s All Things Considered.90  Shenk has taught 
writing at Washington College in Chestertown, MD, the New School, and New York 
University, but is primarily a professional journalist and essayist, whose articles have 
appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, Harper's Magazine, and The New York Times.  He 
has also held writing or editing positions at U.S. News & World Report, The 
Economist, The Washington Monthly, and The New Republic. 
 In addition to the potential value of a model for de-pathologizing depression 
(and mental illness in general), I believe there is also value in examining the 
circumstances that have led to the question of the judgment of pathology becoming 
such a central one in characterizing the experience of depression.  In part, this 
question foreshadows my examination in Chapter 5 of the substantial effort invested 
in delineating the “medical professional” from the “patient” in the context of another 
phenomenon classed as pathological, Gender Identity Disorder. But this is also a 
question about what disability studies as a field has chosen to engage, or not.  Thus 
far, disability studies has largely avoided both the subject of madness/mental illness 
and the conceptual problem of suffering.  It may be that this particular gap currently 
exists because disability studies is such a new field, and scholars may be reluctant to 
argue amongst each other when there is so much work to do in areas of general 
consensus.  Given the many other obstacles that lay in the path of both the field and 
                                                 
90 Joshua Wolf Shenk, Website Describing Press Coverage of Lincoln's Melancholy. ([cited June 4 
2007]); available from http://www.lincolnsmelancholy.com/press_articles.html. 
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individual researchers, one could see how a gap could grow as individual researchers 
repeatedly choose other projects equally necessary but far less contentious in nature. 
 Additionally, it should be remembered that the nature of madness/mental 
illness (and in many cases, illness in general) can be quite substantively different 
from other kinds of disabilities, in terms of its relation to medicine and health care 
providers, and this may also account for the scarcity of certain kinds of scholarship 
and activist work.  Some people with disabilities can make a meaningful distinction 
between an impairment such as blindness, for example, and the disability created by 
discrimination and physical environments designed for sighted people.  Others, 
however, may find their situations more ambiguous.  Certainly, people exist who 
disagree with a medicalized understanding of depression as a pathology, yet find 
antidepressants to be useful tools for daily life, as others use reading glasses.  Such 
individuals would obviously find themselves in a more complicated relationship with 
their health care providers than a rigid politics of demedicalization could encompass, 
and this may account for why the occasional activist group that attempts to tackle the 
concept of mental illness as primarily an issue of prejudice and discrimination never 
lasts very long.  
Against Depression 
 
 The first of the two books to be examined, Against Depression, is used here to 
represent the basic premise underlying the “medical model” approach, which 
understands depression as an illness or pathology to be treated.   
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 Against Depression follows Kramer’s 1993 bestseller, Listening to Prozac, in 
which he examines what he terms the “cosmetic psychopharmacology” of Prozac.91  
After treating patients with Prozac for clinical depression, Kramer began to notice 
that in many instances people experienced such dramatic changes in both mood and 
personality that he felt these experiences could be accurately described as 
“transformations.”  As Kramer expands the circle of patients treated with Prozac to 
include those with sub-clinical conditions (e.g., with signs and symptoms of the same 
sort, though not as severe, as those that would qualify for a clinical diagnosis), he 
reflects upon the ethical considerations involved in the use of drugs to make 
somebody “better than well.”  He notes: 
Psychotherapeutic medication is both instructive and problematic for a 
liberal society.  It leads us to focus on biological difference, whereas 
for years our culture has chosen to biologically based characteristics 
that, in Carl Degler’s words, ‘might serve as an obstacle to an 
individual’s self-realization.’ Emphasis on temperament could be 
divisive and oppressive, if a culture too strongly favors one 
temperament over another—traditionally masculine over traditionally 
feminine traits, for example.  Or awareness of temperament can be 
inspiring, leading perhaps to efforts to minimize psychological harm to 
children, or to foster a social environment welcoming to 
constitutionally diverse adults.92 
Although most of Kramer’s concerns about the use of Prozac to effect personality 
changes have to do with the potential to rob humanity of what is “uniquely human: 
anxiety, guilt, shame, grief, self-consciousness,” he concludes that constitutional 
differences have a biological base.93 
 Kramer opens his 2005 Against Depression by noting the exponential growth 
of depression memoirs since the publication of Listening to Prozac in 1993.  As a 
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popular authority on the subject, Kramer is often asked to read the manuscripts and is 
impressed by the variety of individuals who have penned such “autopathographies.”  
Kramer notes, “There were accounts by sexually depleted depressives, promiscuous 
depressives, urban single mothers, small-town family men, femmes fatales, gay 
lotharios, celebrities, journalists, ministers, and psychologists.”94  Although pleased, 
as a psychiatrist, “to see a mental illness shed some of its stigma,” Kramer notices 
that “despite the superficial variety, the memoirs of depression struck me as 
surprisingly uniform.”   
 Although the accounts would nominally frame depression as an illness and 
advise depressed readers to seek treatment, he also noticed a tendency to attribute an 
ennobling character to depression, “as if affliction with depression might after all be 
more enriching than, say, a painful and discouraging encounter with kidney failure.”95  
He acknowledges that different perspectives on depression do allow placing a 
positive value on the experience, (such as a “left wing” perspective which views it as 
a moral distancing from the culture, “minimalism in contrast to mercantilism,” or a 
“right wing” perspective that views it as a character-building enterprise to tough it 
out), but is disturbed that he also sees traces of a positive valuation of depression 
creep into memoirs and professional thought.  The conflict seemed particularly 
obvious when he attended a professional conference and listened to a psychoanalyst’s 
presentation: 
 He described his treatment of a middle-aged patient who had come 
for help with depression that had arisen out of the blue.  The main 
features were leaden paralysis, obsessive self-doubt, and low self-
regard.  The analyst had the impression that for the whole of his life, 
                                                 




the patient had been self-centered, blandly confident, and lacking in 
insight.  So the doctor allowed the episode to continue.  He hoped that 
the loss of confidence in particular would motivate the patient to 
engage in a psychotherapy that would make inroads against the 
narcissism. 
 I might once have considered this presentation unremarkable—an 
example of a psychoanalyst ‘optimizing’ a patient’s level of 
discomfort in the service of a process of self-exploration.  But now—
with my own patients’ mood disorders so clearly in mind—I was 
seething.  Is there another disease with which a doctor would make 
this choice?  If a patient had cancer or diabetes and seemed 
psychologically the better for it—humbled, taken down a notch—still, 
we would treat the condition vigorously.  Nor would a comparable 
argument, to let the syndrome be, arise in a discussion of other mental 
illnesses, such as anorexia or paranoia. 
 I found myself thinking about the particulars of depression in this 
patient, the one who turned to the psychoanalyst for help.  What do we 
make of its unexplained appearance at midlife in a previously 
confident man?  Perhaps the mood disorder resulted from a specific 
medical condition, outside the brain.  Anemia can cause depression.  If 
it did here, would the analyst tolerate a blood disorder, to provide the 
benefit of low self-worth?  If the patient recovered spontaneously, 
might the doctor recommend therapeutic bloodletting?  The thought 
was an angry one, I knew but I was familiar enough with the brutality 
of depression to feel riled by the pride the speaker took in his choice, 
to let the patient flounder.96 
This anecdote effectively captures Kramer’s central argument in a nutshell: any 
lingering ideas that depression is an indicator of special sensitivity or provides 
particular insight should be ferreted out and obliterated, because depression is a 
bodily disease like any other, and should be treated as such. 
 Kramer divides the book into three sections, “What It Is to Us,” “What It Is,” 
and “What it Will Be,” to emphasize the disjuncture he sees between cultural 
understandings of depression and scientific evidence, and emphasizing a “modernist” 
sort of certainty that there is a distinct and absolute difference between what we think 
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depression is and what it really is.  However, Kramer’s argument doesn’t correspond 
to this structure past the major divisions, and chapters appear to be arranged more 
with an eye to rhythm and illustration than structure per se. As a result, my 
examination of his argument will remain at the level of the major structure. 
 Kramer contends that “What It Is to Us” is a virtue born of necessity.  Two 
stories form the core argument of the section.  One centers on his patient Margaret, 
whom he treated for depression with medication and therapy.  Her therapy explored 
personal relationships and career issues with which she expressed dissatisfaction or 
unhappiness, in accordance with his training in “depth therapies” or resolving 
unconscious conflicts.97  Margaret suddenly (and somewhat inexplicably) emerged 
from her depression, and, as a healthy individual, was a person quite unlike the one 
Kramer knew when she was depressed.  The feelings she reported during the therapy 
were not really hers, she asserted; they belonged to the illness, and they were largely 
foreign to the healthy Margaret, who chastised Kramer for not recognizing the 
difference between Margaret’s “real” feelings and the depression.   Kramer takes 
from this a lesson to be careful in assuming the significance of negative feelings. 
 Superficially, depression sometimes resembles passion, strong 
emotion that stands in opposition to the corrupt world.  This 
impression can arise from the solidity of the symptoms; depression 
looks like a sit-down strike.  Or it can arise from depressives’ tendency 
to act impulsively.  Who would puncture her arms but a woman of 
passion?  In truth, the puncturing is an attempt to feel anything at all.  
Depression is passion’s absence.   
 Simply to name emotions—you feel such guilt—is to lend them 
legitimacy.  With Margaret, in employing the most basic elements of 
therapy—empathy, tentative interpretation, the search for meaning—I 
had in effect sided with the illness and against the person Margaret 
was in health.  The feelings I had underscored for Margaret were 
foreign to her.  She experienced them, she reported them, but there is a 
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sense in which they were not hers. 
 I don’t mean to exaggerate my doubts over Margaret’s treatment.  
The episode of depression we worked on together ended more quickly, 
and with less destruction in its wake, than the one that preceded it.  I 
was open to the possibility that I had done Margaret some good.  I am 
pointing to one of many experiences that convinced me, cumulatively, 
on an intimate basis, that depression is best understood as disease, for 
good and all.98 
 The second story concerns a question he was oftenasked, in a variety of 
contexts and with different examples—“What if Prozac had been available in Van 
Gogh’s time?  Or Kierkegaard’s?”  In response, Kramer reverses the question:  
”So? What if it had?”  He argues that “depth” and “depression” have become so 
closely associated in the public imagination that it is difficult for people to imagine 
creativity without despair, but that this represents a failure in imagination rather than 
an inseparable bond.  As a consequence, he argues, depression can have a certain 
“charm,” and recounts the stories of several patients for whom depression represented 
the allure and possibility of the tortured artist, or the mystery of a lover pursued but 
not quite caught.  Using the example of Sisyphus, Kramer contends that if there is to 
be heroism found in occasions of suffering, it is to be found “because he faces endless 
futility without succumbing to despair.”  
 In the second section, “What It Is,” Kramer argues that recent research 
supports a view of depression as a physical illness.  He summarizes research that 
observes “depression-associated abnormalities in the hippocampus and the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain.  Those regions, along with the amygdala and some others, form a 
circuit that appears to govern the core symptoms of depression, the sadness, 
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hopelessness, lack of energy, and difficulty with memory and concentration.”99  
Kramer draws from the work of a variety of researchers to address questions of 
environmental factors and genetic predisposition—e.g., why not everyone who 
survives a terrible trauma becomes depressed, and why people become depressed who 
have not suffered in a significant way. Whatever the cause or causes, he sees the 
result as being about the same: a problem with a “stuck switch” that leaves an 
individual producing excess stress hormones that cumulatively damage the brain and 
also progressively slow repair functions: 
…chronic stress leads to the production of stress hormones.  Stress 
hormones damage hippocampal (and other) brain cells, isolating them 
and pushing them to the brink of destruction.  Further stressors push 
the cells over the edge.  As damage progresses, feedback systems fail.  
Even minor adversity then causes the overproduction of stress 
hormones.  What would otherwise be limited injuries extend, in the 
presence of stress hormones, into substantial brain damage.  The 
hormones also dampen repair and regeneration functions, so that 
temporary injuries become permanent.100 
Although he acknowledges that the scientific understanding of depression-as-illness 
is still incomplete and as a work in progress will likely change over time, the 
cumulative research is sufficiently compelling to him to close the conceptual gap 
between depressive symptoms and physical illness, at least in practical terms.  
 The final section, “What It Will Be,” reimagines the world when depression 
has been accepted exclusively as a disease, and as a disease for which treatment 
should always be sought.  There is but a single argument advanced, and it is an 
extension of his first: as the existential intrigue and allure of the classical melancholia 
are narrowed down to and replaced with an understanding of depression as a disease, 
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society will have to reevaluate its understanding of insight and of art.  The 
understanding of what constitutes a valuable or insightful discomfort will alter.   
 If we could treat depression reliably, we would have different 
artists, different subjects, different stories, different needs, different 
tastes.  The details—what sort of art and artists—are matters for 
science fiction.  Which is what the whole of this speculation amounts 
to—fantasy intended finally to provide a perspective on the present.  I 
mean mainly to ask why we would not let go of melancholy, and trust 
ourselves with responsive minds and resilient brains.  
 If this fantasy, substituting resilience for depression, remains eerie, 
it may be because the terms of the discussion retain their complex 
connotations. We persist in asking: Seeing cruelty, suffering, and 
death, should a person be depressed?  There are circumstances, like the 
Holocaust, in which depression might seem justified universally, for 
every participant or observer.  Awareness of the ubiquity of horror—
awareness of inhumanity as an aspect of humanity—is the modern 
condition, our condition.101  
To Kramer, the proper conclusion is obvious if not easy: accept depression as no 
more or less than any other illness and seek to eradicate it.  Doing so, he argues, 
carries but one risk that isn’t even really a risk: it might well cost us artistic insight as 
we have known it, but offers the potential of a better form of insight, borne of clearer 
thinking. 
 Against Depression has a simple aim: to push depression onto firmer territory 
as a physical pathology, thereby ensuring more consistent and aggressive treatment 
and alleviating needless suffering.  To Kramer, the problem is that depression is not 
understood as either pathological or physical enough—as an idea, depression remains 
stubbornly and tragically lost in a murky swampland between Culture and Science, 
unable to be seen clearly as an illness because of the lingering associations of 
melancholy and artistic insight.  Situating depression squarely in a more traditional 
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notion of pathology (as demonstrable physical illness) would clearly suggest an 
expanded role in public health efforts and access to certain products and services. 
 Such an approach would likely appeal to those in disability activism who do 
not contest the legitimacy of the assignment of pathology to the experience of 
depression, and conceptualize the appropriate “disability angle” as advocating for 
greater access to mental health care services.   This approach would position 
consumers of mental health services and service providers as allies on the same side 
in the “battle” to “conquer the illness,” to use the most prevalent metaphor.  Although 
this position is not entirely unheard of in disability circles and the inner sanctum of 
the disability studies project, it’s more consistent with the dominant, mainstream 
perspectives of conventional medicine and organizations driven by consumers’ family 
members (e.g., the National Alliance on Mental Illness) rather than those driven by 
consumers.  Such arguments are based in large part on the same theoretical 
assumptions that underlie Kramer’s own argument, the most important of which are 
(1) a modernist understanding of the existence of a universally valid definition and 
taxonomy of depression; (2) an understanding of reliability in the process by which 
knowledge about depression is “discovered;” and (3) a kind of related certainty about 
the valuation of the experience as consistently and reliably pathological.   
 Perspectives more consistent with disability studies would necessarily 
problematize all three assumptions.  Before examining these perspectives in detail, 
however, it is important to bear in mind that medical knowledge is inescapably a 
work in progress. Certainly there are many (important) things that medicine does not 
yet know about depression, yet in practice, doctors must necessarily make do with the 
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knowledge available.  Thus, there is a difference between what should constitute 
proof in a theoretical sense, and medical knowledge in a practical sense.  At best, the 
present understanding of depression-as-pathology constitutes medical knowledge in a 
practical sense, and is largely defined in normative cultural terms.  There is presently 
no blood test, for example, that can diagnose “depression” as a discrete entity in the 
same way that diabetes or cancer can be diagnosed.  As such, the diagnosis is based 
on what one might call contextualized behavioral or experiential criteria.  Because 
obviously most people experience the conditions described below at some time in 
their lives, the point at which a time of distress and unhappiness is transformed into a 
pathological status is necessarily constructed through the context of the criteria: 
• The conditions of depression must occur outside the circumstances when a 
person is normally expected to experience these conditions (i.e., in 
bereavement) 
• The conditions of depression must occur for a longer period or with greater 
severity than is normally expected in periods of distress or unhappiness.   
 
In other words, the point at which the conditions of depression become “symptoms” 
is the point at which they move beyond what is normally expected.  The pathology of 
depression—at least in practical, diagnostic terms—is constructed around an implicit 
understanding of what is normal. 
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Criteria for Major Depressive Episode   
 
A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the 
same 2-week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at 
least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of 
interest or pleasure. 
Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical 
condition, or mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations. 
• depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by 
either subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made 
by others (e.g., appears tearful).  Note: in children and adolescents, 
can be irritable mood. 
• markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, 
activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either 
subjective account or observation made by others) 
• significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a 
change of more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or 
increase in appetite nearly every day.  Note: in children, consider 
failure to make expected weight gains. 
• insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
• psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by 
others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down) 
• fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day 
• feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which 
may be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or 
guilt about being sick) 
• diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly 
every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others) 
• recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying) recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific 
plan for committing suicide 
B. The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode.  
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical 
condition (e.g., hypothyroidism). 
E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, i.e., after 
the loss of a loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or 
are characterized by marked functional impairment, morbid 
preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic 
symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.102 
  
                                                 




The classic critique of the validity of a scientific concept of depression (or any other 
“mental illness”) as a biological illness is Thomas Szasz’ The Myth of Mental Illness: 
Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, originally published in 1961.103  
Szasz, a renegade doctor with strong personal convictions about forced treatment and 
the proper conceptualization of madness/mental illness in general, argued that the 
concept of mental illness, though perhaps intended to be compassionate, is inadequate 
from a scientific perspective because of the lack of appropriate physiological 
evidence and the obvious socio-cultural investments in the formulation of the 
diagnostic criteria.  Instead, Szasz argued that “illness” as a category must remain 
something rooted in the body, i.e., as a physical pathology.   
It is important to understand clearly that modern psychiatry—and the 
identification of new psychiatric diseases—began not by identifying 
such diseases by means of the established methods of pathology, but 
by creating a new criterion of what constitutes disease: to the 
established criterion of detectable alteration of bodily structure was 
now added the fresh criterion of bodily function; and as the former was 
detected by observing a patient’s body, so the latter was detected by 
observing his behavior.  This is how and why conversion hysteria 
became the prototype of this new class of diseases—appropriately 
named “mental” to distinguish them from those that are “organic,” and 
appropriately called also “functional” in contrast to those that are 
“structural.”  Thus, whereas in modern medicine new diseases were 
discovered, in modern psychiatry new diseases were invented.  Paresis 
was proved to be a disease, hysteria was declared to be one.104 
Szasz argued that to talk of “mental illness” was to confuse brain (which could 
become diseased) and mind (which could not).  Thoughts and actions thus could not 
be understood to be themselves pathological.  Not surprisingly, Szasz became 
something of a pariah in mainstream mental health care and a hero to antipsychiatry 
activists.  Psychiatrists (including Kramer) are quick to position him as a radical 
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quack, yet since the publication of The Myth of Mental Illness in 1961, biological 
psychiatry has unquestionably become the dominant approach in the field of 
psychiatry.  (Notably, the critique has rankled mainstream psychiatry enough that 
Kramer still felt the need to argue the point more than fifty years later.)105     
 Szasz’s argument in The Myth of Mental Illness foreshadows much later work 
done on the process of medical classification as a tool of knowledge and power.106   
Szasz identified the construction of the category of “mental illness” as beginning in 
Jean-Martin Charcot’s conceptualization of “hysteria” as a neurological illness.  He 
contended that in its 19th century context, a diagnosis of “hysteria” (as an illness 
producing symptoms out of the patient’s control) probably provided a more 
hospitable future for the individual in question than an accusation of malingering 
(willful refusal to work) and was thus useful as a humanitarian social reform.   By the 
mid-20th century, he contends, such a conceptualization had outlived its humanitarian 
usefulness, and had become instead a compromise of scientific integrity and a 
potential infringement of civil rights by a psychiatric establishment interested in 
protecting its own importance.  Szasz positions the establishment of hysteria as a 
variation of the Emperor’s New Clothes, so that to ask “Who is mentally ill?” will be 
answered by “Those who are confined in mental hospitals or who consult 
psychiatrists in their private offices.” 107  
 Questions of autonomy and agency are at the heart of Szasz’s objections to the 
concept of a behaviorally-based mental illness.  Szasz acknowledged that while  
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It might seem, at first glance, that to advocate, and indeed to insist, 
that an unhappy or troubled person is sick—and that he is sick in 
exactly the same sense and way in which a person suffering from 
cancer is sick—is humane and well-intentioned, as it aims to bestow 
upon such a person the dignity of suffering from a genuine illness over 
which he has no control.  However, there is a hidden weight attached 
to this tactic which pulls the person back into the same sort of 
disrepute from which this semantic and social reclassification was 
intended to rescue him.  Indeed, labeling individuals displaying or 
disabled by problems in living as “mentally ill” has only impeded and 
retarded the recognition of the essentially moral and political nature of 
the phenomena to which psychiatrists address themselves.108  
Szasz referred, of course, to the fact that if pathology was to be understood as 
behavioral, then behavior or thought that was unproblematic to oneself could be 
conceptualized as pathological and “treated” involuntarily, thereby compromising the 
ideal of objectivity in medical science and making diagnosis and pathology a tool for 
“social control.”      
Just as it is possible for a person to define himself as sick without 
having a bodily illness, so it is also possible for a physician to define 
as “sick” a person who feels perfectly well and wants no medical help, 
and then act as if he were a therapist trying to cure his “patient’s” 
disease. …psychiatric help sought by the client stands in the same 
relation to psychiatric intervention imposed on him as religious beliefs 
voluntarily professed stand to such beliefs imposed by force.”109   
 The Myth of Mental Illness is not entirely comfortable reading for the 
contemporary disability studies scholar or advocate, nor Szasz a very charming 
spokesman for those who might seek to position anti-psychiatry advocacy in alliance 
with the disability rights movement. Szasz’s relentlessly libertarian leanings and 
occasional ventures into monolithic commentaries on “the poor” and so forth make 
him a very strange and prickly bedfellow; nevertheless, his enthusiastic and 
idiosyncratic critique of a socially-driven conceptualization of pathology and its 
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application as a political tool is entirely consistent with the kinds of arguments that 
scholars in disability studies would later employ in completely different theoretical 
frameworks. 
 Whereas Szasz focused on situations in which authority and power in 
relationship to the conception of illness was tangible and easily identifiable, such as 
forced psychiatric treatment, other critics have examined more indirect ways in which 
conceptions of illness serve to reiterate and reinforce more subtle or indirect cultural 
hierarchies.110  As Kramer noted, while clearly depression is now predominantly 
understood as an illness, it is not completely assimilated as such.  The observation 
that depression carries lingering associations with insight, intelligence, sensitivity, 
and creativity echoes Susan Sontag’s 1977 essay Illness as Metaphor, in which she 
argues that certain illnesses function as major cultural metaphors and become 
inscribed on the bodies of those so afflicted—e.g., tuberculosis as a 19th century 
metaphor for sensitivity and passion.111  As Kramer notes, depression continues to 
retain a cultural meaning, something that makes it different from high blood pressure 
or heart disease.  T.M. Luhrmann also repeatedly returns to the cultural meanings of 
suffering and mental illnesses in her 2000 ethnographic study of medical residents in 
psychiatry, identifying the sorting out of these issues as key processes in the 
residents’ enculturation as psychiatrists.112    Yet the relationship of depression with 
insight, sensitivity and creativity isn’t only metaphorical and abstract, it is also literal, 
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as illustrated by continuing medical fascination with the association, such as Kay 
Redfield Jamison’s 1993 Touched with Fire: Manic-Depressive Illness and the 
Artistic Temperament.113   
 One of the frequent criticisms of the way that medical knowledge is produced 
and deployed is the way in which non-“professional” perspectives (e.g., patient 
perspectives) are eclipsed by the authoritative observations and conclusions of the 
doctor, most typically in the way that case studies are produced and written up for 
medical journals, but also (as will be discussed in Chapter Five) in the issuing of 
diagnoses and “orders” for treatment.  Against Depression echoes these authoritarian 
forms, as the lay audience purchasing a trade nonfiction book is expecting to be 
instructed by an expert.  Because madness/mental illness resides at the more visibly 
inequitable end of the unreliable patient/authoritative doctor continuum, Kramer can 
reasonably expect to “correct” his patient’s viewpoints and point out errors in their 
perceptions without challenge.  He does this in a politely assured way, confident that 
not only is there a “right” answer, but also that he is the one in possession of it, which 
he has almost by definition as a result of the diagnostic process.  In fact, in the 
example of Margaret, Kramer ultimately faults himself for giving too much 
legitimacy to her stated feelings, because those feelings were actually a product of the 
illness and as Kramer put it, “there is a sense in which they were not hers.”  The 
healthy Margaret, Kramer argues, did not have the same kinds of emotions and 
difficulties as the ill Margaret, for whom a “disease had robbed her of feelings that 
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were properly hers and imposed alternative ones.”114  Of course, his understanding of 
Margaret’s stated feelings as being part of the illness and not part of a “real 
Margaret,” would justify the traditional disregard for patients’ perspectives, 
particularly as Kramer describes how upon recovery, Margaret seemed quite distant 
from some of the dark feelings she had previously experienced, such as her 
ambivalence and doubts about her children.   
 This conflict presents an interesting question about self-interest, accuracy in 
representation and the production of knowledge.  Interestingly, in this example, both 
Kramer and Margaret have explicit investments in defining the state of illness as 
producing an unreliable narrator, which complicates the somewhat simplistic 
insistence of the disability studies/disability rights perspective on the epistemological 
supremacy of the first-person narrative.  If Margaret is in one instance a reliable 
narrator of her feelings and in another she is not, the explanation of her depression as 
an illness that compromised her perception is certainly one way of reconciling the 
discrepancies, though the potential for exploitation within this philosophical 
framework is obvious.  Such an explanation would appear to be even stronger if 
Margaret herself seconded the assessment.115  However, because the feelings that 
Margaret articulated while depressed were ones with a considerable social penalty 
(e.g., mothers are not supposed to doubt their love for their children), it could also be 
seen as necessary for the recovered Margaret to claim an absolute separation between 
the “ill” and “healthy” Margarets.  Such a distancing is, in fact, the only way that the 
recovered Margaret can maintain both the integrity of her words and social 
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115 Kramer hints that Margaret does characterize her feelings in these terms, although of course it is 
Kramer’s book and not Margaret’s. 
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respectability in her role as a mother, as these would be in direct conflict without the 
conceptual circumnavigation of “illness.”  An alternate disability studies viewpoint 
might suggest that this position represents not Margaret’s “true” feelings but rather 
represents her agency and navigation to the strongest possible position within the 
context of an inherent imbalance of power. 
    In this example, both Kramer and Margaret use the presumed unreliability 
of the state of illness as a fixed, central feature around which they construct their own 
stories of “the truth.”  Disability studies, even in its infancy, is accustomed to seeking 
and labeling relative positions of cultural power, but in this example to simply 
identify the more powerful cultural perspective or even Margaret’s agency and means 
of resistance is insufficient to understand the dynamic of representation.  What this 
example might suggest for disability studies is a consideration of the possible 
usefulness of looking instead for “boundary objects” (such as the unreliability of 
illness) as fixed, shared points of cultural knowledge, around which multiple stories 
can be woven like ribbons around a maypole.116  The actual form and scope of 
Margaret’s agency does not become clear until the multiple constraints in 
representation are illustrated, e.g., that Kramer speaks for her, and that she is bound 
by other social constraints, such as constructions of motherhood. 
Lincoln’s Melancholy 
 
 Lincoln’s Melancholy, in contrast, is presented here as an alternative to the 
idea that depression is exclusively a problem to be fixed, and to illustrate what an 
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effort to depathologize the experience of depression could look like.  Shenk contends 
that Lincoln’s Melancholy is not just a psychobiography investigating a historical 
figure to determine if he or she were “really” insane, in the manner of the popular 
film The Madness of King George.117  Instead, Shenk says the “goal has been to see 
what we can learn about Lincoln by looking at him through the lens of his 
melancholy, and to see what we can learn about melancholy by looking at it in light 
of Lincoln’s experience.”118   
 Shenk’s reconceptualization of depression is contextual and postmodern, 
resulting from a working assumption that the experiences of depression and 
melancholy were “essentially” the same thing but also allowing that the two 
conceptualizations of the experience are different and historically specific.119 While 
acknowledging that Lincoln’s chronic depression caused him considerable suffering, 
Shenk’s reading takes a more utilitarian and holistic approach to the meaning of the 
phenomenon.  Even as the likelihood of the existence of a biological predisposition is 
noted, depression is portrayed more as a kind of lifelong pressure which both caused 
Lincoln to develop particular coping skills and which shaped his thinking in particular 
ways.  Echoing Avery Gordon’s concepts of haunting and complex personhood, 
Shenk presents depression as a force that acted upon Lincoln in complicated ways, 
the compound effects of which can’t be accurately represented in a scheme which 
                                                 
117 Nicholas Hytner, in The Madness of King George (UK: 1994).  The movie investigates the peculiar 
behaviors of King George III of England and ultimately “exonerates” him from charges of madness by 
revealing that he had a condition called porphyria, which can produce erratic behavior.   
118 Shenk, Lincoln's Melancholy: How Depression Challenged a President and Fueled His Greatness, 
7. 
119 Far from being a newly “discovered” feature of Lincoln’s life, Shenk argues that Lincoln’s 
melancholy was widely known and remarked upon by both Lincoln’s contemporaries and Lincoln 
himself.  That this feature had largely disappeared from the public imagination Shenk attributes to the 
prediliction of historians publishing in the 1940s and 1950s to present Lincoln as a heroic figure 
consistent with ideals of manliness in the mid-20th century. 
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necessitates an understanding of the experience as strictly “healthy” or 
“pathological.”   
 Lincoln’s Melancholy is organized more or less chronologically in terms of 
Lincoln’s life.   Shenk’s fundamental theoretical argument is that the experience of 
depression is too complicated to be encapsulated by a diagnosis of pathology.  
Unfortunately, the chronological structure (and no doubt also the constraints of the 
nonfiction trade press perceived to be seeking a yes/no answer to the question of 
whether he was “really” depressed) causes the central argument to be articulated 
somewhat less explicitly than it might be under another organizational scheme.  
Shenk subdivides his argument into three parts, quoted here as they also correspond 
to the major sections of the book: 
     As I worked on the book, I heard three main questions about 
Lincoln’s melancholy.  First, was it “clinical depression”?  Part One 
investigates how Lincoln’s melancholy manifested itself in his early 
life and young manhood, and how it fits—and challenges—the 
diagnostic categories of modern psychiatry.  Second, what kind of 
treatment did he undergo?  Part Two shows what Lincoln did in 
response to his melancholy, the strategies he used to heal and help 
himself.  Third, in what way did the melancholy contribute to his work 
as a public figure?  Part Three addresses how Lincoln’s melancholy 
became entwined with his mature character, ideas and actions.120 
 As indicated above, Part One describes Lincoln’s life as a young man and 
addresses immediately the predictable question of a diagnosis of depression and the 
related “nature/nurture” issues.  The first chapter, “‘The Community Said He was 
Crazy’” narrates the maturation of a sensitive, reflective child into an emotionally 
intense young man who alternated between good-natured storytelling and 
introspective solitude.  Noting that insanity clearly ran in the family in a way 
                                                 




consistent with today’s notions of biological predisposition, Shenk also recounts in 
turn the deaths of Lincoln’s mother, then Ann Rutledge (to whom Lincoln was 
rumored to have been romantically attached), and finally his sister.  However, he is 
also careful to contextualize death as appearing largely unremarkable to Lincoln’s 
contemporaries and not necessarily an obvious cause of Lincoln’s first major episode 
of melancholic despair in 1835.  Around this time, Lincoln began to speak of suicide 
frequently enough that concerned friends conspired to supervise and restrain him for 
fear he would harm himself.121  Shenk thus answers the question of a diagnosis of 
depression with a clear “yes,” but uses that as a starting point for a reframing of the 
question. 
 The second chapter, “A Fearful Gift,” distinguishes the current understanding 
of depression from the early-mid nineteenth century understanding of melancholy as 
a temperament or feature of character on a kind of continuum with ordinary sadness 
and sensitivity.  This unquestionably Romantic conception of melancholy was linked, 
à la Sontag, to creativity, intelligence and refinement.  A melancholic temperament 
was “characterized by not only gloominess, asceticism, and misanthropy, but also 
deep reflection, perseverance and great energy of action. …To be grave and 
sensitive—to feel acutely the agony and sweat of the human spirit—was admired, 
even glorified.”122  (The title, “A Fearful Gift,” is suggestive of another tactic that 
disability studies might take in intentionally reinventing the meaning of mental 
illness, by portraying it as a kind of difference that can be extraordinarily useful in the 
proper circumstances, something along the lines of the superhero “mutants” of the X-
                                                 




Men comics and films.)  Shenk suggests that Lincoln’s sensitivity and temperament 
often inspired sympathy and protectiveness in other people, who went out of their 
way to help him financially and otherwise.123  One example offered is the familiar 
anecdote of the young Lincoln entering Joshua Speed’s general store and inquiring 
about the price of fitting out a bed.  Upon seeing Lincoln’s dismay at the price and his 
reluctance to purchase on credit, Speed apparently offered to share his own rooms 
upstairs, a gesture which initiated a particularly important friendship between the two 
young men.   
 In a somewhat similar vein, Chapter Three, “The Most Miserable Man 
Living” examines what Shenk characterizes as Lincoln’s second major bout with 
melancholic despair, when he again inspired great concern and worry for his well-
being.  Shenk devotes considerable energy to examining the potential contributing 
factors to this second breakdown, which he believes is more likely the result of stress 
in Lincoln’s political career combined with the difficulties of a love triangle rather 
than simply a breakup with Mary Todd, as has been frequently supposed.  Lincoln 
sought medical help this time, and was diagnosed with “hypochondriasis,” a disease 
which Shenk describes as “a form of melancholia, less severe than others, though still 
serious enough to demand medical attention, lest the patient succumb to insanity or 
suicide.”124 As the disease was thought to be associated with too much black bile, 
typical treatments included bleeding, purgatives, mustard rubs, mercury (or arsenic or 
strychnine), and cold baths.  Shenk asserts that this period was a turning point for 
Lincoln, in which he again seriously contemplated death and his purpose in life.  He 
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retired to Joshua Speed’s luxurious family estate, where he spent five weeks 
recuperating.  Shenk tells that upon leaving the estate, Lincoln encountered a group of 
slaves in chains, whose good cheer impressed him enough to write to Speed’s sister 
about the incident in a letter famous as his first commentary about slavery.  Shenk, 
however, contends that the letter needs to be placed in context with Lincoln’s own 
misery, and became fuel for a rethinking of his life.   
 In Part Two, Shenk tells a story of coping and adapting to persistent 
difficulties, e.g., what Lincoln did to help himself in the face of chronic depression.  
“A Self-Made Man” sets the context for Lincoln’s work in that arena, placing him in 
a context in which “self-made” was an entirely new concept.  Previously, Shenk 
argues, people were effectively “made,” economically and socially speaking, by the 
circumstances of birth, and the idea of being limited only by one’s own imagination 
and character appealed greatly to young men like Lincoln, to whom it seemed that a 
whole new world was opening up.  However, the new emphasis on individual 
qualities of character simultaneously created the possibility of being a failure, a born 
loser.  Moreover, Shenk contends, this social mobility was understood to make people 
who disturbed the established order vulnerable to insanity, as they might be 
subjecting themselves to stresses for which they did not have the appropriate 
constitution.  Shenk states, “The crucial mental health question in Lincoln’s time was 
whether a person was sane or not. On the right side of that line, one had considerable 
latitude for expressions of distress.  On the wrong side, one could be cast off from 
civilized society.”125  Certainly, according to Shenk’s narrative, Lincoln’s socio-




economic status and periods of profound despair would have raised the question in 
his and others’ minds. 
 Lincoln is presented as having known how to make good use of what 
ambiguity was available in the understanding of his own melancholy, and is described 
as coming to develop a view of his experience that ultimately blended features of 
multiple schools of thought.   In Chapter Five, “A Misfortune, Not a Fault,” Shenk 
describes Lincoln as rejecting a popular view, heavily influenced by Christianity, of 
pronounced melancholy as being sinful in nature and closely related to sloth.  Shenk 
contends that when Lincoln left rural Illinois, he left the hellfire and damnation of the 
Baptist church as well, and instead cut his own path through both the Second Great 
Awakening and a concurrent maelstrom of ideas about secularism and reason.  Shenk 
envisions these great social and philosophical questions of his day as intersecting with 
events in Lincoln’s personal life.  In 1842, Lincoln’s friend Joshua Speed traveled to 
Louisville to seek a bride, and shortly thereafter became deeply distressed and 
depressed himself.  Shenk describes Lincoln as seeking to provide support to Speed, 
and through his letters revealing what Shenk understands to be a personal philosophy 
or conclusion about the nature of depression.  In a letter designed to be read by Speed 
in a moment of low mood, Lincoln explains his prediction of Speed’s depression as a 
result of three special causes in addition to a general one, namely that speed is 
“naturally of nervous temperament.”  Shenk quotes the additional “special causes”: 
The first special cause is your exposure to bad weather on your 
journey, which my experience clearly proves to be verry severe on 
defective nerves.   
The second is, the absence of all business and conversation of friends, 
which might divert your mind, and give it occasional rest from that 
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intensity of thought, which will some times wear the sweetest idea 
thread-bare and turn it to the bitterness of death.   
The third is the rapid and near approach of that crisis on which all your 
thoughts and feelings concentrate.126 
Shenk argues that this letter shows that Lincoln understood melancholy as something 
to which a person of nervous temperament was vulnerable when aggravating 
circumstances arose, such as bad weather or social conditions.  Shenk contends that 
Lincoln’s characterization of Speed as “nervous” rather than “melancholy” suggests 
that Lincoln kept reasonably current with scientific thinking.  Moreover, he argues, 
the substance of Lincoln’s message also reflected the kernels of a kind of self-help 
movement that moved beyond either traditional medicine or Christianity to seek 
answers in new explanations of experience which emphasized management to 
whatever degree possible the forces that were beyond one’s personal control.  Shenk 
also describes Lincoln as responding positively to approaches to temperance, for 
instance, that characterized drunkenness not as an unpardonable sin, but rather as a 
misfortune that demanded compassion from others, and that such approaches 
influenced Lincoln’s thinking to produce in him a similar conclusion about 
melancholy.  Shenk relates an incident in which Speed’s mother presented Lincoln 
with a Bible, encouraging him to seek comfort within its covers, and suggests that 
although Lincoln always seemed to find his own capacity for faith somewhat lacking, 
that the sentiments of resignation in the face of what one cannot control, as well as a 
recognition that one’s emotions can betray one’s thoughts have had a lasting impact 
in Lincoln’s decisionmaking processes, including his decision to marry Mary Todd. 
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 In Chapter Six, “The Reign of Reason,” Shenk investigates what he sees as 
some of the effects of Lincoln’s careful examination of the meaning of his 
melancholy.  Though Lincoln had long preached a triumph of reason over the 
passions, as a young man his actions had been far more often directed by emotion and 
impulse than by intellectual calculation.  Shenk identifies Lincoln’s decision to marry 
as a turning point, placing it in its mid-19th century context as a point at which a man 
came to bear much greater responsibility with the obligation to provide for a wife and 
children.  In Lincoln’s case, Shenk portrays the event as also marking a change in the 
nature of his melancholy, in which intense periods of abject misery gave way to a 
dutiful acceptance of life’s difficulties.  As Shenk notes, “One crucial distinction 
between major depression and chronic depression is that, in the latter, one largely 
ceases to howl in protest that the world is hard or painful.  Rather, one becomes 
accustomed to it, expecting such hardship and greeting it with, at best, a stoic 
determination.”127  Lincoln likewise assumed an attitude of responsibility and duty, 
focusing the best part of his energies on his work.  Noting that chronic depressives 
can often become extremely devoted to work (in contrast to the lethargy frequently 
associated with periodic major depression), Shenk argues that Lincoln withdrew from 
other aspects of his life so that political work became the dominant feature, and 
simultaneously directed his energies to his work because it was one arena in which he 
was successful.   
 Despite Lincoln’s successes in politics, he expressed little joy in his 
achievements and perceived the world as difficult and painful even under the best of 
                                                 




circumstances, which, Shenk argues, serves “to powerfully illustrate the inability of 
accomplishments to satisfy him.”128  In Shenk’s narrative, neither political successes 
nor personal losses (such as that of his young second son) seemed to provoke 
significant demonstration of feeling in him, and emotional reserve seemed to have 
become a pronounced character trait.  Shenk contends that Lincoln’s somber moods 
might well have represented an effort to contain his melancholy, to withdraw into 
himself until the dark feelings were more manageable.  Though Lincoln could still 
entertain and charm with his stories, his melancholy came to have a somewhat 
different effect on people, inspiring them to stay at a distance and leave him to his 
private gloom rather than to step in to share his pain and suffering. 
 Shenk presents Lincoln as developing and employing multiple strategies to 
deal with his melancholy.  In Chapter Seven, “The Vents of My Moods and Gloom,” 
Shenk argues that Lincoln’s use of humor and poetry as coping strategies produced 
increasingly complicated effects in his life.  Although Lincoln’s jokes and funny 
stories provided him with a way to amuse and connect with other people, they did not 
always completely cover his melancholy, and this disjuncture may have been as 
obvious to other people as it seemed to be to Lincoln himself.  Similarly, he contends 
that Lincoln’s withdrawal into the pathos of the copious emotion of 19th century 
poetry may have provided comfort in the sense of finding like-minded souls, but it 
may also have prolonged and deepened Lincoln’s thinking about his existential and 
moral difficulties.  In the last stanzas of Lincoln’s favorite poem, Shenk sees a 
resonance with Lincoln’s complex experience of melancholy: 
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Yea! Hope and despondency, pleasure and pain, 
Are mingled together in sun-shine and rain; 
And the smile and the tear, and the song and the dirge, 
Still follow each other, like surge upon surge. 
’Tis the wink of an eye, ’tis the draught of a breath, 
From the blossoms of health, to the paleness of death, 
From the gilded saloon, to the bier and the shroud 
Oh, why should the spirit of mortal be proud!129 
The pertinent feature of Lincoln’s chosen therapies, according to Shenk, was that they 
“did not dampen, but rather highlighted, the essential tension of his life,” namely, the 
complexity of emotion and the difficulties of taking any pleasure in a life’s work 
when so much still remained to be done. 
 The complicated entanglement of Lincoln’s melancholy with the rest of his 
life is the subject of Part Three.  In Chapter Eight, “Its Precise Shape and Color,” 
Shenk argues that the same qualities which caused Lincoln so much personal distress 
began to have a significant positive effect in his professional life.  Shenk argues: 
It was not what we would call a recovery, and certainly not what we 
would call a cure.  Lincoln’s story confounds those who see depression 
as a collection of symptoms to be eliminated.  But it resonates with 
those who see suffering as a potential catalyst of emotional growth.  
“What man actually needs,” the psychiatrist Victor Frankl argued, “Is 
not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for a 
worthwhile goal.”  Many believe that psychological health comes with 
the relief of distress.  But Frankl proposed that all people—and 
particularly those under some emotional weight—need a purpose that 
will both draw on their talents and transcend their lives.  For Lincoln, 
this sense of purpose was indeed the key that unlocked the gates of a 
mental prison.  That doesn’t mean his suffering went away.  In fact, as 
his life became richer and more satisfying, his melancholy exerted a 
stronger pull.  He now responded to that pull by tying it to his newly 
defined sense of purpose.  From a place of trouble, he looked for 
meaning.  He looked at imperfection and sought redemption.130 
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Shenk contends that Lincoln’s longstanding ambition to leave the world a better place 
than he found it came to rest on the debate over slavery.  Lincoln argued that slavery 
was fundamentally rooted in selfishness and that philosophically, any society that 
claimed justice as a fundamental principle must necessarily strive to eliminate slavery 
because it was inherently unjust.  Shenk argues that this critical appraisal of the 
country’s position relative to the philosophical ideal mirrored Lincoln’s constant 
reassessment of himself and struggle to attain an unreachable ideal.   
 As Shenk describes it, Lincoln’s contemporaries were well-prepared to 
envision a somber, even pessimistic man as appropriately prepared for public office, 
because such an individual was understood to be cautious and thoughtful.  Shenk does 
not present Lincoln’s anti-slavery arguments as being anti-racist in the sense that we 
understand such a term now, but portrays Lincoln as recognizing slavery as unjust in 
a political sense, and seeing in the conflict over slavery (specifically in the Kansas-
Nebraska Act) the potential for the demise of the entire country.  Lincoln ran for the 
Senate in 1855, but withdrew midway through and asked voters to support another 
anti-Nebraska (Democratic) candidate when it was clear that he did not have a 
winning margin.  Shenk sees Lincoln’s withdrawal from the race as an exercise of 
discipline, of placing a commitment to a cause over personal success.  Moreover, 
Lincoln took this approach with others as well, encouraging them to see particular 
events as merely components of a much larger struggle.  In particular, Shenk 
contends, Lincoln urged people not to become disheartened too quickly, and to take a 
very long-term approach to the eradication of slavery.   
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 Shenk explicitly removes his narrative of Lincoln from the kind of ahistorical 
debate about whether he was “really” a great man, noting that while Lincoln’s racism 
can be disappointing to those who wish to see him as singularly heroic, his 
contemporaries often reflected sentiments and rationale a very great deal more 
offensive to present-day sensibilities.  More to the point, however, Shenk argues that 
Lincoln’s life does not lend itself to the standard “crisis and recovery” narrative form 
of many biographies (a theme that will be explored in detail in the following chapter 
of my study).  Shenk states, “Whatever greatness Lincoln achieved cannot be 
explained as a triumph over personal suffering.  Rather, it must be accounted for as an 
outgrowth of the same system that produced the suffering. This is not a story of 
transformation but one of integration.  Lincoln didn’t do great work because he 
solved the problem of his melancholy.  The problem of his melancholy was all the 
more fuel for the fire of his great work.”131 
 In Chapter Ten, “Comes Wisdom to Us,” Shenk describes how he sees 
Lincoln as coming to reap the long-term benefits of his coping strategies.  
Specifically, he argues, Lincoln’s lifelong effort to attain unreachable ideals of 
character and society had accustomed him to operating in a conceptual space of 
perpetual uncertainty and even failure, in which he learned to depend upon sources of 
inspiration (such as philosophy and religion) that were not connected to the successes 
and failures of the battles of the Civil War.   Moreover, Lincoln’s continued approach 
to the Civil War and the question of slavery as something so much more important 
than his own political situation also prompted him carefully to attempt to restrict the 
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opportunities for the victors to seek vengeance and to operate in a spirit of 
magnanimity whenever possible. 
 Unquestionably, the most useful service that a study like Lincoln’s 
Melancholy performs for disability studies is to directly question the usefulness of 
categorizing the experience of depression as a purely pathological experience, and to 
do so in an understated manner uncommon in most disability studies work.  Although 
Shenk is certainly not the first to observe that the kind of experiences usually 
characterized as “depression” or “melancholy” could be approached in a more 
complex fashion than the medical model does, making such an argument within the 
parameters of contemporary popular nonfiction without venturing too far into the 
territory of “inspirational” is something of a departure from the beaten path.  It offers 
a “kinder, gentler” and less confrontational model that may prove to be more effective 
political outreach for disability studies than the more common, strident tone. 
 Most obviously, Shenk challenges the naturalized universality of the 
contemporary idea of depression by maintaining the historical specificity of 
“melancholy” in the 19th century U.S.  By framing the question of the meaning of 
Lincoln’s experience in historical terms of “melancholy,” rather than in the 
contemporary terms of “depression,” Shenk immediately guides readers towards an 
alternate reading of the meaning of the experience, i.e., as something associated with 
insight, sensitivity, and spirituality.132  In so doing, Shenk is not only presenting his 
subject matter in the appropriate historical context, but is also capitalizing on any 
lingering tendency on the part of the reader to imagine depression as a kind of 
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suffering with a greater importance than that of ordinary physical illness (exactly 
what Peter Kramer complained about). 
 Shenk’s portrayal of Lincoln’s experience of melancholy emphasizes the 
utility and practicality of Lincoln’s strategies of adaptation—the usefulness of his 
emotional vulnerability in creating connections with people, his resigned pessimism 
that taught him to confront his difficulties head-on, and his embracing of the 
emotional component of poetry and humor as a means for thinking through problems 
with existential implications.  In other words, Shenk focuses on those accomodations 
that Lincoln made to his depression resulting in what today might be termed the 
“positive outcome” of substantial personal success.  By emphasizing the relationship 
between Lincoln’s adaptations and his successes (both personally and for the country 
as a whole) and using the medical model’s own implicit criteria of productivity, 
Shenk essentially disarms the social/cultural/medical process of turning undesirable 
behavioral traits into pathology—and along the way, quietly exposes that process as 
political rather than scientific.  From this vantage point in history, it would be 
impossible to say that Lincoln wasn’t a fully functioning member of society, given 
that he was able to get elected as President.  It’s difficult to argue that he had 
“inappropriate guilt” for the ownership of slaves.  And if he were working late at 
night instead of sleeping, in retrospect, that activity is more likely to be attributed to a 
good work ethic and sense of responsibility than to a disturbance in sleep patterns.  At 
some point, common sense begins to question the validity or utility of a 
conceptualization of “mental illness” that could be applied to someone like Lincoln.  
After all, how “sick” could he be if he managed a career like that?       
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 Shenk insists that Lincoln’s success was a direct result of his strategies of 
adaptation, and clearly implies that this success effected a much greater good than he 
would have likely achieved if he were “normal.”  In this way, Shenk challenges the 
presumption that “normal” is the most desirable state, and echoes academic disability 
studies’ explication of the conflation of the normal with the ideal through the 
historical relationship between statistics and eugenics.  Lennard Davis’ 1995 work on 
statistics in Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness and the Body, for example, 
describes the way in which the idea that a population could be “normed” was 
superimposed on and merged with well-established classical notions of the ideal, in 
which human beings could only imperfectly embody small fragments of the divine 
ideal.133  This transformation replaced the abstract ideal with the “upper” end of the 
bell curve, which in visual, graphic terms can be conveniently pivoted mid-curve to 
show a progession from the low to the high in a way that parallels the valuation of 
certain traits.  Shenk exploits the conflation and exposes the paradox: Lincoln’s 
overachievement is certainly not “normal” in a purely statistical sense, but is so 
desirable in a social sense that the presumptive ideal in the assertion of normal is 
necessarily questioned. 
 In practice, Shenk’s call to the reader to re-think depression is gentle, non-
confrontational, and subtle, sufficiently so that a reader who isn’t actively looking for 
a radical reconceptualization of the meaning of illness may not even notice that he’s 
seen one.  This approach may be of considerable use to disability studies in the 
current context of dominance of biological psychiatry.  Because disability studies has 
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grown out of the disability rights movement, it has primarily grown in the direction of 
analyzing what makes disability a site of oppression, and often still frames its work in 
the voices of those outraged at the injustice of that oppression.  Although this analysis 
is intellectually necessary and serves as a kind of social glue within the disability 
community, it also has a number of difficulties.  This kind of explicit, head-on 
conflict creates an awkward position for those whose disabilities are the result of 
illness, and who seek medical care and improved health at the same time that they 
want to resist the social and cultural forces that bear down on disability.  Thus, in 
practical terms, Shenk’s more low-key approach of speaking in the dominant 
language (metaphorically, by demonstrating “positive outcomes” and the paradox of 
the conflation of normal and ideal) constitutes a new kind of disability rights 
discourse that can potentially have much wider application.   
 It is important to understand the discursive importance of Shenk’s harnessing 
the power of haunting in his narrative, and how this contrasts with the traditional 
narratives of disability.  The traditional and usually autobiographical narrative forms 
of the lived experience of (physical) disability, although they describe stories of 
resistance against an oppressive medical model of disability, continue to be haunted 
by the first impression, so to speak, of being disabled and thus victimized by an 
oppressive culture.  Authors of the physical disability narratives may position the 
origin of their disability in cultural terms rather than as their impairment, but in both 
cases the narratives focus on the authors’ own positions in the struggle.  Their 
discursive success is dependent upon their ability to persuade the reader to identify 
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more closely with them than with the oppressive system, and the narratives are 
haunted by this process of victimization.   
 But in Shenk’s storytelling, haunting functions differently.  Because Lincoln 
is first and foremost understood as a hero, even a tale attempting to establish that he 
was depressed is haunted by the ghost of the Great President.  In other words, the 
narrative of Lincoln’s “deficiency” is consistently haunted by the presence of his 
professional success.  In fact, the presence of this ghost is so strong that it is 
effectively prevents Lincoln’s depression from becoming pathological, in cultural 
terms at least.   Of course, Lincoln is an unusual subject in this regard, and most of us 
do not have such profound success as to be functionally beyond reproach.  However, 
the comparative success of this anomalous subject suggestive of a need to think about 
how standard narratives of illness and recovery or political resistance to an oppressive 
theoretical model may not be the most effective way of repositioning disability 
culturally, even if this is the way in which depression or disability is experienced.  In 
other words, a disability studies project that wants to achieve social and cultural 
change may want to think about whether an emphasis on the voice of lived experience 
is the most useful theoretical approach to take, and whether other ways of 
representing and conceptualizing disability might be more effective. 
 The issue of discourse isn’t just about developing more sophisticated public 
relations.  It also signals an opportunity to remodel disability theory to include—or 
rather to correct the exclusion of—people whose disabilities involve illness.  By 
reshaping the engagement with power from the implementation of the system, so to 
speak, to the theory behind the system, it is possible to de-emphasize the collision 
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with the implementation of health care.  A disability studies project that is more 
subtly engaged with fundamental difficulties of the medical model (e.g., in the case of 
depression, that the behavioral criteria for pathologizing it are the materialization of 
capitalist social norms) focuses less on the day-to-day struggle and conflict with 
health care providers.  It stops making people with illness-related disabilities less 
politically authentic than those with impairments that don’t cause suffering. 
 Recognizing of the difficulty of this conflict also creates conceptual space for 
Avery Gordon’s notion of complex personhood described earlier in this chapter, 
which has a number of other implications.  As I will discuss in the next chapter, 
because so many illness-and-recovery narratives of madness/mental illness have been 
published and now constitute at least in practice a standard for such things, Lincoln’s 
Melancholy makes several contributions towards a more complex conception of the 
representation of the experience of depression than either a case study or the standard 
illness-and-recovery model permit.    
 By explicitly using depression as a “lens,” (i.e., as a theoretical framework 
that also functions somewhat as an organizing devices), Shenk addresses the 
difficulties of attempting to fit a portrait of a complete, complex person into the 
standard idea of biography as linear chronology.   The inevitable inconsistencies and 
contradictions of mind and experience can appear as sloppy errors in continuity if 
held to either a traditional biographical narrative model or a traditional idea of 
scholarly evidence. For example, at times, Lincoln’s melancholy is expressed as 
vulnerability that motivates others to help him, yet at other times it acts to divide him 
emotionally from other people, who leave him alone during his blue periods.  In his 
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physical life, of course, both were probably simultaneously true enough to be 
recognized as such, or fluctuated at a level of detail that the historian can neither 
practically represent nor likely even access.  The linear narrative generates a need to 
choose, to pin it down, to contour the portrait of the character at any given moment of 
time to fit into a larger and coherent story of an event or series of events.  
Unfortunately, the necessity of creating a linear narrative that can accommodate a 
sequential chain of events generally does not accommodate a story that loops back on 
itself or branches off in multiple directions as one’s thoughts and moods typically do.   
 The comparison of these two interpretations of the meaning of depression 
establishes that they do share one common understanding, though its significance is 
in dispute.  They both assert, in their own ways, that the experience of depression has 
not been entirely assimilated into medical discourse (though medical discourse has 
clearly become the dominant discourse) and that depression still retains traces of the 
character of melancholy, i.e., it is still able to be understood as some kind of 
ennobling suffering, or a refined kind of affliction to which deeply sensitive people 
are vulnerable. 
 What is at stake can be mostly broadly understood as a de facto collective 
cultural judgment of whether the experience of depression is a kind of pathology.   In 
this particular context, in one way that question boils down to whether we understand 
and judge the experience of depression as uniformly bad, to put it as simply as 
possible, or whether that experience can be judged to be complex, with components 
that can be both good and bad.  That, obviously, is one of those questions for which 
there will never be an absolute answer, and what sort of response you get depends on 
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who you ask.  But that is, ultimately, what the disagreement of whether depression is 
“really” an illness is about. 
 That disagreement, however, is also about the degree to which medical 
authority is accepted as valid, and to which other ways of thinking are successful in 
resisting the dominance of medical authority.  This component might be understood 
as a struggle between modernist views of an absolute, scientific medicine that 
“discovers” cures for illnesses in an arena where judgment is not in question, and 
postmodern approaches that position medicine as an inherently political arena.  What 
is at stake here is the viability of a disability rights project that seeks to depathologize 
non-normative bodies and experiences. 
 However, in the intellectual arena, this is also a struggle about the ownership 
of knowledge and what can be broadly understood as legitimate evidence and 
scholarship.  This is also a modernist/postmodernist kind of struggle, but it also 
includes a disciplinary component in terms of who may lay claim to certain kinds of 
intellectual terrain.  It’s a question of accountability in using the authority of a field to 
make certain kinds of claims (e.g., that depression is a disease) and the 
responsibilities of other intellectuals to hold such claimants and their arguments 
accountable to broader, multi-disciplinary standards for intellectual rigor. The 
question of what counts as evidence is crucial, as it defines both what we know and 
how we know it, and determines what is judged legitimate enough to be understood 
as “real.”   
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Chapter 4: The Standard Story of the Unique Individual Experience 
 Although the gradual institutionalization of disability studies as a field has 
resulted in its beginning to be integrated in the larger body of work of “the 
scholarship of difference,” disability studies thus far has been fueled largely by the 
same highly specific forces of political unrest as the disability rights movement, and 
disability studies scholars are still almost always people with disabilities. The oft-
quoted rallying cry of “nothing about us, without us” epitomizes the disability rights 
movement’s emphasis on personal experience as an extremely valued form of 
knowledge.  As such, an emphasis on perspective, personal experience, and 
representation characterize writing associated with both the disability rights 
movement and with academic disability studies.  The scholarly and theoretical 
literature informing my inquiries having been analyzed in Chapter Two, I turn now to 
examine what some might call the real literature of disability. 
 The literature of the disability rights movement (and much of the fledgling 
disability studies project) emphasizes perspective, personal experience and 
representation for several reasons.  First, the construction of perspective and personal 
experience as a form of knowledge positions people with disabilities as the experts on 
the subject, with unique and valuable forms of insight and experience.   Second, 
memoir as a literary form is, at least in theory, accessible to anybody who has the 
means to write, though publication is another issue.  Third, memoirs of illness or 
disability (what Nancy Mairs refers to as “the literature of personal disaster”) fit 
neatly within the publication explosion of “confessional” literature recounting abuse 
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or trauma of various kinds.134  The rise in popularity of personal accounts dealing 
with experiences of disability or illness (one’s own or that of a family member) has 
often been observed, but as I will discuss in more detail later on, little critical work 
has been done on what sort of impact these texts have, or might have, on disability 
studies/disability rights activities or on the position of disability in public culture 
more generally.   
 In this chapter, I will argue that autobiography and memoir of disability and 
illness may be roughly sorted into two major philosophical-political camps.  These 
memoirs tend to share characteristics depending on whether the individual has 
experienced a “physical” or “mental” disability or illness.  Specifically, I will argue 
that the “physical disability” narratives align with a political consciousness and 
conceptualization of disability as a socially-produced kind of difference, and the 
“mental illness” narratives align with the dominant medical model of biological 
psychiatry.  Both sets of binary classifications—“physical” vs. “mental” and 
“medical” vs. “minority”—are rough and simplistic, but the point is to establish a 
provisional  working structure through which certain characteristics, similarities, and 
differences become more easily visible.  My use of this rough taxonomy is intended 
to illuminate an important distinction absent from conventional systems of organizing 
or investigating autobiography and memoir, namely the identification with or refusal 
of the process of  good/bad judgment associated with pathology.  That alignment can 
be used to predict and to contextualize, to a large extent, what kind of tale will be 
                                                 
134 Nancy Mairs, Voice Lessons: On Becoming a (Woman) Writer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 124. 
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told.135   My taxonomy theorizes that conceiving of a particular experience of 
embodied difference as “disability” (rather than as “illness” or “defect”) is strongly 
associated with the capacity for imagining progressive social action.   The narratives 
that engage a politicized idea of disability consistently share certain characteristics, 
and the reverse is true as well.  My experiment in this chapter is to examine ten 
narratives of disability and illness, and consider them in the context of my provisional 
taxonomy. 
 My inquiry is directed more to the production of memoir and what it means 
for disability studies than to its consumption; consumption has been studied to the 
point that the “liberatory potential” of amplifying previously unheard voices and 
demonstrating political agency on the part of oppressed groups has become a truism 
of cultural studies. However, consumption also can affect production, because 
contemporary authors of memoirs and autobiographies don’t live in a vacuum.  This 
means that the ideas about how personal stories are consumed and what effects they 
have upon readers have themselves become part of the cultural ideology about such 
stories (at several different levels) and, I contend, affect how such memoirs are 
created, because many of these stories seem to be created with the express intent of 
helping or reaching out to the reader.   
 I will focus more closely on the intellectual aspects of the production of 
memoir rather than the economic aspects, though of course they are related.   A writer 
can look at her text and see a political argument, and an editor can look at the same 
                                                 
135 This absence is illustrated clearly in the categorization of Library of Congress subject headings, 
which have historically classified memoirs of disability or illness by the disability or illness, a 
categorization scheme which shows the difficulty of conceiving of disability or illness in any terms 
other than the usual medical model.   
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text and see a potential bestseller for completely different (and perhaps even 
contradictory) reasons—hence, the intellectual and economic aspects of production 
and publication are another instance of King’s idea of lacquered layerings.  To further 
complicate matters, there is a related academic cycle of the consumption of disability 
memoir and the production of academic disability studies on memoir.  The 
production/consumption cycle in academic disability studies is of greater strategic 
concern to me than consumption of such memoir by the general public or even the 
disability rights community as a whole.136 
 It’s important to note a particular assumption on which this chapter is based.  
Specifically, I’m assuming that the writing of life stories—especially those published 
in formats likely to have wide accessibility—can have a powerful impact on how 
people formulate their ideas about what the experience of a particular illness or 
disability will look like.  I base this assumption on what I would describe as 
overwhelming anecdotal observation that people who receive a diagnosis of one sort 
or another will often rush to find out more about it through whatever means they have 
readily available to them, which might be the Web, books, television, or friends and 
family.137  As far as I can tell, one very frequent source of information is biography or 
autobiography, which is not surprising, inasmuch as biography or autobiography is 
easier to read than medical texts.  Autobiographies and memoirs may also address 
other kinds of questions that might well be more important—what it’s like to actually 
                                                 
136 As disability studies moves from being a fledgling academic enterprise to being more integrated in 
mainstream cultural studies, it has the potential to affect people exponentially (e.g., first scholars, then 
the students who take their classes, etc.).    
137 There are, of course, a vast array of narratives on the Web, representing an extraordinary diversity 
of perspectives.  Primarily for reasons of scale, these were not included in this study.  Published 
narratives were also chosen because they have been “vetted,” so to speak, by the publication houses, 
which to some extent serve as third-party verification of the cultural intelligibility of the narratives, 
something more difficult to obtain with websites. 
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live with this illness or that disorder.   People with disabilities or illness are not 
necessarily surrounded by family and friends who also share that particular 
experience of difference, nor necessarily likely to have an extended social network 
built around the category in quite the same way as, say, some kinds of LGBTQ 
communities.   
 This assumption is supported by Anne Hunsaker Hawkins’ observation that 
such stories “are often written with the expectation that the author’s experience might 
serve as a mirror, or model, or the prospective reader.  Thus authors with heart 
disease will direct their narratives to potential readers with heart disease; women 
writing about breast cancer will write for other women with the same problem.  To 
some extent, the assumption about the ‘generalizability’ of illness is a part of our 
modern nomothetic mythology about disease, which assumes a uniformity of 
experience within a diagnostic category.”138  And which also, I would add, reinforces 
the idea of the diagnosis as the most pertinent way of categorizing experience.   
 Existing academic scholarship on illness and narrative (including, but not 
limited to, autobiography and memoir) has tended to center primarily on what I would 
describe as content (as opposed to structure or function), and certainly has not 
considered such narratives as salable goods that are manufactured for consumption.  
In general, much of the work on illness and narrative focuses on medical discourse, 
with the implicit intent of identifying sites or practices in which medical discourse 
dehumanizes ill people or otherwise denigrates or rewrites their “stories,” and such 
work usually seeks explicitly to improve and facilitate doctor-patient 
                                                 
138 Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography, 2nd ed. (West Lafayette, 
IN: Purdue University Press, 1999), 5. 
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communication.139  Of the works attending more specifically to narrative and 
discourse in autobiography and memoir, most focus primarily on what individual 
authors have used such memoirs to “do” in terms of reconciling themselves to their 
bodily experiences, and how the authors use (or refuse) the discourse of medicine.  
Such studies include most notably Anne Hunsaker Hawkins’ Reconstructing Illness: 
Studies in Pathography (1993), Thomas Couser’s Recovering Bodies: Illness, 
Disability and Life-Writing (1997), Cheryl Mattingly and Linda C. Garro’s edited 
volume Narrative and the Cultural Construction of Illness and Healing (2000), and 
Dwight Fee’s edited volume, Pathology and the Postmodern: Mental Illness and 
Discourse and Experience (2000). 140  Couser’s Recovering Bodies is of particular 
importance relative to this study as it is from his comparatively “data-driven” and 
very detailed observations of many of the mechanics of narrative (e.g., whether the 
narrative downplayed an illness/disability experience by contextualizing it within a 
whole life, or emphasized the experience by beginning the story at the onset of 
illness) that I came to realize that there was actually a distinct difference in how 
narratives of physical disability and narratives of mental illness were constructed.   
 Yet such scholarship, while often tremendously insightful and clearly oriented 
towards improving the quality of life for patients, does not question to any great 
                                                 
139 An enormous amount of work in medical anthropology is applicable here.  Some of the better-
known examples of the most relevant scholarship include Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: 
Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), Arthur Kleinman, The Illness 
Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (New York: Basic Books, 1988), Arthur 
Kleinman, Writing at the Margin: Discourse between Anthropology and Medicine (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995).. 
140 G. Thomas Couser, Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life-Writing, Wisconsin Studies in 
American Autobiography (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), Dwight Fee, ed., Pathology 
and the Postmodern: Mental Illness as Discourse and Experience (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, 2000), Hawkins, Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography, Cheryl 
Mattingly and Linda C. Garro, Narrative and the Cultural Construction of Illness and Healing 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
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degree the ideological categories of “health” and “illness,” or interrogate the validity 
of the idea of pathology in the same way that scholarship more explicitly associated 
with a disability rights/disability studies consciousness usually does.  The difference 
is not merely one of having a radical political objective versus a more liberal 
approach to reform; it is also a fundamental intellectual issue of the degree to which 
the assumptions and naturalization of the medical categories of health/illness, or 
normal/pathological are questioned. 
 Thus, this study addresses the gap between a vague understanding of certain 
texts as having “liberatory potential” and the strategic deployment of ideas in the 
service of either scholarly theory or practical action.  It assumes that meaningful 
political change—i.e., materially recognizable respect for the autonomy and 
embodiment of disabled or ill people—can’t occur within an intellectual system that 
presupposes such individuals as deficient, and seeks to identify the points at which 
understandings of embodiment diverge into recognizable narrative patterns.  
Criteria for Selection 
 
 Texts were selected for examination in this chapter primarily on the basis of 
their visibility and perceived importance in shaping perceptions of what an 
autobiography or memoir of experience with disability or illness is “supposed” to 
look like.  Those selected are comparatively popular texts in straightforwardly 
measurable ways (i.e., published by major trade presses, still in print at the time of 
writing, and available through major booksellers such as Borders or Amazon.com), 
and as such, have some claim to reaching a broad audience.  They are also popular 
texts in less easily quantifiable, but perhaps more influential ways: they are among 
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the most frequently cited texts of their kind in the relevant scholarly literature; they 
are often popular “teaching books,” (the kind of texts teachers use to first introduce 
students to new perspectives); and they are the sorts of books that people are likely to 
share with their friends and families, because they communicate powerful feelings in 
“plain English” without substantial technical language or esoteric concepts.   
 A second consideration is of demographic diversity.  There are very few 
commercially published memoirs of illness and disability by people who are not 
white and middle-class, and clearly there is a discrepancy between the publication 
record and the epidemiology of disability and illness.  My primary purpose here is to 
document how disability and illness are currently presented in memoir, and in turn to 
illustrate how ideas of health and illness are entwined with the construction of 
narrative.  That logic would require that the most representative texts be used, to most 
accurately reflect the representations that actually do exist, and not those that should. 
Indeed, 80% of the texts used fit this description.  However, two illness memoirs 
published by black writers have also been included here, however unrepresentative 
they may be, because they function as the exceptions that prove the rule—they 
illustrate exactly how memoirs of illness and disability are frequently misunderstood 
to be universal experiences of disability rather than disability understood in the 
particularity of race, gender, class, etc.  (The larger implications of disproportionate 
representation will be discussed at length later in the chapter.)  I have also attempted 
to represent a range of sexualities, which has created some asymmetry in the texts 
chosen, but again, that asymmetry is also revealing. 
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 The ten texts chosen for examination are as follows:  
Mental Illness141 
 Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey 
through Depression, A Memoir 
 Lauren Slater, Prozac Diary 
 William Styron, Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness 
 Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America 
 Faith Reidenbach, “Backward by Threes,”  in Restricted Access: Lesbians on 
Disability, edited by Victoria A. Brownworth and Susan Raffo,  
 
Physical Disability142 
 Kenny Fries, Body, Remember: A Memoir 
 Simi Linton, My Body Politic: A Memoir 
 Audre Lorde, The Cancer Journals 
 Nancy Mairs, Waist High In the World: A Life Among the Nondisabled 
 Irving Kenneth  Zola, Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living with a Disability 
 
 I have deliberately omitted memoirs that are explicitly “inspirational” because 
they are of a fundamentally different nature than the non-religious texts.  The focus in 
these texts, as Anne Hunsaker Hawkins notes, tends to be on the explanation of the 
meaning of suffering more than anything else, or, I would add, serve an explicit 
purpose promoting or affirming religious belief.   While this approach is certainly 
relevant to understanding the ways in which people attribute meaning to the 
experiences of disability or illness, including these narratives would necessarily 
complicate and divert this project away from my primary interest, which is the 
relationship between narrative and the construction of pathology. 
                                                 
141 Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman's Journey through Depression, a 
Memoir (New York: Norton, 1998), Lauren Slater, Prozac Diary (New York: Random House, 1998), 
William Styron, Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1990), 
Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1994). Victoria A. Brownworth and Susan Raffo, eds., Restricted Access: Lesbians on Disability 
(Seattle: Seal Press, 1999).Faith Reidenbach, “Backward by Threes,” 
142 Kenny Fries, Body, Remember: A Memoir (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), Simi 
Linton, My Body Politic: A Memoir (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), Audre Lorde, 
The Cancer Journals, Special ed. (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1997), Nancy Mairs, Waist-High 
in the World: A Life among the Nondisabled (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), Irving Kenneth Zola, 
Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living with a Disability (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982). 
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Commonalities and Divergences 
 
 The most important characteristic of this literature is its reformulation of 
authority, and its relocation of where discourse about bodily experience belongs.  
Obviously, all memoir positions the author as the expert to some degree, but in 
literature associated with the disability rights movement, the positioning of author-as-
expert has particular significance as a rejection of medical authority.  To the extent 
that disabled bodies are often understood to have a “medical condition,” they are 
placed physically and discursively under the authority of medicine.  The repositioning 
of the disabled person as the source of the most pertinent and comprehensive 
expertise (at least on the subject of that particular life) is a re-appropriation of 
authority and at least in that capacity, challenges the traditional authority of medicine 
to speak on behalf of “patients.” 
 However, the narratives diverge in how they choose to use this re-acquired 
authority.  The narratives of madness/mental illness tend to use the authority of voice 
largely to reinforce dominant conceptualizations of what constitutes health and 
illness; their goal is usually either to reduce the stigma of madness/mental illness by 
showing that the author is a regular person, just like everybody else, or to urge others 
so afflicted to seek help in the hopes of bettering their quality of life.143  They may 
show some criticism of individual doctors, or perhaps a critique of a mental health 
care system insufficient to societal needs.  Very rarely, however, do they seriously 
                                                 
143 This kind of “public service” approach also echoes through the scholarly literature on the subject.  
For instance, in the opening sentences of a recent volume on depression and narrative, editor Hilary 
Clark writes “…there can never be enough visibility for this illness or condition whose stigma causes 
the sufferer to dissemble and ‘pass,’ foregoing needed treatment, or to withdraw from others in 
shame—a condition misrepresented by myths and stereotypes that inevitably color, and cover, our 
understanding.”  Hilary Anne Clark, Depression and Narrative: Telling the Dark (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2008), 1. 
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question the legitimacy of the medical establishment to issue a diagnosis or treatment 
that pertains to them.  The central question that ultimately differentiates these two 
groups of texts is whether the experience is understood as being fundamentally 
individual in character (i.e., illness) or fundamentally social/cultural (i.e., disability), 
and this determines whether the experience is understood as pathological or not.    
Memoirs of Mental Illness 
 
 The memoirs dealing with mental illness (as these authors characterize the 
experience) tend to conform to trends in contemporary psychiatry, meaning that the 
experience is understood unequivocally as illness (as opposed to a test of religious 
faith, a form of social oppression, etc.), and specifically as illness that can be 
physically located in the brain, in the functioning of neurotransmitters, etc.144  
Perhaps the most striking difference between the memoirs of mental illness and those 
of physical disability is that the memoirs of mental illness frequently cite the DSM 
definition of whatever illness they are experiencing, and some of the earlier narratives 
even included contact information for mental health resources at the end.145  This 
practice of citing the DSM is in some ways a routine borrowing of authority that 
positions the author as a well-informed individual who, by citing the dominant 
diagnostic tool of the trade, speaks with the implicit weight of the medical 
                                                 
144  It is noteworthy that the texts selected here discuss unipolar depression, bipolar disorder (manic 
depression), and anxiety.  There are, of course, memoirs that discuss experiences ranging from 
schizophrenia to dissociative identity disorder (a.k.a. multiple personality disorder) and everything in 
between.  However, there are fewer of these and they are much more sparsely distributed, as are 
narratives of depression or manic depression that portray the diagnosis as a mask and tool for political 
oppression (e.g., Kate Millett, The Loony-Bin Trip (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).).  While an 
argument could be made that the diagnosis qualifies such a book for inclusion here, this study is 
concerned with looking at the idea of pathology and its relationship to bodily experience and the 
inclusion of such narratives here would be inappropriate. 
145 Of the works studied here, Styron, Slater, and Danquah all cite the DSM.   
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establishment behind him or her.  However, this practice of citation is interesting in 
the context of these narratives, as it also serves to establish the author as a reasonable 
person, in the most literal sense of the term as “having reason” or being sane, thereby 
avoiding a potential weakness in credibility.    
 Mental illness narratives also tend to employ one or more strategies to 
separate the illness from the self.  Thomas Couser observes: 
 Although it may seem counterintuitive, narratives of somatic 
dysfunction tend to become life writing to the degree that the writer 
identifies the self with the body.  Thus pure illness narrative tends to 
disengage the body from the self in the way that medical discourse 
often tends to do.  Full life-writing is facilitated, authorized, or even 
required when one assumes that what happens to one’s body happens 
to one’s life…146 
Couser’s assertion, however, presents a curious narrative problem for the writer of a 
mental illness narrative.  If they assert that mental illness is a real physical illness, and 
that illness is located in the brain (which is as close to a physical location of the “self” 
as one is likely to get), then there is an inherent crisis of credibility and personhood.  
Chronology is thus often used to create the necessary distance between illness and 
self.  The narratives of mental illness often begin (excepting anecdotal introductory 
material) with the onset of the illness, rather than at childhood or early adulthood, or 
following a more holistic framing of the life.  They tend to follow a narrative 
trajectory that describes an “ordinary life” interrupted by an illness, which gets 
progressively worse until the proper cure arrives.  Normalcy is then more or less 
restored, often leaving the writer somewhat battle-weary but wiser for the experience.   
In many narratives, there is an implicit distancing of the period of illness from the 
                                                 
146 Couser, Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life-Writing, 14. 
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writer’s current self.  The distancing serves to avoid questions of the author’s 
credibility as witness (e.g., “Then I was sick, now I am well.”)  
 William Styron’s Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness (1990), while not 
the first account of depression ever written, was at the forefront of a wave of such 
memoirs in the 1990s, and in some ways set a standard for those that came after.  
Styron’s popularity and recognition as a novelist no doubt accounts, in part, for the 
memoir’s hitting the bestseller list.   
 Styron opens the narrative in Paris, 1985, at the moment he realizes that “the 
struggle with the disorder in my mind—a struggle which had engaged me for several 
months—might have a fatal outcome”.147   His description of the struggle potentially 
having a “fatal outcome” immediately and firmly places his experience in the context 
of physiological illness, avoiding any possibility of his depression being interpreted in 
romantic terms as a “merely” a Camus-like angst.  The narrative trajectory takes the 
reader through progressive difficulties, unsuccessful psychopharmacological 
treatments of various kinds, equally unhelpful psychotherapy, and ultimately a period 
of profound suicidality that culminated in hospitalization.  As Styron moves through 
time with these unsuccessful treatments, he simultaneously unravels back to what he 
feels is the origin of his depression in the previous summer, when he abruptly quit 
drinking and started taking extremely large doses of the tranquilizer Halcion.  (He 
later firmly identifies Halcion as a contributing factor to his depression in a way that 
strongly suggests that the heavy dosage was tantamount to medical malpractice.)  
 One of the distinguishing features of Styron’s narrative is an insistence that 
depression is a disease.  Styron refers to depression as an “illness” and “disease” 
                                                 
147 Styron, Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness, 3. 
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repeatedly, so while there is no question that he is describing the kind of anguish and 
existential angst that prompted Albert Camus, his literary hero, to remark that the 
only serious philosophical problem was whether to commit suicide, he also clearly 
understands that anguish to be a byproduct of disease, not an entity with meaning in 
its own right.  Styron, who describes himself as interested in medicine and more 
knowledgeable than most, explains the relationship between madness and depression: 
Our perhaps understandable modern need to dull the sawtooth edges of 
so many of the afflictions we are heir to has led us to banish the harsh 
old-fashioned words: madhouse, asylum, insanity, melancholia, 
lunatic, madness.  But never let it be doubted that depression, in its 
extreme form, is madness.  The madness results from an aberrant 
biochemical process.  It has been established with reasonable certainty 
(after strong resistance from many psychiatrists, and not all that long 
ago) that such madness is chemically induced amid the 
neurotransmitters of the brain, probably as the result of systemic stress, 
which for unknown reasons causes a depletion of the chemicals 
norepinephrine and serotonin, and the increase of a hormone, cortisol.  
With all of this upheaval in the brain tissues, the alternate drenching 
and deprivation, it is no wonder that the mind begins to feel aggrieved, 
stricken, and the muddied thought processes register the distress of an 
organ in convulsion.148 
 
Ordinarily, the depression-as-illness stance implies that feelings of anguish aren’t 
quite real because they are merely the effect of “chemicals,” but Styron’s grace and 
skill as a writer is such that he is able to combine two different conceptual arenas— 
“anguish” and “neurotransmitters”—in a way that they don’t seem incompatible.      
 The effort to reconcile personal experience with a medical (and therefore 
“real”) explanation is typical of depression narratives, as is the suggestion of 
justification or absolution that the explanation carries.   In one particularly intriguing 
scene, Styron describes his rude behavior in abruptly declining an invitation to a 
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lunch in his honor from the French committee that is awarding him a literary prize, 
and begs forgiveness, explaining that he is sick with “un problème psychiatrique.”  
Styron’s explicit attribution of responsibility for his behavior to the illness, and his 
concurrent expectation that illness will be understood to be an acceptable excuse for 
the rudeness is provocative: it suggests that he understands himself to be literally “not 
himself,” and that it is the illness, not he, who has control over his actions.149  Despite 
the compassion that his evocative description of his suffering evokes in the reader, it 
is difficult not to also see Styron’s new identification of depression as illness as a 
somewhat self-serving philosophy inasmuch as it excuses him from responsibility for 
his own behavior.  Styron’s recognition of depression as an illness is described as a 
fairly new phenomenon.  After portraying himself as a comparatively knowledgeable 
person with regard to medical issues, “it came as an astonishment to me that I was 
close to a total ignoramus about depression, which can be as serious a medical affair 
as diabetes or cancer.  Most likely, as an incipient depressive, I had always 
subconsciously rejected or ignored the proper knowledge; it cut too close to the 
psychic bone, and I shoved it aside as an unwelcome addition to my store of 
information.”150 [Emphasis mine.]  The “proper” knowledge presents depression as a 
much different phenomenon than did his previous “improper” knowledge.  However, 
although the convenience of the excuse may be suspect, Styron’s fear of suicide is 
tangible and resonates throughout the account.  Recounting the suicides of friends and 
colleagues, Styron clearly considers a cause-and-effect relationship to be obvious, and 
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the fear of suicide as a distinctly possible outcome underlies his argument, whatever 
other purposes it might serve.   
 One of the very curious features of this narrative is Styron’s choice to frame it 
as a memoir of depression, rather than one of medical malpractice.  Styron explains at 
some length that he had been prescribed the tranquilizer Halcion, and at doses three 
times the ordinary strength.  He describes Halcion as a “causative factor in producing 
suicidal obsession and other aberrations of thought in susceptible individuals” and 
observes that at the hospital, when he was prescribed a different drug to help him 
sleep and discontinued Halcion, his suicidal notions soon disappeared.  Perhaps a 
memoir of depression could better capture the existential angst that he clearly felt; or 
perhaps a memoir of being poisoned by prescription drugs would implicitly dismiss 
that the existential angst was quite real to him.  Then, too, the “victims” of illness 
have hope for recovery not only from the illness but from the concurrent association 
of weakness, whereas to be the victim of medical malpractice, when one is ostensibly 
reasonably informed in medical matters, is a somewhat less flattering portrait. 
 Whereas Styron tends to answer the question of the legitimacy of depression 
obliquely, in Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America (1994), Elizabeth 
Wurtzel explicitly focuses on arguing that depression as “real” and different from 
merely being unhappy.  The characterization of depression as an illness, per se, is of 
considerably less significance than making it clear that the experience is utterly 
overwhelming, pervasive, and undeniable.  More than anything, Wurtzel seeks to 
make depression intelligible as a real problem, as she clearly believes she is perceived 
by those around her as malingering. 
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 The trajectory of Wurtzel’s narrative coincides with the onset of her illness at 
age 11.  Her parents divorced when she was two, and much of her childhood was 
spent in confusion and fear, in ways that she attributes to her circumstance as a child 
of divorced parents.  Wurtzel describes in detail her overdoses at summer camp, the 
occasions in which she cut herself with razors, her feelings of being a social outcast, 
and the misery that she presents as the defining characteristic of her personality even 
as she earns a scholarship to Harvard.  It follows the standard depression memoir 
narrative path of opening with the onset of illness, following it down into the depths 
of crisis, and then being resolved through therapy or drugs or both, in this case 
Wurtzel’s relationship with psychiatrist Diana Sterling, who prescribes Prozac. 
 Wurtzel’s memoir was regularly pilloried in reviews for being endlessly self-
pitying and whiny.151   Nevertheless, first as a New York Times bestseller and later 
turned into a major studio movie starring Christina Ricci, Prozac Nation enjoyed 
considerable visibility.152  In some respects, one can see the narrative as tapping into 
some very traditional story lines, i.e., the nearly-tragic coming of age story, the story 
of the tortured and alienated artist, etc.  Though Wurtzel describes in detail the 
unfortunate circumstances of her life, she also regularly punctuates that narrative with 
observations that her mother went to great lengths to ensure that she was comfortably 
(though not luxuriously) provided for, educated carefully, and deeply loved. 
Recounting an exchange with her therapist, she writes: 
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“This is going to sound dumb,” I began, far too aware that everything I 
said was so trite, “but, the thing is, I really don’t feel like I have a right 
to be so miserable.  I know we can look back and say my father 
neglected me, my mother smothered me, and I was perpetually in an 
environment that was incoherent to me, but—” But what?  What other 
excuses do you need?  I wasn’t feeling gross enough to mention 
Bergen-Belsen, cancer, cystic fibrosis, and all the other real reasons to 
be sorrowful.  “But a lot of people have hard childhoods,” I continued, 
“much harder than mine, and they grow up and get on with it.”153 
In this passage, Wurtzel both disrupts the usual Tortured Young Artist narrative and 
reinscribes it: ultimately, her point is that although she hasn’t suffered through 
anything so horrible as the Holocaust—or cancer or cystic fibrosis, which should 
possibly be of greater note in a dissertation on disability studies—she nevertheless 
has suffered as a result of depression and her suffering ought to be understood as 
legitimate as a result.   
 Wurtzel clearly seems to understand that a well-mannered “good girl” is 
expected to diminish her own experiences as meaningless and trite and does so, yet it 
is also quite clear that she is expecting the reader to contradict her and protest, “But 
you do have a real reason to be sorrowful!  You’re depressed!”  Wurtzel’s 
differentiation between depression and “all the other real reasons to be sorrowful” is 
interesting, particularly in the context of this chapter.  Though her tone is very self-
consciously sardonic, she nevertheless makes a serious distinction between her 
depression and the presumably more tangible bodily experiences of cancer and cystic 
fibrosis.  Ironically, this suggests that depression actually is not fully materialized as 
illness for Wurtzel; she does not identify herself as ill in the same way that she would 
if she had cancer, even though she contends elsewhere that depression has the 
potential to be a fatal illness, and one which nearly killed her. 
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 Yet as explicitly as Wurtzel identifies her suffering as a result of depression-
as-illness, she also claims alienated youth as a kind of style and even a point of pride.  
Recalling high school, she writes: 
By then, I was the perfect weirdo by any standard.  This was the year 
of the cheerleader-style miniskirts that Norma Kamali and Betsey 
Johnson had foisted upon the unfortunately fashion-conscious, and all 
the girls at my high school fell into that category.  It seemed 
everybody in school was on the cheerleading squad except me, I alone 
was stuck somewhere in Stevie Nicks-land, showing up every day in 
these long, diaphanous things that nearly reached the ankles of my 
leather riding boots, matched with romantic, loosely tied tops that 
showed off my collarbone.  I was all belts and bows and ties and 
fabric, always weighted down by so much stuff, and this was in the 
beginning of the Reagan-era optimism of the early eighties, the time of 
lightheartedness and good tidings and bright colors.  When all the girls 
adorned themselves with plastic earrings and accessories in turquoise 
and yellow and chartreuse and hot pink, there I was in everything cold 
and dark, silver and lapis hanging from my ears like an old throwback 
to the sixties or the seventies, or maybe to an unhappy time and place 
that everyone who surrounded me didn’t remember or had never even 
been to in the first place.154   
Here, Wurtzel presents her dark mood as manifested in her attire, but despite her 
description of herself as the “weirdo,” she also hints at her prescience in refusing to 
follow the herd, and implies that her darkness is a “cool,” iconoclastic kind of 
alienation. This is by no means the dominant characterization of depression in her 
memoir, but that she can’t seem to resist including it—despite the contradiction to her 
central thesis that she was plagued by an overwhelming, tangible misery that was 
completely beyond her control—suggests that even if depression is understood as 
illness, it is an illness with significant cultural meaning.  
 Of the many autobiographical accounts of depression published in the last few 
years, Lauren Slater’s Prozac Diary is quite possibly the most complex and 
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thoughtful.  Slater was one of the first to go on Prozac, and the publication of Prozac 
Diary marks approximately her ten-year anniversary on the drug.  Diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder at age nineteen, Slater had at various points been 
anorexic, attempted suicide, and was a veteran “cutter” (intentionally cutting the skin 
on her arms with razor blades).  At the time she started Prozac, Slater had been 
hospitalized five times for depression, anxiety, and eventually obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, the problem for which she was referred to the person she calls the “Prozac 
Doctor.”   
 Slater describes her first visit to the Prozac Doctor almost in terms of religious 
ritual, a theme which recurs and is slowly transformed through the course of the 
diary.  After the Prozac suddenly takes effect⎯a revelation, a stunning 
transformation of her entire life⎯the pill itself becomes a mixture of the object of 
worship and the means of worship.  On Prozac, Slater is suddenly released from her 
tight, constant, and intense world of counting calories and checking stove dials.  The 
new freedom is exhilarating, and Slater throws herself into exploring what is now an 
almost entirely unrecognizable world. 
 “Unrecognizable” is perhaps the key word⎯as Slater recounts her 
experimentation with new food, new books, and new friends, she also places these 
new experiences on a virtually blank page.  She writes: 
... Doctors assure the public that psychotropic drugs don’t get a patient 
high; rather, supposedly, they return the patient to a normal state of 
functioning.  But what happens if such a patient, say myself, for 
instance, has rarely if ever experienced a normal state of functioning?  
What happens if such a patient has spent much of her life in mental 
hospitals, both pursuing and pursued by one illness after another?  
What happens if “regular life” to such a person has always meant 
cutting one’s arms, or gagging?  If this is the case, then the “normal 
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state” that Prozac ushers in is an experience in the surreal, Dali’s 
dripping clock, a disorientation so deep and sweet you spin...155 
Without her identity of illness, she doesn't know who she is.  Prozac may have 
brought a cure, but the cure has brought an identity crisis of major proportions.  Slater 
continues: 
After all, when you are sick, there are plenty of places (insurance 
willing) where you can go to get healed, but when you are healed are 
there any places you can go to learn not to be sick?  The very idea of 
having to learn the landscape of health sounds vaguely ridiculous, so 
ensconced are so many of us in the notion that health is as organic as 
grass, in the right conditions growing green and freely.156 
 As Slater became somewhat more accustomed to her expanded life on Prozac, 
she began to consider her relationship to and dependence on the drug, describing it at 
various stages as: a lover; similar to peyote as a cultural means of accessing God; 
(later) as a former lover; and (later still) as a good friend, the presence of whom can 
help a difficult situation but who can’t eradicate a problem completely.    
 At her ten-year mark, Slater is profoundly ambivalent towards Prozac.  
Though grateful that she’s no longer checking stove dials, she is uncomfortable with 
what is essentially a drug dependence, describing herself at one point as an orchid 
with a wide bloom, but one which is growing more or less out of the Eli Lilly 
company.  “It's one thing to be dependent on a drug,” she writes, “but the issues get 
more thorny still if the substance imparts unfair advantage [reference to Peter 
Kramer’s claims that Prozac makes people ‘better than well’].  Thus I wonder, am I 
now entering the wrestling ring of life on psychic steroids?”157   
                                                 





 Slater foreshadows—or perhaps begins a bridge towards—disability studies, 
through her gnawing discomfort with her depression being cast as intrinsically and 
completely pathological.   For example, though Slater clearly claims an illness 
identity, she also clearly values the creativity that she associates (not without 
precedent) with her depression.  She does acknowledge some element of pathology in 
terms of her behavior (rather than in terms of her emotional state.)  Yet despite 
diagnostic criteria focusing on behavior, depression is generally thought of as being 
primarily an emotional or mental disorder that is manifested in behavior.  This is an 
important distinction because it suggests that social construction (in the form of one’s 
position as doctor or patient, for example) creates variations and subtleties in the 
perception of the nature of pathology, creating multiple readings even for a single 
event which both doctor and patient would label pathological.  Slater, a psychologist 
as well as a writer, certainly aligns her experiences with the category of illness, but 
perhaps her concurrent authority as another kind of mental health professional 
permits some philosophical musings about illness, self, brain, and mind. 
 One of the very few autobiographical accounts of mental illness by a person 
of color, Willow Weep for Me focuses very specifically on the intersection of 
Ghanaian Meri Nana-Ama Danquah's experience of depression with her experience of 
life as a black woman.  Danquah tends to follow the standard narrative trajectory, 
though with some variation.158  She begins the main story line with the onset of her 
first major depression when she was twenty-two, having moved to Los Angeles from 
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Washington, D.C. At first, she was enthusiastic about her life in L.A., and started a 
twice-monthly poetry series called “Positive Vibrations through Spoken Word,” 
through which she met a 38-year-old Ghanaian accountant.  They began dating and 
Danquah soon found herself pregnant.  Unfortunately, she also gradually found 
herself unable to cope with the daily tasks of self-care, and her prolonged absences 
led temp agencies to drop her from their lists.   The relationship with the accountant 
dissolved soon after the baby was born, and Danquah found herself in serious straits, 
eventually moving into a run-down building that she managed in exchange for free 
rent, and working a phone sex line to help pay the bills.  When she became truly 
overwhelmed, she moved back to Washington, D.C., where her parents still lived, and 
into her mother’s apartment, which is where her memoir really gets underway. 
 Although Danquah’s narrative is akin to other depression narratives in most of 
its major features, it “reads” somewhat differently.  Though Danquah moves more or 
less chronologically through the main line of the story, she keeps dipping back into 
memory, making the chronology difficult to map.  She has a sense of humor which is 
muted but always present; it is a perhaps some sort of quiet hopefulness rather than 
the cultivated, dry sarcasm of some of her white counterparts.  Danquah’s narrative 
also feels less removed and, in a way, more personal than some other narratives, even 
though she is much less revealing about some of the intimate details.  This reserve 
seems to make the details that she does reveal—e.g., that she sets four separate alarm 
clocks to ring up to an hour and a half before she actually rises—feel very genuine, 
personal, less of a spectacle.  
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 One of the other distinctive features of Danquah’s narrative is the way in 
which she represents lay people  (e.g., not doctors) as major catalysts to action.  For 
example, as Danquah is falling apart in Los Angeles, her friend Eugene tells her that 
he thinks she’s depressed. When she challenges him on his knowledge on the subject, 
he reveals that his mother, a prominent figure in D.C. black middle class society, has 
a seasonal depressive disorder.  Danquah is astonished; she is further astonished when 
she later meets the woman and finds her to be “normal”—and not at all what her idea 
of a depressed person should look like.  Likewise, when Danquah meets Jade, a friend 
of a friend who also ended up in Washington, D.C., she comes to understand that Jade 
is also depressed, recognizing the “masks” involved in covering up the depression.   
This shared experience helps to forge a very strong bond between them.  
 These relationships seem to serve to ease Danquah towards acceptance of the 
diagnosis of depression, which she has resisted because it seems impossible for her, a 
black woman, to be depressed.  She writes, 
Stereotypes and clichés about mental illness are as pervasive as those 
about race.  I have noticed that the mental illness that affects white 
men is often characterized, if not glamorized, as a sign of genius, a 
burden of cerebral superiority, artistic eccentricity—as if their 
depression is somehow heroic.  White women who suffer from mental 
illness are depicted as idle, spoiled, or just plain hysterical.  Black men 
are demonized and pathologized.  Black women with psychological 
problems are certainly not seen as geniuses; we are generally not 
labeled “hysterical” or “eccentric” or even “pathological.”  When a 
black woman suffers from a mental disorder, the overwhelming 
opinion is that she is weak.  And weakness in black women is 
intolerable.159 
This is an intriguing passage for several reasons.  First, Danquah’s assertion that 
mental illness is a different sort of cultural event for different people differentiates her 
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somewhat from most of the other authors of mental illness narratives who tend to 
stick rather closely to the biological “it’s an illness, like diabetes” line of argument, 
and which make little mention of such kinds of variables in their descriptions of their 
cultural contexts.  (This is perhaps not surprising, as these published narratives are 
often written by those who do not seem to see economic or white privilege as being 
relevant factors.)  Second, she does not seriously differentiate between “mental 
illness” and “psychological problems,” in terms of kind, but only in terms of scale, 
which also differentiates her somewhat from the majority of authors who tend to 
understand the phenomenon in terms of physiological illness. For instance, Danquah 
writes, “…when depression reaches clinical proportions, it truly is an illness, not a 
character flaw or an insignificant bout with the blues that an individual can ‘snap out 
of’ at will.” 160 This, of course, suggests that depression that has not yet reached 
clinical proportions could be a character flaw or insignificant bout with the blues.   
(Interestingly, Danquah notes that depression in black men is “pathologized” but says 
no more about it, a curious contradiction in a book that claims that depression is an 
illness, e.g., pathological, in the technical sense.) 
 On the surface, Danquah’s framing of depression as an illness when in clinical 
proportions can be read as the standard protest that depression “really” is an illness, 
and should be taken seriously; however, by the time of publication in 1998, this 
argument had been made repeatedly in mainstream depression memoir and was losing 
some of its novelty.  Instead, I think it can also be read with a slightly different slant, 
perhaps one that better reflects Danquah’s Ghanian cultural heritage.  On the whole, 
Danquah seems much less likely to compartmentalize and distinguish between 
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“herself” and “her illness” in the way that, say, Wurtzel or Styron do.  Danquah’s 
white counterparts seem to understand depression-as-illness at least to some extent in 
the context of the mind-body split, so that while body (which in this case includes the 
physical brain) may be ailing, mind still remains somehow aloof and protected from 
accusation of illness.   Danquah, who came to the U.S. as a child and who remains 
partially connected to Ghanaian culture, does not seem to need to perform this kind of 
contortion, or at least not to the same degree; the book chronicles her slow acceptance 
of her depression as real, but once she does, she understands it as an integral part of 
her life.  Likewise, an explication of her childhood (and descriptions of traumatic 
events or potential causes of psychological distress) is noticeably absent.   Danquah 
only briefly mentions the fact of her emigration or her parents’ divorce.  She notes, 
“When I first started therapy, I found myself unable to talk about my parents or admit 
that I felt a tremendous amount of rage toward them.  I imagine that it was because in 
African as well as African-American cultures, talking about one’s parents is frowned 
upon; only an ingrate would do such a thing.”161  Unlike her white counterparts who 
usually either explicate the psychology of their youth in detail, or protest that they 
had happy childhoods (to lend support to the biological illness explanation), Danquah 
says very little—again the exception that proves the rule. 
 Finally, Restricted Access: Lesbians on Disability, edited by Victoria 
Brownworth and Susan Raffo, provides an additional “diverse” perspective to the 
narratives examined here.  However, I will treat this anthology both as a whole object 
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(foreshadowing extended discussion of the “physical disability narratives”) and also 
focusing more particularly on four short essays about mental illness.162   
 As a complete object, it represents one of the better efforts to date at 
compiling a demographically diverse pool of memoirs.  Published by a feminist press 
with academic associations, it is often cited in disability studies/activism when an 
effort is being made to include lesbian perspectives on disability, probably because 
the editors so explicitly address the categories of identity that shape much of 
contemporary cultural studies.  In the introduction, for instance, Brownworth remarks 
that at the onset of her disability she went looking for writing by working-class 
disabled lesbians, found a conspicuous absence of such texts, and that this absence 
became much of the impetus for the establishment of this collection.  Brownworth’s 
efforts to publicize explicitly lesbian perspectives on disability encapsulates the social 
and intellectual advantages of representing a variety of points of view, as well as the 
difficulties of using social categories of difference as demarcations to stand in for 
intellectual differences.  (This latter point will be discussed at length later in the 
chapter.)   Brownworth notes the difficulty that she and co-editor Raffo had in 
obtaining manuscripts by non-white contributors, a point which echoes my own 
difficulty in obtaining a demographically diverse pool of published narratives to work 
with.  Even if still unsatisfactory to Brownworth, the pool of contributors is at least as 
diverse in terms of race, sexuality, and class as anything else on the subject in a 
mainstream publication, and that effort towards a balanced demographic 
representation is intellectually and methodologically appropriate, if nothing else.  
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 Twenty-seven of the thirty-one contributions in Restricted Access are 
primarily about physical disability, by which I mean that the authors address the 
experience of living with a physical disability.  As with much feminist writing 
anchored in 1970s and 1980s feminist thought, however, there is a desire to represent 
the experience of the whole person, so there are ways in which the traditional 
Western mind/body distinctions are intentionally blurred.  Also predictably, in most 
ways these contributions have a very disability-activist perspective, with a rejection 
of the pathology of disability, and call for greater opportunities for people with 
disabilities in the name of social justice.   
 However, the four contributions explicitly addressing the experience of 
madness/mental illness are interesting and unusual in how they have been fitted into 
the rest of the collection.  These narratives, in general, follow the usual illness-
recovery trajectory of the mental illness category, and do not reject pathologization, 
instead using their acceptance of the label of “mentally ill” as a call for greater 
availability for services, much like the popular public service announcement-style 
framing of breast cancer, which uses every survivor as a reason to expand the 
research agenda and to make diagnostic services more accessible.  The editors note: 
“As a consequence of this complicated and often brutal history, 
[referring to the pathologization of lesbianism itself] lesbians have 
frequently refused to seek help for mental illness—and have found 
wellsprings of support for that refusal within the lesbian community.  
Fear of the medicalizations of the past—which continue in some 
communities—has led to other problems for lesbians with mental 
illness; there remains far more support within our community for 
rejecting therapeutic care, particularly medications, than for utilizing 
those often quite necessary therapies.”163  
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 Like most other mental illness narratives, contributor Faith Reidenbach begins 
her narrative at the onset of her first experience with mania, in 1979, during her 
sophomore year at a women’s college in Massachusetts.  She describes her erratic 
behavior, how things seemed to her in contrast to how they seemed to her friends, and 
chronicles the events leading up to her friends taking her to the school infirmary to 
see a psychiatrist—and most notably, the pointed efforts of her friend Angela to make 
sure that Reidenbach not enter the psychiatric care system.  From there, she describes 
her struggles with diagnosis and treatment, including a typical series of doctors and 
therapists with varying assessments and treatment plans, also with the typical 
emotional roller-coaster of the impact of her experiences on friendships and romantic 
relationships.  At the time of writing, Reidenbach had come to accept the diagnosis of 
manic depression (bipolar disorder) and emphatically supports medical treatment, 
e.g., in her case, lithium.  She frames her experience as a “hidden disability” and is 
grateful that she received treatment, though noting that some experiences were more 
helpful than others.164   
 Reidenbach’s narrative, like others in Restricted Access, is different from the 
usual published mental illness narrative in one important way; the cultural context(s) 
through which psychiatric treatment is perceived.  Reidenbach’s friend Angela 
explicitly perceived psychiatric treatment as a kind of cultural policing of gender and 
behavior, a process from which her friend should be rescued—a perspective that 
should be understood in the context of 1970’s feminism and lesbian-feminism, and 
also in the context of the behavioral approaches to psychology that were in greater 
fashion at that time.  Reidenbach also notes her parents’ concern that her lesbianism 
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and manic depression were related, and recounts experiences with feminist therapists 
that perceived psychiatric illness as the oppressive tool of a male medical 
establishment. In other words, Reidenbach’s immediate cultural context—that of 
1970’s and 1980’s feminist communities—was an environment with a view of 
psychiatric treatment and diagnosis distinctly different than that seen in mainstream 
publications today.  The official diagnosis of lesbianism as an illness has been 
vanquished from psychiatry, and indeed seems oddly anachronistic.  But it is the 
realization that the psychiatric treatment that Reidenbach received in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s had such a strong behavioral component that seems most shocking 
today, and serves to illustrate how comprehensively biological approaches to 
psychiatry have become the contemporary standard.  The way that Reidenbach’s 
narrative presents the mental illness experience itself is really quite typical: it is the 
contrast between what “resistance” in service to people with disabilities could mean 
in Reidenbach’s different historical contexts that is intriguing. 165 
Memoirs of Physical Disability 
 
 Like the memoirs of mental illness, the memoirs of physical disability also 
conform to several narrative conventions, the most important of which is a refusal of 
the medical model of disability as equivalent to deficiency or pathology.  In some 
ways, this is a delicate matter; it is difficult to seriously frame progressive or terminal 
illness as merely a matter of a spectrum of human variation, as some people with 
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other kinds of disabilities often do.  But even where pathology for the disability itself 
is granted (e.g., for illness such as multiple sclerosis or cancer), these narratives 
emphasize that there are other ways of thinking about and living with these things that 
refocus attention to what is possible, beautiful, or enjoyable, rather than seeing all 
aspects of the experience as detractions from a “normal” life. 
  Memoirs of physical disability usually serve as the chronicle of a journey to 
acceptance—usually less about acceptance of the physical disability or illness itself 
than acceptance of the need to consider disability a political category or issue.  
Without exception, all of the memoirs studied here include some revelation that some 
sort of social/political action is needed, whether that action is indirect, such as raising 
awareness about disability by writing about one’s personal experience with it, or 
more direct, such as street protests or lobbying for stronger occupational, consumer, 
and environmental protections, to help reduce the ingestion of carcinogens by an 
unsuspecting public. 
 Closely related to the embracing of disability as a political category is the 
emphasis on developing a personal community of people who share some 
understanding of what the experience of living with disability is like.  This is not so 
much the “support group” sort of help with tips for transferring from wheelchair to 
toilet, but rather the sort of community in which it is not necessary to accommodate 
the discomfort of nondisabled people.   To some extent, this overlaps with the 
recognition of the need for actions toward social justice, but there is also a way in 
which it is an assertion that the ability to socialize without always being 
uncomfortable in one’s own skin is something akin to a fundamental human right.  
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 Occasionally described as the book that gave birth to disability studies, Irving 
Kenneth Zola’s Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living with a Disability (Temple 
University Press, 1982) frames the author’s experiences visiting Het Dorp, a Dutch 
residential facility for people with disabilities.  Zola was physically disabled as a 
result of polio and a later car accident, and used back and leg braces in combination 
with a cane to move around, but he did not claim an identity as a disabled individual 
prior to his visit.   His visit to Het Dorp was originally a professional one, in his 
capacity as a medical sociologist at Brandeis University.   In an act that comes to be 
the catalyst to epiphany (and that would generally be critiqued today for its 
presumptuousness), Zola chose to use a wheelchair during his week-long 1976 stay so 
that he might “live like a resident.”  In fact, it is Zola’s experiences at Het Dorp that 
lead him to identify much more actively as a person with a disability in the political 
sense of the term.  The epiphany Zola describes is actually quite bizarre to the 
contemporary reader who is more apt to wonder how he managed not to see himself 
as disabled prior to his visit. 
 Zola describes the 165-acre Het Dorp as a relative utopia, at least compared to 
other facilities for people with disabilities.  At Het Dorp, residents have private 
apartments designed specifically to be wheelchair accessible with electrical outlets 
placed higher, windows and countertops lower, and spacious bathrooms also suitably 
arranged.  The residences are organized into tree-lined streets with a central kitchen, 
library, and church/community center. “Dogelas”—essentially a pool of personal 
assistants—provide services at the request of residents, but do not anticipate needs or 
provide medical care.  (Medical services are available on site if needed, however.) 
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 Zola’s dual perspective as both a medical sociologist and as a person with a 
disability, in combination with his adoption of the wheelchair for the week, come 
together to elicit a revelation that despite, or perhaps precisely because of, his own 
disability, he has internalized a series of prejudices and assumptions about people 
with disabilities.  The change of scenery resulting from his use of the chair sensitizes 
him to how many ordinary activities have new layers of practical difficulties that 
must be managed, but more importantly how some of the practical difficulties have 
substantial social effects on the residents.  He observes that there are very few units 
available for married couples, despite considerable demand, and from a surprisingly 
honest and straightforward conversation about sex (with a male resident who is 
unable to masturbate by himself) and gains an understanding that even this 
comparatively respectful facility falls far short of recognizing the full humanity of its 
residents.  For Zola personally, these observations and others combine to elicit an 
epiphany that he has a greater solidarity and identification with the residents than he 
thought he did. 
 Simi Linton’s My Body Politic: A Memoir, is a hybrid of memoir and 
academic essay that also describes her journey to becoming politically identified as 
disabled.  Published by the University of Michigan Press—notable among academic 
presses for its disability studies series—and written by one of the eminent disability 
studies scholars and activists, it is an exceptional book in many respects.  Linton’s 
memoir did not make her a celebrity within disability studies or amongst paraplegics; 
she was already known for her academic scholarship and this text, though written in a 
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conversational style and based on the terms of her personal life, is no less “argued” or 
theoretically informed than her scholarly work.   
 Linton’s memoir begins with the 1971 car accident that killed her husband and 
best friend and left her paralyzed from the waist down.  This temporal structure is 
reflective of the sudden onset of Linton’s career as a person with a disability, but is 
explicitly much less concerned with the onset of the paralysis per se than the process 
of her becoming disabled in the political, epistemological senses of the term.  Linton 
observes, “The new shape and formation of my body were set on that April day; the 
meaning this new body would have for me took years to know.”166   
 Linton’s memoir seems to flow in fits and starts; she gives comparatively little 
attention to formal experiences that academics usually tend to set greater weight on 
(such as her graduate work) and a great deal more attention, proportionally speaking, 
to moments that are perhaps best described as deeply symbolic, such as an occasion 
in college when she encountered a man using a wheelchair who was engaging in a 
playful yogurt-throwing dance/foodfight with three women on a Berkeley street.  
Likewise, Linton often reminisces, which also disrupts the trajectory and gives the 
impression of a strung-together series of discrete moments.  Briefly summarized, 
Linton covers her recovery from the accident, her rehab center experiences, her first 
solo apartment without her husband, and her decision to go to California to study.  
She returned from California to study psychology at Columbia University, and later 
went on to obtain a Ph.D. in counseling psychology from NYU.  She taught for more 
than a decade, and left academia a few years ago to pursue a career as a consultant 
and activist, promoting disability in the arts. 
                                                 
166 Linton, My Body Politic: A Memoir, 3. 
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  Linton’s history emphasizes her relationships with other people with 
disabilities, and the way that knowing them has changed her thinking.  The climax of 
the memoir seems to be either the chapter in which she describes the people whom 
she’s met through the Society for Disability Studies (SDS), or the chapter in which 
she describes her second husband, and their lives with their various friends, many of 
whom are also disabled.  While it is certainly understandable that Linton’s journey to 
political identification as disabled would be strongly, even primarily, shaped by the 
people with whom she surrounds herself, as well as the people with whom she finds 
many things in common, her relationships become overtly politicized in some ways 
but less so in others.  For example, when Linton describes her friends from SDS, she 
describes beautiful and talented people without whose support (and rapport) she could 
not manage, and the importance she places on them emphasizes the degree to which 
something can seem either possible or impossible depending on the kind of 
knowledgeable encouragement and collaborative support is available.   
 However, Linton is also describing the intelligentsia of academic disability 
studies, many of whom inform much of the scholarly direction of the field and/or do 
various kinds of work with autobiographical narrative or other forms of representing 
personal experience.  Linton’s representations of the people she knows from SDS or 
similar situations certainly can and should be read as providing respectful (and 
generous) portraits of people with disabilities and a legitimate counter-narrative to the 
discourse of disability-as-deficiency, but the modest size of the community also 
makes the interrelationships complicated.  Linton, for example, sits on the editorial 
board for the “Corporealities: Discourses on Disability” series for the University of 
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Michigan Press, and her chapter on her friends from SDS includes portraits of other 
members of the editorial board and the series editors.  My Body Politic is not a part of 
that series, but the fact of its publication through the University of Michigan Press (a 
press of choice in disability studies) and not a trade press publisher is notable 
nevertheless, because some of those figures—Linton included—are simultaneously 
subject matter, author [Linton only, in this case], and influential in the publication of 
disability-related texts from this university press.  I make this point not to suggest 
impropriety, but to illustrate that a fairly small number of people have, through 
multiple roles, an exponentially large impact on the circumstances of production of 
this narrative, in both the literal sense of its production as a discrete book and also in 
a more abstract way of producing alternative (i.e., alternative to disability-as-
pathology) discourse on disability.167  Though mediated by a different and much more 
respectful set of expectations about the appropriate kind of discourse on disability, the 
self-referentiality inevitably means that Linton’s memoir operates under narrative and 
discursive constraints just as surely as her fellow authors at trade presses. 
 Kenny Fries’s Body, Remember is a very “written” memoir, perhaps the most 
obviously framed as a journey to political acceptance.  It is crafted carefully to 
develop and unfold several intertwining stories at once, reflecting Fries’s tangled 
process of coming to terms with himself as a disabled, gay, Jewish man.  Fries’s 
narrative argues for a conception of disability as a political identity by paralleling it 
with his Jewishness and gayness.    
                                                 
167These overlapping relationships are easily attributable to the small  size of this emerging field and 
the necessity of having editorial boards composed of prominent figures in the field. 
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 Fries’s description of his early life is fairly centered on issues of power and its 
manifestations: physical pain from surgeries; the emotional pain of realizing the 
social meaning of his body’s difference; and abuse from his father and older brother.  
While memoirs written by people with a disability-rights consciousness often portray 
the medical establishment in a predominantly negative light, Fries describes his 
experiences in more complicated terms.  Although he describes the considerable fear 
he felt prior to his childhood surgeries (which in at least one circumstance he suggests 
manifested itself as a sudden fever the night before the surgery) and the pain 
thereafter, his relationship is ambivalent.  It might be described as being genuinely 
and warmly grateful that it wasn’t worse.  For example, Fries appears to have 
relatively warm feelings towards his pediatrician, Dr. Milgram, who performed 
several surgical interventions to allow Fries to walk in his own way on his own legs, 
rather than recommending amputation to “manage” the missing and unusually-formed 
bones in his feet and legs.  Though these interventions were painful and Fries implies 
that they may possibly have contributed significantly to back pain in later years, 
Milgram remained Fries’s trusted doctor until the end of his career.   
 A trip to Israel in early adulthood is an important component in solidifying 
Fries’s identification as a disabled, gay, Jewish (and American) man.  The men he 
meets there are both like him and not like him, and these juxtapositions help to 
crystallize for him who he is, by allowing him to see who he is not.  In a clever 
literary parallel of the theory of the social construction of disability, what Fries’s legs 
“mean” in Israel plays a much smaller role in this section than in others in the book; 
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“disability” as a category of identity is greatly overshadowed by Jewishness, 
Americanness, and gayness.   
 The third section of the memoir focuses on the way in which these identities 
come together, and come together in crisis.  In this section, Fries describes a 
complicated period of crisis in his life, where the discontinuities have multiplied to a 
point in which Fries feels himself becoming fractured.  Physically, he begins to 
experience significant back pain and an exaggeration of his limp, which he attributes 
to a gradual change in his stride, yet for a long time he doesn’t seek medical care.  
Emotionally, he begins to experience severe depression.  Two major romantic 
relationships are marred by distrust, infidelity, and domestic violence; stress is also 
contributed by the discovery that his first partner is HIV positive, and that the second 
is an alcoholic.  Fries eventually checks himself into a psychiatric ward when he 
becomes suicidal.  In the course of psychotherapy, Fries begins to recall more vividly 
experiences of childhood abuse by his father and brother, and realizes that the 
separation of his life into discrete categories (and experiences) is contributing to his 
sense of disjuncture and unrealness.   
 Predictably, Fries’s psychotherapy and the addressing of these issues results in 
healing and a bridging of these facets of life kept separated.  Fries confronts both his 
brother (who turns out also to be gay) and father about the abuse and reaches 
reconciliation with his family.  In some technical  respects, the reconciliation serves 
as the denouement, inasmuch as there was an obvious crisis to be resolved 
(depression as a result of the repression and fragmentation of parts of his life).  
However, Fries’s reconciliation is complex, and the resolution of some crises lead to 
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new difficulties rather than resolution.  A scene in which Fries visits the Holocaust 
museum and observes remembrances of the Jews and homosexuals, noticing the 
absence of acknowledgement of the people with disabilities who also perished.  Fries 
imagines a monument for people with disabilities, similar to the Homomonument, 
and this imagining sets the tone for the closing of the memoir.  Although at the end 
Fries has come to a place of maturity where fragments of his life are no longer hidden 
or concealed, disability remains the uncertain component.  In many ways, Fries’s 
resolution with disability is that it is something that has no resolution; any answers as 
to what it means will always be provisional.  
 Nancy Mairs echoes Fries’s acceptance of the provisional.  She frames her 
Waist-High in the World: A Life Among the Nondisabled as being grounded in her 
own experience, as that is the one thing she has that no other writer can offer, and 
thus, because MS is interwoven through her life, MS is interwoven through her 
writing.  Mairs claims that a “desire for accuracy” prompts her to describe herself as a 
cripple rather than as a person with a disability, because as she says, “In truth, though 
I am severely crippled, I am hardly disabled at all, since, thanks to technology and my 
relatively advantaged circumstances, I’m not prevented from engaging in the 
meaningful activities and relationships the human spirit craves.”168  Mairs uses this 
“desire for accuracy” to startle her reader and vandalize expectations about what life 
with a disability is supposed to be.  Perhaps better described as a shock tactic, she 
frequently describes in a very matter-of-fact way details that most people would 
choose to conceal (e.g., incontinence) to put her illness’ worst face forward.  Of 
                                                 
168 Mairs, Waist-High in the World: A Life among the Nondisabled, 13. 
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course, this approach presents a life comprised of small annoyances and pleasures, 
and nothing near as dreadful as most people would imagine her life as a whole to be. 
 Mairs divides the book roughly into two sections, the first dealing with the 
“Home Truths” of her life in her body, and the second dealing with “The Wider 
World” and her place in it. This arrangement is essentially the journey to activism 
story told elsewhere; as Mairs adapts to the gradual deterioration of her body, she also 
gradually assumes a progressively greater identification in her life in her body, and 
thus a progressively greater identification with the position of other disabled people.   
Mairs avoids the idea of pathology, not so much as a conscious refusal, but rather by 
making the idea seem irrelevant as she focuses instead on the practical materialities of 
what her body can and cannot do.  She takes a similar approach to her depression; 
although she resists drugs at first, she comes to the conclusion that they make her feel 
better and therefore are useful to her.   
 Mairs engages the politics of disability throughout, but her engagement with 
the most personal aspects are among the most interesting.  Mairs recounts a day in 
which there is a “breakdown in the Nancy-care apparatus,” meaning that schedules 
got mixed up and there was nobody there to help her get dressed and started in her 
day.  Mairs then recounts the specific challenges of getting washed and dressed, in 
which it becomes very clear that even a slight mistake could have dire consequences; 
if her wheelchair is parked too far away and she falls getting from bed to chair, there 
will be nobody there to help her for several hours.  She couldn’t even telephone for 




And now I am in front of the computer, limp but victorious: clean, 
clothed, and fed.  I can hardly wait for George to get home so I can 
gloat.  He’ll be horrified, I know, but also hopeful at this sign that I’m 
not yet wholly incapacitated.  We both recognize that such efforts 
aren’t a wise use of my limited resources and that the more often I try 
to repeat them, no matter how cautiously, the more likely some serious 
mishap would become.  I owe much of today’s triumph to pure luck.169 
Of particular note is her recognition that her ability to perform certain tasks are not 
necessary good for her—e.g., they represent a risk, and a more beneficial long-term 
approach considers her overall safety more prominently.  Mairs engages the ideas of 
“dependence” and “independence” in far more sophisticated ways than do most 
writers, and does not approach them as direct metaphors for her political status.  
Rather, Mairs offers a completely different sort of model for approaching the 
valuation of abilities; her journey is not only about coming to accept activism as a 
necessary part of her activities, but also about accepting her MS as a set of 
complicated circumstances that offer both limitations and new opportunities. 
 Audre Lorde’s The Cancer Journals is one of the more challenging narratives 
described here because it bears little formal relation to what has become the usual 
disability rights-based memoir, yet it is undeniably true to the spirit of the enterprise.  
First published in 1980, The Cancer Journals predate Zola’s Missing Pieces by two 
years, and should be understood in context: The Cancer Journals were published with 
a feminist audience in mind.  Lorde’s writing and thinking was organized around her 
feminist sisters, especially her black feminist sisters, and in any event, the idea of a 
disability rights audience did not yet really exist.   
 The Cancer Journals is comprised of a series of essays interspersed with 
excerpts from Lorde’s journal, and thus does not proceed along the usual 
                                                 
169 Mairs, Waist-High in the World: A Life among the Nondisabled, 68. 
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chronological path.  Section I, “The Transformation of Silence into Language and 
Action,” is a manifesto on the need to speak as an antidote to fear, silence, and 
isolation.  Section II, “Breast Cancer as a Black Lesbian Feminist Experience,” 
recounts Lorde’s discovery of the tumor, her surgery, and recovery.  Section III, 
“Breast Cancer: Power vs. Prosthesis” examines the ways in which cultural pressures 
to wear a prosthesis deny the life-threatening and life-changing implications of 
cancer. 
 Rather than the “journey to activism” story that many of the disability rights 
memoirs tell, Lorde is already immersed in the context of social justice activism at 
the beginning of the book.  Instead, Lorde struggles to fight the cancer with 
conventional Western medicine and equally, struggles to resist assimilation into what 
she sees as a silencing of the experience of breast cancer.  It is worth noting that The 
Cancer Journals were published by a small lesbian feminist press and not a major 
corporate press; Lorde published with both in her lifetime, but in 1980, perhaps the 
story of a one-breasted black lesbian warrior poet not trying to conceal her surgery 
would have been a bit too much for a mainstream corporate press.  
 Again, it is an African American woman writer who serves as the exception 
that proves the rule, in this case the (dominant, and white) rules about writing 
disability memoir.  Lorde uses The Cancer Journals to address her audience in a 
more holistic way than is typically seen in later memoirs, which seem much more 
targeted to disability as a discrete identity.  Perhaps the most striking difference is 
that Lorde does not internalize the identity of “cancer patient” too deeply, embracing 
it merely as a descriptor of her particular circumstances rather than as a way of 
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thinking about herself.  Instead, she identifies as a black lesbian dealing with multiple 
forms of injustice and oppression, among which she counts environmental pollution, 
hormone- and chemical-laden foods, and the generally unhealthy conditions in urban 
areas in which many non-white people live.  The famous scene in which Lorde is 
chastised by a nurse for failing to wear a prosthestic breast form to conceal the fact of 
her mastectomy (because it’s “better for morale” for the other women in the waiting 
room) is unquestionably a vivid illustration of the silencing and erasure of disability-
related issues, a concern shared with many disability rights activists.  Even where 
other writers acknowledge other facets of identity (e.g., Kenny Fries’s 
homosexuality), disability is treated as a very specific kind of oppression to be 
overcome, and thus, a very specific kind of identity.    
 In contrast, Lorde approaches her cancer (and all the accompanying attitudes 
that demand its erasure) more as a symptom of a larger disease, the systems of power 
that relegate certain people (people of color, women, lesbians, and those who have 
breast cancer) to having to deal with greater proportions of injustice.  From a 
historical perspective, comparing her memoir with those written more recently is akin 
to comparing apples and oranges, and there is much to be said about understanding 
her narrative in context.  But I’m not at all sure that such narratives are necessarily 
read in a historical context, at least by those who might read such things outside of 
scholarly pursuits, and Lorde’s acclaim means that she is read much more widely 
today than Irving Zola, for instance, perhaps because the anger with which she 
approaches the injustices of her cancer and its treatment.170  Lorde approached her 
                                                 
170 “Injustice” requires a bit of contextualization here, as Lorde is not talking about individual justice in 
the sense that it is unfair when bad things happen to good people.  Lorde is angry about the difficulties 
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cancer as she approached the rest of the world; cancer was but one of many problems 
in the world that needed addressing, and in many ways her tone in addressing her 
cancer is quite like a lot of 1970s lesbian feminist work.  My point here is that The 
Cancer Journals functions quite nicely as an ahistorical artifact; what is on the page 
fits in well with what contemporary disability studies argues, and of course any 
current social justice movement would cheerfully claim Lorde as a member to the 
extent possible.171  Therefore, Lorde is posthumously and retroactively claimed by the 
disability rights movement, and by disability studies. I am not necessarily critical of 
this posthumous inclusion, as it seems consistent with who she was and how she 
thought.  But it does seem to capitalize on an awareness of the political work that 
memoir can do, with something of an intent to make The Cancer Journals into one 
more foot soldier in a larger army.  The fact of that usage underscores my point in this 
chapter that these narratives take on something of a life of their own; they necessarily 
become read in context with other stories that are classified as “like” or “unlike” in 
ways that are at least as much about contemporary agendas and power as about the 
documents or writers themselves.  
Standardizing the Story 
 
 One of the most interesting questions about these groups of narratives as a 
whole is the issue of diversity, in both the demographic and the intellectual sense of 
the term.  As noted earlier, the overwhelming majority of narratives of mental illness 
                                                                                                                                           
of living a healthy life in an urban environment and clearly considers pollution of various kinds as a 
possible cause of her cancer.  Likewise, she is angry about her options in treatment, both of which she 
sees as evils perpetrated by a racist, sexist, capitalist society, and to that extent Lorde essentially 
approaches all cancer or related illness as having some component of injustice.   
171 Gary L. Albrecht, Encyclopedia of Disability, 5 vols. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2006), 468.  The inclusion of Lorde in the Encyclopedia speaks to the standard acceptance of her status 
as a figure in disability studies. 
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and physical disability—when framed primarily as such—are written by (apparently) 
middle-class whites. 
 The predominance of middle-class writers is fairly easily explained.  As the 
publication record obviously does not correlate to epidemiology, it’s important to 
understand these texts as reflecting a very limited portion of the population, e.g., 
those for whom the writing and publishing of books is a response that can be 
contemplated in the circumstances of the adversity of disability (whether the 
adversity is an illness itself, or the many forms of social/cultural discrimination and 
disadvantage that tax the time and energy of disabled people who are otherwise 
unhampered by their disabilities).  
 The issue of race is more complicated.  Of the narratives in significant popular 
circulation (e.g., meaning published by mainstream publishing houses, not those 
published through vanity presses), there are very few illness narratives by people of 
color, and no memoirs by people of color about other kinds of physical disability (to 
the best of my knowledge), at least not in this type of published book form.  I would 
speculate that the fact that there are so few is probably reflective of a wide range of 
factors: publication patterns in general, differences in preferred media, and 
differences in preference for the kinds of stories that people want to tell (i.e., the kind 
of illness narrative described in this chapter might reflect a level of individual self-
absorption that is unflattering in some cultural contexts.)172   
                                                 
172 In his doctoral dissertation, Tyrone Stewart examines the politics of emotionality in black men, 
most especially in terms of clinical depression, and provides a number of arguments for developing a 
more complex understanding of the experience of depression. Stewart challenges the pathology of the 
diagnosis of depression by arguing that a holistic understanding of the emotional experiences of black 
men should be more inclusive of other factors (e.g., the particularity of race).  Likewise, he makes a 
compelling case that black male depression can be seen in a much wider range of forms of self 
expression than the depression memoir, many of which tend to reject outright classification as 
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 However, the functioning of what one might call “popular conceptual 
taxonomies” also complicates the issue, and can hinder and obscure the relationship 
of illness or disability to other conceptual categories.  For example, even when illness 
plays a significant role in the context of an autobiography, it can disappear from the 
way a book is classified by Library of Congress subject heading in libraries, or by 
commercial booksellers. Thomas Couser also notes that nonliterary celebrities’ 
accounts of illness are usually shelved in the biography section  (e.g., Arthur Ashe’s 
Days of Grace).173  The hierarchy of popular conceptual taxonomies also means that 
“race” can trump “disability” or “illness,” so that even contemporary biographies of 
such figures as Harriet Tubman or Wilma Rudolph do not generally appear under 
“disability” or “illness.”   
 I believe this kind of taxonomy to be enormously significant, though 
quantification is beyond the scope of this study.  For example,  I originally found 
Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s memoir of depression—classified by the LOC headings 
first as “Danquah, Meri Nana-Ama—Mental Health,” then as “Depressed persons—
United States—Biography” and finally as “Afro-American women—Biography”) 
shelved in the African-American section in Borders Books and Music (as well as a 
random selection of other bookstores, as I usually now check out of curiosity.)   
Interestingly, however, one online equivalent—the “Customers Who Bought This 
                                                                                                                                           
depression.  But Stewart does not seriously challenge the idea of the experience of depression itself as 
anything other than “bad.”  Tyrone Anthony Stewart, “What Is a Black Man without His Paranoia? 
Clinical Depression and the Politics of African Americans’ Anxieties toward Emotional Vulnerability” 
(University of Maryland, 2009).  It is also my understanding that a forthcoming book from Sheri L. 
Parks will address some issues related to emotionality in black women.  Sheri L. Parks, Fierce Angels: 
The Strong Black Woman in American Life and Culture (New York: One World/Ballantine, 2010) 




Item Also Bought” section on Amazon.com—associates this book overwhelmingly 
with other memoirs about mental illness.   
 All of that said, I am not suggesting that what is needed is just for more 
people of color who have experienced illness or disability to write about it and 
publish.  I am addressing the absence of narratives of illness or disability by people of 
color because I believe inquiry into the causes of the disproportionate representation 
is important to an ethically and an intellectually rigorous methodology.   I am not the 
first to notice this publication pattern; both Thomas Couser and Victoria Brownworth 
have also observed this difficulty and challenge.  Brownworth muses: 
“Wide-ranging as I feel the essays in Restricted Access are, and 
diverse as the complement of writers appears to be, it is important to 
point out that even working together from our very different 
communities…we would have liked to have had an even broader 
representation, particularly from women of color.  In the past, I have 
chastised other editors in reviews for lack of representation of people 
of color; I believe it is incumbent upon white editors to make 
anthologies as inclusive as possible.  In my other anthologies, I have 
striven for racial balance and managed to achieve it.  This anthology, 
for reasons neither Susan nor I understand, and despite our best efforts, 
was far more difficult.  Though Susan posted our call for submissions 
on every conceivable Internet site, the responses were, throughout the 
process, predominantly from white women.  I do not make this point to 
excuse having fewer women of color—especially black women—than 
either Susan or I would have preferred in this anthology, but to signal 
what I believe is a concern for both the disabled community and the 
lesbian community.  Access to the Internet by women of color seems 
far more restricted than it is for white women even when they are of 
limited income…  Nearly every woman writing in Restricted Access, 
regardless of her particular disability, geographical location or class 
status, speaks of a certain level of isolation.  Not surprisingly to me, 
women of color and women who are not middle class felt this more 
acutely.  If the writers in Restricted Access represent a cross-section, 
as we hope they do, of disabled lesbians in America, then women of 
color and poor and working class women are even more isolated from 
lesbian community than their white, middle-class sisters.  Perhaps an 
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anthology of writing by disabled women of color compiled by disabled 
women of color would help bridge that gap.”174 
Brownworth, however, is too simplistic in her implicit assumption that a broad 
demographic representation will actually ensure intellectual diversity.  In theory, her 
efforts to collect contributions from a demographically diverse base should result in a 
more representative view of the experiences of illness and disability—but it doesn’t 
seem to work that way.   
 I don’t mean to say that Brownworth should be focusing on matching the 
demographic distribution of her narratives to epidemiology, though of course that 
might prove interesting.  One of the contentions of this chapter is that the fact that 
memoirs of disability and of madness/mental illness can be grouped so easily into two 
kinds of camps and share so many characteristics means that  there are remarkably 
few kinds of stories that are granted legitimacy, or at least legitimacy in the sense of 
being understood to be published in a mainstream press.  Because there are two such 
very distinct narrative sub-genres suggests that, culturally speaking, there are 
disability-specific ways to articulate the experience of being physically disabled or 
mentally ill.   Further, it is no coincidence that these sub-genres correspond to a 
difference in the framing of the experience as fundamentally an individual 
phenomenon of pathology (mental illness) or a socio-cultural phenomenon of 
oppression (physical disability).   
 However, it is curious that the mental illness narratives give no hint at all that 
the concept of mental illness has been severely criticized as means to judge and 
control individuals who do not conform.  Foucauldian-type arguments that judgment 
                                                 
174 Brownworth and Raffo, eds., Restricted Access: Lesbians on Disability. 
 151 
 
against an individual for behaving in ways unacceptable to society can and is 
materialized as mental illness have been around for nearly half a century and have 
had profound effects on academic thought and grassroots movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s.175   In fact, grassroots versions of Foucauldian-type analyses of how the 
disabled physical body is also disciplined and punished have been a cornerstone of 
the (physical) disability rights movement, and can be seen echoing (albeit sometimes 
distantly) throughout the physical disability narratives examined here.   
 Thus, it strikes me as fairly significant that the idea of mental illness as a tool 
of social control would have disappeared altogether from these memoirs (except 
when directly rejected, as by Faith Reidenbach).  The continuing association of 
“pathologization” with “oppression” by the disability rights movement/disability 
studies enterprise means that the concept has not faded from the public arena, but it 
has clearly changed, at least as pertains to mental illness.  The most obvious 
explanation is the shift in psychiatry towards biological (“chemical”) explanations for 
experiences such as depression, with drugs for addressing the same.  This shift, which 
has been accompanied by a concurrent lessening of the stigma of experiences of at 
least certain kinds of mental illness (e.g., depression and anxiety) has made it possible 
to redraw the boundaries where mental illness, physical disability, stigma, and 
oppression are concerned.    
 These memoirs of mental illness and physical disability routinely get grouped 
together through a variety of the “popular conceptual taxonomies” I mentioned 
                                                 
175 By the term “Foucauldian-type arguments” I also refer to the work of Thomas Szasz, Ronald Laing, 
and Erving Goffman, who made similar arguments about mental illness functioning as a form of social 
regulation, but whose arguments were more pertinent to the on-the-ground activities of the anti-
psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s.   Similar lines of thought make extensive appearances in 
feminist theory as well.   
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earlier—Nancy Mairs’ description of them as “the literature of personal disaster,” my 
own grouping of them as a subject of analysis in a dissertation, their suitability as 
subject matter for inspiring stories of “courageously overcoming a challenge” on the 
six o’clock news.  However, it seems that memoirs of mental illness and physical 
disability actually do very different kinds of cultural work.   
 While the authors of the mental illness narratives reinscribe the idea of 
pathology onto the experience, they simultaneously distance themselves from the 
experience.   The writing of the experience—from the safe position of relative 
health—almost functions as a kind of “passing” inasmuch as it is simultaneously a 
validation of the practice of judging (e.g., by endorsing the interpretation of the 
experience of mental illness as a pathology) and an attempt to camouflage themselves 
so as not be counted among those on the negative side of the judging.   The more the 
experience can be conceived of as not really about them—i.e., by making it a matter 
of brain chemistry and not of the Self—the more it can be managed and distanced.  
To appropriate Judith Butler’s theory on the cultural “intelligibility” of gender, one 
could argue that because biological psychiatry (unlike psychoanalysis) offers a way to 
still be read as being on the right side of the pathological divide, they have an 
investment in keeping that boundary intact.   
 The authors of the physical disability narratives, on the other hand, focus on 
deconstructing the boundary between “health” and “illness,” (inclusive, in this sense, 
of disability not related to disease) and seek instead to establish the idea of a spectrum 
of human variation.  The narratives focus on a rejection of pathology—not always of 
the fact of illness or impairment in a literal way, but of the associated expectations 
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that the person with the disability will assume a marginalized social role and quietly 
retreat from most kinds of public life.  Like the illness narratives, there is an 
implication that the story has been written to help the prospective reader, but the 
overall sense is that the help provided will be less about learning to cope with 
limitations than of encouraging a journey towards activism and a demand for full 
social inclusion.  Here, the expectation in the telling of the story is that the author will 
be recognized as a full person through the telling of the story, and that this kind of full 
personhood, along with a degradation of the idea of “normal” through the “spectrum 
of human variation,” will achieve a far more radical restructuring of cultural power. 
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Chapter 5: Gender Identity Disorder and the Enforcement of  
Medical Authority 
 
 This chapter examines the political “work” done by pathologization of 
transgenderedness through the creation of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) as a mental 
illness—not so much as an example of heteronormative gender regulation, as is 
usually the primary concern of scholars working on transgender-related subjects, but 
rather as a way of looking at the process of pathologizing other experiences classified 
as mental illnesses by the mainstream medical establishment.  One of the assumptions 
made in this project is that the idea of mental illness is sufficiently “naturalized” in 
mainstream American culture that the central mechanisms for the production and 
reproduction of medical authority are virtually invisible when approached straight on, 
and must be examined from an oblique angle to make the machinations visible.   
 Gender Identity Disorder provides an ideal subject for such examination 
because it lies at the margins of the category “mental illness.” It is clearly delineated 
as a psychiatric disorder in all formal respects, yet it is also fundamentally different 
from the kinds of phenomena historically identified as mental illness (i.e., words such 
as “psychosis,” “lunacy” and “insanity,” are not easily linked to “gender identity”).  It 
is also a useful subject because it has come into existence as a medicalized disorder—
as opposed to an idiosyncracy or a perversion—in fairly recent history.  Gender-
related distress caused by living in the “wrong body” only really began to be a 
popularly meaningful idea in 1952, when Christine Jorgensen made her very public 
transition, and Gender Identity Disorder was not officially included as a 
diagnosis/pathology in the DSM until 1980.   
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 In this chapter, I will examine two documents that formally govern the 
diagnosis and treatment of Gender Identity Disorder: (1) the relevant sections of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (Text 
Revision), properly abbreviated as the DSM-IV-TR, but more casually known just as 
the DSM, and (2) the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's 
Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders (6th version), published in 2001.176  
Since that time, the organization has changed its unwieldy name, and is now the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH).  I will focus 
primarily on the Standards of Care, which effectively build on the DSM criteria and 
serve as clinical guidelines governing practice and implementation, and which are 
also in some ways more intriguing because of their (relative) subtlety.  The DSM 
criteria for Gender Identity Disorder effectively position “healthy” gender behavior in 
such traditional terms that it is easy to see what is being pathologized, and why; 
however, the question of how the DSM criteria actually function to pathologize non-
normative bodies/persons is more difficult to see because the DSM is such a central 
part of an incredibly large and complex system for regulating ideas of health and 
illness.  Because the Standards of Care function in a much smaller domain, it’s easier 
to see how they work.  I will examine these documents both as texts and as objects 
with agency, a somewhat artificial distinction intended to get at the fact that 
sometimes what a text says is not the same as what it does.  As texts, I am interested 
in representation and rhetoric; as objects, I am interested in how representation and 
rhetoric are used to do certain kinds of work. 
                                                 
176 The International Classification of Diseases-10 also has an entry for Gender Identity Disorder, but 
in the United States, the DSM is the standard manual in professional practice.   
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 My concerns in this chapter are with the kinds of stories that are told in 
relation to Gender Identity Disorder, what those stories are taken to mean, and how 
those stories are reproduced.  As with other chapters, I focus on how the personal 
story engages with the construction of pathology, but in this particular context I am 
concerned with two kinds of stories not normally encompassed in the realm of 
autobiography: the “patient’s story,” meaning what a patient/client tells a doctor 
about what he or she is feeling, and the “doctor’s story,” meaning what a doctor tells 
the patient/client and the world about his or her own engagement with the specific 
pathology.177  These stories are then situated in the context of conceptualizing gender-
related distress as Gender Identity Disorder.  While this approach might not work in 
other situations, the contested pathologization and treatment of Gender Identity 
Disorder has produced both patient/client and scholarly commentary on the 
requirements of the “patient’s story,” and likewise, the particular features of the 
Standards of Care offer substantial material for the “doctor’s story.” 
 What these stories are taken to mean is complicated, particularly the “patient’s 
story.”  Because it is given under somewhat compromised circumstances, I will 
argue, it becomes suspect—perhaps of necessity, and perhaps rightly so, but with 
complicated consequences.  If there is only one kind of story about an “illness” that 
will serve to secure for its teller the desired “treatment,” then of course people will 
tell that story, at least in the examining room.  The required story, in this case, is of an 
entire lifetime feeling as though one were the “other” gender in the binary gender 
                                                 
177 I include “client” in preference to “patient” in part from a disability rights sensibility, but also 
because it helps to paint the engagement in less familiar terms, encouraging a fresh look at the relations 
between the parties. 
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system, of wanting all the trappings of traditional gender presentation and behavior, 
and of having “appropriate” (heteronormative) objects of sexual desire.178  
 But some tellers are deliberately lying when they tell this story, as they readily 
admit in other contexts.  This lying is provoked by a primitive ideology of binary 
gender unable to accept any shades of gray, and, to my mind at least, is substantively 
different from the many mean and nasty kinds of lies that human beings create.  I cast 
no judgment on lies of this nature, but it is important to identify that they are lies 
nonetheless, and to understand the context in which they occur, because it challenges 
the understanding of the personal story, and shapes how certain kinds of personal 
narratives become the only “right” story to tell about whatever feature of difference is 
at hand.    
 When lying is known to occur in this context, and yet some people continue to 
tell that same story outside of the examining room, the story becomes suspect and its 
tellers become vulnerable to accusations of being sellouts or dupes, identifying 
themselves in contextually normative ways to gain social approval at the expense of 
their less normative peers.  That suspicion, however, conflicts with the “nothing about 
us, without us” philosophy informing the disability rights/disability studies project, 
                                                 
178  It is important to remember that there are a variety of perspectives on the validity of the binary 
gender system.  First, there is the population of people that have historically been understood as 
“transsexual,” e.g., which do not contest the binary gender system as a system but who locate 
themselves as being in the “wrong body.”  This is a perspective on gender identity disorder that is 
roughly similar to the narratives of madness/mental illness described in the previous chapter, and is 
exemplified in such works as Holly [Aaron] Devor, FTM: Female-to-Male Transsexuals in Society, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997) or Jamison Green, Becoming a Visible Man, 
(Nashville:Vanderbilt University Press, 2004),  Second, there is also an important critique of the 
legitimacy of the binary gender system itself, which is also a kind of critique of the pathologization of 
bodies that are non-normative in terms of gendered presentation.  There is a very large and important 
body of academic literature in this area, but for purposes of this study, the principle is perhaps most 
clearly exemplified in Halberstam’s study of the separation of “masculinity” from the male body.  
Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998).  
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and challenges the reliance on the personal story or personal experience a valuable—
perhaps the most valuable—form of knowledge. 
The Standards of Care and Medical Authority 
 
 The first story told through the Standards of Care is one about the medical 
establishment,  including both psychiatry and the related semi-medical fields of 
clinical psychology, social work, and therapy by any other name—fields that 
incorporate psychiatric classifications and diagnoses, even if diverging in some ways 
on the best approaches to treatment.   This story is about the medicalization of 
transgenderedness; about the pathologizing of the phenomenon overall but 
specifically focused on the contemporary rhetoric that positions “professionals” as de 
facto gatekeepers.   
 One of the most striking features of The Harry Benjamin International Gender 
Dysphoria Association's (HBIGDA) Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders 
(6th version) is that the document is extremely concerned with outlining the standards 
of care in terms of persons, rather than procedures; i.e., the Standards place a 
considerable emphasis on defining the roles of both providers and receivers of care.  
The statement of purpose asserts (emphasis mine): 
The Purpose of the Standards of Care. The major purpose of the 
Standards of Care (SOC) is to articulate this international 
organization's professional consensus about the psychiatric, 
psychological, medical, and surgical management of Gender Identity 
Disorders. Professionals may use this document to understand the 
parameters within which they may offer assistance to those with these 
conditions. Persons with Gender Identity Disorders, their families, and 
social institutions may use the SOC to understand the current thinking 
of professionals. All readers should be aware of the limitations of 
knowledge in this area and of the hope that some of the clinical 
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uncertainties will be resolved in the future through scientific 
investigation. 179 
 The statement of purpose provides an initial framing of an issue of contention 
that runs throughout the Standards; namely, the delineation of “the professional” and 
his or her rights in relation to “the patient.”  The fact that there was a perceived need 
for such a delineation, however, indicates some instability of the diagnosis, treatment, 
and the general cultural/professional legitimacy of Gender Identity Disorder as a 
disorder.  From a Butlerian perspective, the statement actually suggests the opposite 
of what it says: there would only be a need for a declaration of consensus (which, by 
its very nature, suggests that this viewpoint is obvious and widely shared), if in fact 
the reverse were true and no such professional consensus existed.  To be precise, the 
organization states that it articulates “this [WPATH’S] international organization’s 
professional consensus,” [emphasis mine] but evokes its “international” membership 
to suggest that its consensus should be interpreted as the consensus of a much broader 
group of professionals. 
 Gender Identity Disorder, the subject of all this contention, was created and 
introduced into the DSM in 1980.  The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for Gender 
Identity Disorder (as presently written) include a specific code for children, and 
another for adolescents and adults.  The primary criteria include “a strong and 
persistent cross-gender identification” and “persistent discomfort with his or her sex 
or sense of appropriateness in the gender role of that sex,” which must not be 
concurrent with a physical intersex condition and which must cause “clinically 
                                                 
179 World Professional Organization for Transgender Health Inc., Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Identity Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth 
Version (World Professional Organization for Transgender Health, 2001 [cited August 1 2009]); 
available from http://wpath.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf. 
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significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.”180   
  The initial positioning of Gender Identity Disorder as a mental disorder is 
presently understood—by academic historians, at least—as an effort by progressive 
individuals within the medical profession to reach a tolerable practical solution to a 
thorny philosophical problem.   Joanne Meyerowitz’s 2002 How Sex Changed: A 
History of Transsexuality in the United States remains the definitive history on what 
might be called the era of transsexuality, meaning the period when the twinned ideas 
of sex and gender as a binary, representative system were challenged by those who 
wished to change their bodies to match their preferred gender role.  In chronological 
terms, this stretches roughly from Christine Jorgensen’s transition in 1952 through the 
1970s.181  Because much of the popular understanding of these categories closely 
followed the authority of the medical establishment and its understanding of these 
categories, her study examines in some detail the careers of doctors such as Magnus 
Hirschfield and Harry Benjamin, considers the ways in which medical perspectives 
were neither uniform nor uncontested, and includes substantial evidence that 
transgendered people sought to participate actively in the shaping of access to 
medical services.  (Her efforts at balance notwithstanding, I find it telling that one 
                                                 
180 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
Iv-Tr). 
181 Joanne J. Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). A note on terminology: The explosion of the ideas 
of “queer” and “transgender” and all the variations of meaning associated with those terms have made 
“transexuality” a difficult word to use now even in historic specificity.  It seems inherently dated, a 
reference to a kind of change that existed in a more simplistic political economy of sex and gender than 
now exists, and feels as though it is a concession to the more conservative, medical configuration of 
the phenomenon.  For that reason, I will use “transgendered” to refer to individuals diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder and seeking hormones or surgery, even though the term “transgender” is 
often now understood to encompass a variety of gender identities and expressions that do not involve 
engaging with Gender Identity Disorder or the medical establishment. 
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reviewer defined the study as “trac[ing] the changes in attitudes among medical 
professionals and the establishment of a separate diagnostic category”—a good 
example of how (medical) professional definition of a phenomenon is implicitly 
understood as, if not the only legitimate definition, at least the default one.182 )   
 Overall, Meyerowitz represents the events leading to the establishment of the 
diagnostic category of Gender Identity Disorder essentially as a series of 
compromises between multiple conflicting interests.  Meyerowitz generally portrays 
the doctors who performed surgeries, prescribed hormones, and asserted the 
legitimacy of the need for such services as doing so in a good faith effort to serve the 
needs of their clients, even though criticisms of the pathologization of transgenderism 
were made by transgendered individuals at the time.  Consequently, she portrays the 
creation of Gender Identity Disorder as an achievement of sorts, at least in context, 
because by establishing a formal theoretical basis for the diagnosis and treatment of a 
disorder, it legitimized the use of hormones and surgery and made the treatment of 
clients with Gender Identity Disorder something that a doctor could do without fear 
of charges of malpractice or “local mayhem,” (statutes preventing the mutilation of 
healthy males, originally envisioned relative to concern about attempts to avoid 
military service). 
 Without disputing Meyerowitz’s assessment of the intentions behind the 
establishment of Gender Identity Disorder, I seek to illustrate that the establishment 
of Gender Identity Disorder nevertheless reflects an expansion of medical authority in 
                                                 
182 Vern Bullough, "Review of Meyerowitz, 'How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexualism in the 
United States'," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 77, no. 4 (2003): 984. 
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ways inconsistent with most other kinds of elective services and procedures.183  Riki 
Anne Wilchins’ fantasy on a rhinoplasty consultation makes the point succinctly: 
 “How do you know you want rhinoplasty, a nose job?” he inquires, 
fixing me with a penetrating stare. 
 “Because,” I reply, suddenly unable to raise my eyes above his 
brown wingtips, “I’ve always felt like a small-nosed woman trapped in 
a large-nosed body.” 
 “And how long have you felt this way?” He leans forward, 
sounding as if he knows the answer and needs only to hear the words. 
 “Oh, since I was five or six, doctor, practically all my life.” 
 “Then you have rhino-identity disorder,” the shoetops state flatly. 
My body sags in relief.  “But first,” he goes on, “we want you to get 
letters from two psychiatrists and live as a small-nosed woman for 
three years… just to be sure.”184 
Wilchins’ point is that such treatment would be inconceivable were the “disorder” in 
question not concerned with disrupting conventional notions of sex and gender.  185 
 However, the concern here is with the expansion of medical authority through 
the establishment of treatment eligibility guidelines that transform an individual’s 
pursuit of a somatic procedure into a psychiatric disorder.  The Standards of Care 
require one letter for hormone therapy or breast surgery (either to enlarge or reduce), 
and two letters for genital surgery, with further stipulations: “If the first letter is from 
a person with a master's degree, the second letter should be from a psychiatrist or a 
Ph.D. clinical psychologist, who can be expected to adequately evaluate co-morbid 
psychiatric conditions. If the first letter is from the patient's psychotherapist, the 
                                                 
183 Some would argue with my use of the term “elective,” on the grounds that the “necessity” for such 
surgery is highly subjective.  That point is well taken,  but my purpose here is just to distinguish 
between planned surgeries and emergency procedures where the client/patient is routinely not 
consulted. 
184 Riki Anne Wilchins, Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender (Ann Arbor: 
Firebrand Books, 1997), 63. 
185 This is not strictly true, as the diagnosis of Body Dysmorphic Disorder is now also used to prevent 
“excessive” cosmetic procedures of other types. Sander L. Gilman, Making the Body Beautiful: A 
Cultural History of Aesthetic Surgery (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Victoria Pitts-
Taylor, Surgery Junkies: Wellness and Pathology in Cosmetic Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2007). Both of these studies discuss at length controversies surrounding cosmetic 
procedures of various kinds,  
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second letter should be from a person who has only played an evaluative role for the 
patient. Each letter, however, is expected to cover the same topics. At least one of the 
letters should be an extensive report.”186   
 These eligibility guidelines represent quite an extensive expansion of the 
psychiatric enterprise, so to speak, so as to be functionally necessary to obtain 
hormones or surgery.  Though the Standards of Care explicitly state that 
psychotherapy is not an absolute requirement for triadic treatment, in context, there is 
an implication that for most people, psychotherapy will be required. 
Psychotherapy is Not an Absolute Requirement for Triadic 
Therapy. Not every adult gender patient requires psychotherapy in 
order to proceed with hormone therapy, the real-life experience, 
hormones, or surgery. Individual programs vary to the extent that they 
perceive a need for psychotherapy. When the mental health 
professional's initial assessment leads to a recommendation for 
psychotherapy, the clinician should specify the goals of treatment, and 
estimate its frequency and duration. There is no required minimum 
number of psychotherapy sessions prior to hormone therapy, the real-
life experience, or surgery, for three reasons: 1) patients differ widely 
in their abilities to attain similar goals in a specified time; 2) a 
minimum number of sessions tends to be construed as a hurdle, which 
discourages the genuine opportunity for personal growth; 3) the mental 
health professional can be an important support to the patient 
throughout all phases of gender transition. Individual programs may 
set eligibility criteria to some minimum number of sessions or months 
of psychotherapy.187  
Likewise, the last sentence functionally undermines the rest of the paragraph as it 
indicates that it is permissible for individual programs (e.g., individual clinics) to set 
more restrictive guidelines that do entail psychotherapy as an absolute requirement.  
                                                 
186 World Professional Organization for Transgender Health Inc., Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Identity Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth 
Version.  Letters are typically presented to the internist or endocrinologist prescribing hormones, or to 




Curiously, the result is to require something that is normally considered 
“treatment”—therapy or counseling—to confirm a diagnosis of psychopathology.    
 The same section of the Standards of Care goes on to describe the desired sort 
of relationship between the therapist and the client, and to identify the goals of 
therapy as “to help the person to live more comfortably within a gender identity and 
to deal effectively with non-gender issues.”188  In general, this section of the 
Standards describe an approach that positions gender in the context of a “whole 
person,” that deals not only with specific issues of gender identity but also how they 
fit with the person’s work, family, and other kinds of relationships.  While a 
comprehensive approach would seem to be a logical one, and probably very useful to 
those who truly seek assistance and not merely formal validation, the Standards of 
Care bury within the rhetoric of support an act of force (perhaps even violence): the 
transgendered individual must display trust in the therapist:   
The therapist should make clear that it is the patient's right to choose 
among many options. The patient can experiment over time with 
alternative approaches. Ideally, psychotherapy is a collaborative effort. 
The therapist must be certain that the patient understands the concepts 
of eligibility and readiness, because the therapist and patient must 
cooperate in defining the patient's problems, and in assessing progress 
in dealing with them. Collaboration can prevent a stalemate between a 
therapist who seems needlessly withholding of a recommendation, and 
a patient who seems too profoundly distrusting to freely share 
thoughts, feelings, events, and relationships.189 [emphasis mine] 
“Trust” and “distrust” effectively become metaphors for “submission” and 
“noncompliance.”  It’s difficult to understand the grounds on which the WPATH 
Standards of Care Committee would think that anybody would want to submit to 
having his or her “thoughts, feelings, events and relationships” probed and reviewed 





by a therapist if that person did not have any doubt about his or her desire to obtain 
hormones or therapy.  The underlying presumption is that medical and semi-medical 
professionals have an inalienable right to determine the circumstances when their 
services are needed, and in effect to issue a judgment of pathology (“distrusting”) if 
there is any resistance.  “Distrusting” seems, from a Marxist perspective, to be a 
perfectly appropriate response to the suggestion that a person should purchase 
services for a need defined by an authority that stands to profit form the sale of the 
services—and this response works in a more abstract sense of cultural regulation as 
well. 
 It is, however, the assumption of the superiority of professional knowledge 
that is most important here.  The question of what constitutes a “professional” looms 
large in this examination and a few words about assumptions and values are 
appropriate.  It is unfashionable to offer criticisms of the helping professions and 
difficult to critique one’s colleagues, but I contend  that such actions are also 
necessary if the idea of professionalism or professional respect is to retain any real 
meaning.  I don’t doubt that therapists can offer transgendered and transsexual people 
real and substantial help in sorting through complicated thoughts and feelings, but I 
take issue with the notion that holding a master’s degree in social work in and of itself 
constitutes appropriate qualifications to make decisions about what is best for another 
person and his/her body.   In other words, I am concerned with the way that these 
guidelines deploy power to serve the interests of the “professionals”—not necessarily 
as individuals, but certainly as a class.  Such an explicit use of power “on behalf of” 
the presumed best interests of others is highly questionable from a social justice 
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perspective, as such arguments have been used to justify unfair and even inhumane 
treatment of other human beings on countless occasions, but it is equally offensive on 
an intellectual basis.    
 Perhaps the most obvious question to ask about a document that so clearly 
separates the qualified professional from the unqualified layperson is who created it, 
in the sense of the creators’ qualifications.  As a general rule, professional credibility 
is established through transparency; it should be easy to see who is making decisions 
in a professional organization and who those individuals are (particularly in terms of 
their professional qualifications, affiliations, etc.), and this kind of transparency is 
generally considered to be an issue of ethics.  In medicine and psychology—the 
dominant fields relevant to Gender Identity Disorder—organizations such as the 
American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association include 
recommendations related to transparency among their ethics guidelines.190 
 WPATH does not make the professional identities of the Standards of Care 
Committee members as clear as it might.  It’s not at all uncommon for organizations 
comprised primarily of “professionals” to include (hypothetically) representative 
members of the constituencies that the field or organization purports to serve, and 
normally these alternative qualifications are described in biographical sketches or 
even by title (e.g., Consumer Representative).  The Standards of Care Committee 
website lists the committee members and their highest degree earned, but it does not 
                                                 
190 For example, the American Medical Association includes guidelines on peer review, and the 
American Psychological Society includes guidelines on the representations of credentials in public 
statements.  American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 9.10 - Peer Review 
([Issued prior to April 1977; Updated June 1994.] [cited August 29 2009]); available from 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion910.shtml.  American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists 




specify the field.  More problematically, WPATH does not provide any biographical 
information for those whose participation on the committee is best explained by 
qualifications other than a terminal degree, and this creates a certain awkwardness.  
Of the eighteen members of the Standards of Care Committee in 2001, four are 
publicly identifiable as transgendered (though not on the WPATH website): Holly 
(now Aaron) Devor, Ph.D.; Sheila Kirk; M.D.; Anne Lawrence, M.D.; and Jude 
Patton, PA-C.  Of course, it’s possible that other members of the Standards of Care 
Committee may also be transgendered and choose to keep that information private. 
But by not clearly distinguishing community participants from professional 
participants, WPATH invites speculation (at least from external audiences) that the 
transgendered participants serve on the committee in part because of their non-
professional credentials (particularly as there appear to be two transmen and two 
transwomen, which could well be coincidental but hints at controlled inclusion).  This 
functions to detract from their professional credibility even where it should not be in 
question, and can be seen as a particularly subtle and egregious form of tokenism.  On 
the flip side, by not explicitly identifying community participants as being invited to 
participate on the grounds of having a different sort of expertise, WPATH 
compromises the idea of qualifications; however wonderful a therapist Patton might 
be, surely certification as a physician’s assistant is not an appropriate professional 
credential for this kind of committee.191  The identification of discipline would seem 
not only useful but essential from a professional ethics perspective, especially as a 
                                                 
191 In an interview, Jude Patton confirmed the intent of the committee was to have a “consumer 
advocate,” but noted that there was concern about having an advocate unlikely to support practices that 
positioned doctors as gatekeepers. Deborah Rudacille, The Riddle of Gender: Science, Activism, and 
Transgender Rights (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005), 177-78.  
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good portion of the Standards seek to explicitly define the appropriate credentials for 
caregivers.   
 In the context of the Standards of Care, the definition of qualifications and 
appropriate credentials is well beyond an issue of good management or even ethics; it 
is a concern that calls into question the legitimacy of the Standards, by its own stated 
purpose.  The articulation of “this international organization’s professional 
consensus” invokes the rhetoric of professional authority and expert knowledge, 
presumably to ensure patient wellbeing, and establishes requirements concerning 
provider credentials.  For example, the criteria for the “Adult Specialist” are: 
The education of the mental health professional who specializes in 
adult gender identity disorders rests upon basic general clinical 
competence in diagnosis and treatment of mental or emotional 
disorders. Clinical training may occur within any formally 
credentialing discipline -- for example, psychology, psychiatry, social 
work, counseling, or nursing. The following are the recommended 
minimal credentials for special competence with the gender identity 
disorders:  
1. A master's degree or its equivalent in a clinical behavioral science 
field. This or a more advanced degree should be granted by an 
institution accredited by a recognized national or regional 
accrediting board. The mental health professional should have 
documented credentials from a proper training facility and a 
licensing board.  
2. Specialized training and competence in the assessment of the 
DSM-IV/ICD-10 Sexual Disorders (not simply gender identity 
disorders).  
3. Documented supervised training and competence in 
psychotherapy.  
4. Continuing education in the treatment of gender identity disorders, 
which may include attendance at professional meetings, 
workshops, or seminars or participating in research related to 
gender identity issues.192 
                                                 
192 World Professional Organization for Transgender Health Inc., Harry Benjamin International 




Yet the committee, which is in effect making decisions about the entire population of 
individuals seeking hormones or surgery, does not itself meet the kind of 
credentialing requirements that it defines as the “minimal credentials” to make 
decisions on behalf of single transgendered person seeking hormones or surgery.  
This is a disturbing contradiction.  One wonders, if half the committee members 
aren’t qualified to make such decisions by the committee’s own definition, on what 
basis are they qualified to establish the standards, particularly as the document is 
positioned as a collective professional position?  Figure 1 presents the information I 
was able to obtain on each committee member by searching databases covering the 
professional literature (e.g. PubMed, LGBT-related databases, etc.), databases 
covering newspaper coverage and biographic materials such as Who’s Who (Lexis-
Nexis Academic), and Google.  In the cases in which researchers were associated 
with universities or hospitals, I took their qualifications at face value with the 
knowledge that such institutions typically require verification of credentials at the 
time of hiring.  It is far more difficult to obtain information on the credentials on 
living people working in private practice, especially when they do not have a 
particularly flourishing career publishing in scholarly or peer-reviewed journals.   
 Of the 18 members of the committee, fewer than half can be publicly 
identified as holding the credentials required in the first criterion alone, which 
requires a “master’s degree or its equivalent in a clinical behavioral science field.”  
Meyer, Bockting, Cohen-Kettenis, Coleman, Di Ceglie, Kuiper, Webb, and Wheeler 
all hold Ph.D.s in psychology or a related field, specialize in psychiatry, or hold an 
M.S.W., thereby meeting the qualification (assuming that they obtained the degrees 
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from accredited institutions).  Patton’s educational credentials could not be 
ascertained.  One might make a plausible argument that Schaeffer, who describes 
herself as a psychologist, might also have obtained comparable counseling training if 
her Ed.D. were in an area such as counseling and school psychology, but education, 
as a field, is not normally considered to be a “clinical behavioral science.”  Webb 
qualifies with her M.S.W., though her Doctor of Human Sexuality was earned at the 
Institute of Advanced Study of Human Sexuality in San Francisco, an institution 
which holds neither national nor regional accreditation. 
 The rest of the committee is comprised of doctors who have specialized in an 
area of medicine, such as plastic surgery, that does not meet the criterion of a 
“clinical behavioral science” field. Of particular note is Anne Lawrence, who appears 
to have resigned her hospital position in 1997 after allegations about an inappropriate 
examination of an unconscious client, and now practices psychotherapy (holding a 
valid Physician and Surgeon license in the State of Washington).193  Trained as an 
anesthesiologist, Lawrence appears to have been practicing psychotherapy without 
the minimum credentials required by the committee, and to have been doing so for 
several years at the time of the 2001 publication.  She apparently obtained a Ph.D. 
from the Institute of Advanced Study of Human Sexuality, but again, this institution 
is not accredited, the normal way of validating an institution’s ability to provide 
                                                 
193 Documentation on the investigation was collected and disseminated by the author of a transgender 
resources website. Andrea James, TS Roadmap [Appendix to "the Anne Who Would Be Queen"] 
[website, cited September 5 2009]; available from http://www.tsroadmap.com/info/lawrence/anne-
lawrence-incident.html..  Lawrence’s own website indicates that she holds a M.A., a M.D., and a Ph.D.  
Anne A. Lawrence, Transsexual Women's Resources (About the Author) [cited August 22 2009]; 
available from http://www.annelawrence.com/twr/index.html.  However, neither her website nor a 
substantial sampling of her recent publications indicate the institution or discipline of her Ph.D.  An 
editorial in Transgender Tapestry states that Lawrence received a Ph.D. in 2001 from the Institute of 
Advanced Study of Human Sexuality in San Francisco.  International Foundation for Gender 
Education, "[Opinion] Concerns About Dr. Anne Lawrence," Transgender Tapestry 105 (2004).  
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quality education.  All private practitioners the United States were determined to hold 
the appropriate state licenses to practice legally.    
Figure 1.  Qualifications of WPATH Standards of Care Committee Members 
Name Degree194 Discipline/Specialization/ 




M.D. Pediatric Psychiatry, 
Pediatric Endocrinology 
Kempner Professor of Child 
Psychiatry, Department of 
Psychiatry and Behavioral 
Sciences, University of 




Ph.D. Psychology Associate Professor, Center 
for Sexual Health, University 




Ph.D. Psychology Professor, Department of 
Medical Psychology, VU 




Ph.D. Counseling and Student 
Personnel Psychology 
Professor and Director, 
Program in Human 
Sexuality, University of 
Minnesota Medical School 
Domenico 
DiCeglie  
M.D. Psychiatry, child and 
adolescent gender disorder 
[Practicing psychiatrist], 





Ph.D. Sociology Professor, Department of 
Sociology, University of 







Retired.  Professor Emeritus, 
Vrije Universiteit of 





Plastic surgery Department of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery, 
Netherlands Cancer Institute, 
Antoni van Leeuwenhoek 
Hospital 
                                                 
194 Where I could determine an affiliation with a hospital or university, I have considered this sufficient 
evidence of the acquisition of the degree.  Information that I could not verify but which I don’t have 
any particular reason to doubt is in brackets. 
 172 
 
Name Degree194 Discipline/Specialization/ 
Field of Practice 
Affiliation/Notes 
Sheila Kirk  [M.D.] [Surgery, gynecology] Apparently retired from 
private practice.  Opened 
Transgender Surgical & 
Medical Center with two 
other physicians with 
university hospital 
appointments; some 
professional publications.  
Center is now closed.   
Bram 
Kuiper  
Ph.D. Clinical psychology Since 2000, Director of the 
Helen Dowling Institute, 
specializing in psycho-
oncology.  Previously a 
psychologist at the VU 
hospital in Amsterdam. 
Donald 
Laub, Sr. 
M.D. Plastic Surgery Adjunct Clinical Professor at 
Stanford University, private 





Anesthesiology/unknown Worked as an 
anesthesiologist until 1997, 
following an investigation 
into a complaint about an 
inappropriate vaginal exam 
on an unconscious patient.  
Holds a current Physician 
and Surgeon license in 
Washington State.  Currently 
provides psychotherapy, 
counseling about gender 
concerns and 
consultations/evaluations.    
Yvon 
Menard  
[M.D.] Plastic and reconstructive 
surgery 
Private practice specializing 




M.D. Plastic and reconstructive 
surgery 
Tenured academic staff in the 
Department of Surgery, 
University of Ghent. 
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Name Degree194 Discipline/Specialization/ 









 Practicing therapist.  Holds 
Physician Assistant, Mental 
Health Counselor and 
Marriage and Family 
Therapist licenses from 
Washington State.   No 
information available on 




Ed.D. [school counseling? 
Describes herself as a 
psychologist] 
Practicing therapist.  Holds a 
New York State license as a 









Social work, human 
sexuality 
Apparently retired from 
private practice.  D.H.S. is 
from the Institute of 
Advanced Study of Human 
Sexuality, San Francisco, 





[Ph.D.] [Psychology] Licensed as a Marriage and 
Family Therapist through 
September 2009 by the New 
York State Education 
Department Office of the 
Professions.  Some 
professional publications.   
   
 While not every organization publishes biographical information on its key 
participants or makes its membership roster available to the public, WPATH’s 
membership is curiously restrictive for an interdisciplinary area, and functions more 
to maintain boundaries between professional and non-professional than to distinguish 
practical intellectual boundaries in an interdisciplinary field. WPATH limits full 
membership to “professionals working in disciplines such as medicine, psychology, 
law, social work, counseling, psychotherapy, family studies, sociology, 
anthropology, speech and voice therapy, sexology and other related fields.”195  
                                                 
195 World Professional Organization for Transgender Health Inc., Membership Benefits (Web Page) 
([cited September 4 2009]); available from http://www.wpath.org/membership_benefits.cfm. 
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Supporting memberships (without voting privileges) are available to those who don’t 
work in the fields cited above, which provokes an interesting question.  This is a very 
curious range of fields: certainly one sees the relevance of all of these fields to the 
phenomenon and experience of transgenderedness, taken broadly.  But by that token, 
insight into and professional interest in the overall phenomenon of transgenderedness 
could also be provided by a much larger range of “professionals,” perhaps most 
pointedly those who work in LGBT or transgender studies, public health, law 
enforcement, etc.   Conversely, one might argue that law, family studies, sociology, 
anthropology, speech and voice therapy, and sexology are not professional fields 
appropriate to transgender health concerns, inasmuch as practitioners of these fields 
are not licensed to treat the mental disorder outlined in the DSM.  Emeritus and 
student memberships are also available (although student membership “requires 
sponsorship and recommendation by a full member along with proof of current full-
time status as a graduate student in a program directly related to transgender 
health.” [emphasis original]196  Again, it appears that there is a deliberate attempt to 
exclude students in LGBT or gender studies programs. 
 The incoherence of WPATH’s definition of full association membership 
reveals several sorts of instabilities.  To state the obvious, the experience of 
transgenderedness—or the experience of providing gender “reassignment” services to 
transgendered people—is larger and more complex than its positioning as a 
psychiatric disorder can encompass.  That broadening of the field, however, has the 
potential to open doors that blur professional boundaries and threaten to destabilize 
the rationale for professional authority.  It’s one thing to expand “professional” to 




include a sociologist who studies female-to-male “transsexuals,” e.g., those who are 
primarily concerned with changing their own genders (and not challenging WPATH’s 
mission or values), rather than deconstructing “gender” as a concept.   It’s quite 
another to expand the category of “professional” to include an academic with a Ph.D. 
in philosophy, who argues against the neat differentiation of sexuality from gender, or 
to give voting rights to the accomplished artist, theorist, engineer and academic often 
cited as the “founder” of transgender studies, because her expertise does not include a 
“patient/health care provider” approach to the subject.197     
 The circling of wagons around the concept of “professional” echoes back to 
the histories of psychiatry that frame psychiatrists as constantly battling insecurity in 
the profession.  The emphasis on distinguishing “professional” persons from “lay” 
persons gets to the fundamental issue of gatekeeping.  An entity as new as 
“transsexualism,” in the sense that such a thing did not exist as an American cultural 
phenomenon until the 1950s, means that it does not have the kinds of historical 
associations with medicine that other “illnesses” do, and with pressure from some 
segments of the transgendered population to depathologize the phenomenon, the 
reasoning as to why “professionals” should be the ones making decisions about who 
has access to hormones and surgery is by no means uncontested.   
Gender Identity Disorder and the Social Regulation of Gender 
 
 Gender Identity Disorder and the Standards of Care also tell a story about 
what gender—or, in this case, what the two normative genders—should look like, 
through the means of diagnosis through the DSM-IV (or ICD).   
                                                 
197 I refer to Aaron Devor, Judith Butler, and Sandy Stone respectively.   
 176 
 
 The “Diagnostic Features” (a more free-form textual description of the 
Diagnostic Criteria) of Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-IV are quite shockingly 
traditional to many contemporary eyes, and perhaps give a better feel for what is 
meant by the Diagnostic Criteria:   
In boys, the cross-gender identification is manifested by a marked 
preoccupation with traditionally feminine activities. They may have a 
preference for dressing in girls’ or women’s clothes or may improvise 
such items from available materials when genuine articles are 
unavailable. Towels, aprons, and scarves are often used to represent 
long hair or skirts. There is a strong attraction for the stereotypical 
games and pastimes of girls. They particularly enjoy playing house, 
drawing pictures of beautiful girls and princesses, and watching 
television or videos of their favorite female characters. Stereotypical 
female-type dolls, such as Barbie, are often their favorite toys, and 
girls are their preferred playmates. When playing “house,” these boys 
role-play female figures, most commonly “mother roles,” and often are 
quite preoccupied with female fantasy figures. They avoid rough-and-
tumble play and competitive sports and have little interest in cars and 
trucks or other nonaggressive but stereotypical boys’ toys. They may 
express a wish to be a girl and assert that they will grow up to be a 
woman. They may insist on sitting to urinate and pretend not to have a 
penis by pushing it in between their legs. More rarely, boys with 
Gender Identity Disorder may state that they find their penis or testes 
disgusting, that they want to remove them, or that they have, or wish to 
have, a vagina. 
 
Girls with Gender Identity Disorder display intense negative reactions 
to parental expectations or attempts to have them wear dresses or other 
feminine attire. Some may refuse to attend school or social events 
where such clothes may be required. They prefer boys’ clothing and 
short hair, are often misidentified by strangers as boys, and may ask to 
be called by a boy’s name. Their fantasy heroes are most often 
powerful male figures, such as Batman or Superman. These girls 
prefer boys as playmates, with whom they share interests in contact 
sports, rough and tumble play, and traditional boyhood games. They 
show little interest in dolls or any form of feminine dress-up or role-
play activity. A girl with this disorder may occasionally refuse to 
urinate in a sitting position. She may claim that she has or will grow a 
penis and may not want to grow breasts or to menstruate. She may 
assert that she will grow up to be a man. Such girls typically reveal 
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marked cross-gender identification in role-playing, dreams, and 
fantasies.198 
The use of phrases such as “stereotypical female-type dolls” and the like (without any 
irony whatsoever) puts the entire Gender Identity Disorder diagnostic procedure into 
a realm of absurdity almost without parallel.  The DSM-IV concept of gender seems 
completely unblemished by second-wave feminism, or in fact nearly any kind of 
cultural change since the early 1960s, and the extraordinary abstraction of gender 
seems to be much more revealing of the gender-related insecurities of the 
authors/editors of the DSM-IV than of any transgendered individual.  The reference 
to Batman and Superman, for instance, seems more a nostalgic recollection to the 
author/editors’ own childhoods than any kind of realistic picture of contemporary 
children and their engagement with, say, Harry Potter, Wii, or contemporary toys. 
My arguments about the specific kinds of stories that Gender Identity Disorder 
requires from transgendered individuals seeking hormones or surgery are drawn 
primarily from Dean Spade’s essay, “Mutilating Gender.”  Others have made similar 
points, but Spade’s essay more explicitly and effectively addresses lying than most 
others, an issue which, as will be examined in more detail later in the chapter, is of 
considerable concern.199   
  Spade’s essay examines the relationship between transgendered individuals 
seeking surgery and “the medical establishments with which they must contend in 
order to fulfill their goals.”200   His primary contention is that transgendered 
                                                 
198 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV-TR). 576-577  
199 Dean Spade, "Mutilating Gender," in The Transgender Studies Reader, ed. Susan Stryker and 
Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
200 Ibid., 316. 
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individuals’ efforts to obtain surgery are policed primarily because the specific 
surgical interventions sought are in conflict with the regulation and policing of gender 
expression—or, in other words, surgical interventions sought by transgendered people 
are policed when similar surgeries by non-transgendered people are not (or at least 
not in the same ways across the board.)  
 Several excerpts from Spade’s personal story of trying to obtain free or low-
cost counseling in pursuit of a double mastectomy tell of his learning what “story” he 
is supposed to tell in order to obtain surgery, and of the difficulties in reconciling the 
prescribed story with his own “real” story.   
  “When did you first know you were different?” the counselor at 
the L.A. Free Clinic asked.  “Well,” I said, “I knew I was poor and on 
welfare, and that was different from lots of kids at school, and I had a 
single mom, which was really uncommon there, and we weren’t 
Christian, which is terribly noticeable in the South.  Then later I knew 
I was a foster child, and in high school, I knew I was a feminist and 
that caused me all kinds of trouble, so I guess I always knew I was 
different.”  His facial expression tells me this isn’t what he wanted to 
hear, but why should I engage this idea that my gender performance 
has been my most important difference in my life?  It hasn’t, and I 
can’t separate it from the class, race, and parentage variables through 
which it was mediated.  Does this mean I’m not real enough for 
surgery? 
 I’ve worked hard not to engage the gay childhood narrative—I 
never talk about tomboyish behavior as an antecedent to my lesbian 
identity, I don’t tell stories about cross-dressing or crushes on girls, 
and I intentionally fuck with the assumption of it by telling people how 
I used to be straight and have sex with boys like any sweet trashy rural 
girl and some of it was fun.  I see these narratives as strategic, and I’ve 
always rejected the strategy that adopts some theory of innate sexuality 
and forecloses the possibility that anyone, gender-troubled childhood 
or not, could transgress sexual and gender norms at any time. 201 
Of particular note is Spade’s articulation of his efforts to avoid “the gay childhood 
narrative,” which I see as less the “gay” childhood narrative than as the kind of 
                                                 
201 Ibid., 319-20. 
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essentialized abstraction of childhood gender described in the DSM-IV.  But it does 
clearly position the content of the narrative at odds with any sort of transgression of 
traditional sexual and gender norms, and effectively positions transgendered 
individuals seeking surgical modification as having to present their genders in hyper-
traditional ways.  Spade continues,  
 The counselor at the L.A. Free Clinic decided I wasn’t transsexual 
during the first (and only) session.  When I told him what I wanted, 
and how I was starting counseling because I was trying to get some 
letters that I could give to a surgeon so that they would alter my chest, 
he said, “You should just go get breast reduction.”  Of course, he 
didn’t know that most cosmetic surgeons won’t reduce breasts below a 
C-cup (I wouldn’t even qualify for reduction), and that breast 
reduction is a different procedure than the construction of a male-
looking chest… To this counselor, my failure to confirm to the 
transsexuality he was expecting required my immediate expulsion 
from that world of meaning at any cost.  My desire couldn’t be for 
SRS because I wasn’t a transsexual, so it must be for cosmetic surgery, 
something normal people get.202 
 It is perhaps unsurprising that psychiatrists and therapists in these narratives 
are often portrayed as idiots, trafficking in such simplistic models of health-as-
normativity that one wonders what good they might ever do anyone.  Anne Bolin, 
however, offers the observation that an explanation for such a profound disconnect 
might be better located in the structuring of the diagnostic criteria itself:  she observes 
that “In the process of interacting with the caretakers, transsexuals are merely 
engaging in something they have learned as a consequence of transsexualism.  They 
are fabricating personal identities in order to present caretakers a picture consistent 
with caretakers’ own research and the literature on transsexualism.  The therapeutic 
                                                 
202 Ibid., 324-25. 
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encounter is ideal for such false oral documentation and “biographical editing.”203  
The fact that the medical establishment has always required a single kind of story has 
meant that transgendered people have always figured out what that story needed to 
sound like to convince the doctors, and produced it as required.204  Spade also 
describes great awareness amongst transgendered and transsexual people of the need 
to provide this monolithic story. 
After attending only three discussion group meetings with other trans 
people, I am struck by the naivete with which I approached the search 
for counseling to get my surgery-authorizing letters.  No one at these 
groups seems to see therapy as the place where they voice their doubts 
about their transitions, where they wrestle with the political 
implications of their changes, where they speak about fears of losing 
membership in various communities or in their families.  No one trusts 
the doctors as the place to work things out.  When I mention the places 
I’ve gone for help, places that are supposed to support queer and trans 
people, everyone nods knowingly, having heard countless stories like 
mine about these very places before.  Some have suggestions of 
therapists who are better, but none cost less than $50/hr.  Mostly, 
though, people suggest different ways to get around the requirements.  
I get names of surgeons who do not always ask for the letters.  
Someone suggests that since I won’t be on hormones, I can go in and 
pretend I’m a woman with a history of breast cancer in my family and 
that I want a double mastectomy to prevent it.  I have these great, sad, 
conversations with these people who know all about what it means to 
lie and cheat their way through the medical roadblocks to get the 
opportunity to occupy their bodies in the way they want.  I understand, 
now, that the place that it is safe to talk about this is in here, with other 
people who understand the slipperiness of gender and the politics of 
transition, and who believe me without question when I say what I 
think I am and how that needs to look.205 
                                                 
203 Anne Bolin, In Search of Eve: Transsexual Rites of Passage (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 
1988), 64. 
204 Ibid, Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States, 161. 
205 Spade, "Mutilating Gender," 326-27. 
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Gender Identity Disorder and the Personal Story 
 
 The third story with which this chapter is concerned is about the “patient’s 
story” as autobiography, and the context in which that story is produced and 
consumed.  This consideration argues that the presentation of a personal history to a 
doctor is an autobiography of sorts—a somewhat curious form, to be sure, but an 
autobiography nonetheless.   
 This form of autobiography has several unique features.  First, the story is 
implicitly contextualized as a somatic story—even when it is a story with substantial 
psychological, spiritual, or political components, the telling of it in the context of the 
doctor’s office of necessity makes it a story about the body.  Second, this kind of 
story is told provisionally; the doctor retains the authorial privilege in this storytelling 
activity and may either confirm or reverse any conclusion the client-patient offers.   
The client-patient may craft a story very carefully with the intent of obtaining a 
particular diagnosis, but the privilege of drawing conclusions and assigning a 
diagnosis (and therefore, in some circumstances at least, an identity) is the doctor’s.      
As noted, the criteria for diagnosis with Gender Identity Disorder are comparatively 
narrow and conventional, which means that people seeking that diagnosis tell a fairly 
constricted sort of story.  But if there is only one kind of story that is understood as 
valid to obtain surgery and hormones, then the truth of the personal story is 
immediately tainted, at least in some ways.  In other words, people lie, and the fact of 
lying creates multiple kinds of social difficulties.  It creates a community context ripe 
for the policing of authenticity, it creates a certain difficulty in for scholarship heavily 
invested in making oppressed voices heard (my primary concern here), and generally 
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creates an uncomfortable fact that has to be gotten around.  Overall, the entire process 
of the construction of identity in mainstream, secular culture—and specifically 
including “therapeutic discourses”—has very little in the way of ability to deal with 
intentional falsification.206 
 The fact of lying, and the need to align stories with normative ideas of gender, 
creates a context for a transgender “community” that virtually ensures a degree of 
infighting and the policing of authentic identity.   I turn here to David Valentine’s 
Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category, which examines the idea of 
“transgender” as a site of contestation between contemporary academic/professional 
understandings of “gender” and “sexuality” as being fundamentally different aspects 
of identity and older conceptions of “gayness” or homosexuality as including 
components of both.  Valentine’s project is to examine what kinds of political work 
can be done through the idea of “transgender” as separating gender variance from 
sexuality; to examine what conceptual possibilities this notion opens up and what 
conceptual possibilities it forecloses.   
“Since the early 1990s… the category transgender has come to be 
understood as a collective category of identity which incorporates a 
diverse body of male- and female-bodied gender-variant people who 
had previously been understood as distinct kinds of persons, including 
self-identified transsexuals and transvestites, but also many others… 
In its collectivity, the capacity of transgender to incorporate all gender 
variance has become a powerful tool of activism and personal 
identification.  And even more remarkably, in the period since the 
early 1990s it has already become institutionalized in a vast range of 
contexts, from grassroots activism, social service provision, and 
                                                 
206 To clarify: I say this without moral judgment.  But I do find this to be an interesting intellectual 
problem with considerable implications for any kind of scholarship related to identity.  As noted in 
Chapter Two, the literature on trauma and memory touches on this kind of question, yet remains on the 
margins of discourse in scholarship pertaining to identity.  My point is only that the fact of lying seems 
to make people generally uncomfortable and it tends to be avoided, rather than embraced, in 
scholarship.   
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individual identification, to journalistic accounts and the way that this 
book itself is categorized.  Most importantly, transgender identification 
is understood across these domains to be explicitly and fundamentally 
different in origin and being from homosexual identification, a 
distinction referred to in the social sciences as ontological.  This 
distinction, in turn, has been made possible through another that 
developed in social theory and activism over the past thirty years: that 
between sexed body, social gender, and sexuality.  In this ordering of 
human experience, gender identity is not causally related to sexual 
desire, and both are conceptualized as independent of sexed bodies.  In 
short, “transgender” has changed the terms by which U.S. Americans 
understand and differentiate between gendered and sexual 
variance.”207 
Valentine’s project contrasts the contemporary academic notion of “transgender” as 
ontologically distinct from sexuality with an ethnographic exploration of the declared 
identities of [“transgendered”] people who instead describe themselves with a range 
of different terms and conceptions including “gay,” etc.  Valentine, however, 
observes that in the context of his study, these views of sexual and gender identities 
were generally viewed by social service providers not as alternative views but rather 
as false ones, as though his informants used such definitively outmoded ideas of 
identification because they lacked education.  In the view of the social service 
providers, gender and sexuality are fundamentally different kinds of facets of identity 
and those who would persist in “conflating” them are merely confused or lack 
awareness of the unquestionable truth of this separation.  To the service providers, 
Valentine’s informants were all clearly “transgendered,” but did not know the proper 
name for themselves.  The emphasis of Valentine’s project thus evolves from being 
an ordinary ethnography of a community to an investigation into how the idea of 
                                                 
207 David Valentine, Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007), 4. 
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“transgender” as an umbrella description of a wide range of gender variance works to 
constitute a community, and that this political work is done in service of activism.   
 It seems, however, that the process of intentionally working in support of 
activism is a double-edged sword.  Encouraging activism—or at the very least self-
liberation—is the implicit goal of much transgender studies and disability studies 
work.  But the more intentional such work becomes, the more it seems that the goal 
determines what sorts of stories can be told, and again, stories become subject to 
excessive social pressures.  Within (some) transgendered “communities,” for 
instance, authenticity seems to be policed on basis of the normativity of the story told 
outside the doctor’s office.  It is presently fashionable, at least in some circles, to 
identify as transgender in ways that are as deliberately disruptive of all gender norms 
as possible, e.g., “femme transman.”  The idea is that the normative binary gender 
structure is far too restrictive to encompass individual identity.  While some of this 
kind of identification can indeed be read as a kind of fashion among young people in 
the same ways that various counter-cultural ideas have been for years, it also 
functions as a way of policing identity and authenticity, and of the boundaries of 
community.  That sort of ideology makes the more traditional transsexual narrative 
(“I’ve always felt I was really a woman”), when told outside the doctor’s office, look 
like a form of false consciousness, of having succumbed and finally come to believe 
the dominant narrative through having to tell the normative lies so many times.  
Whether this sort of policing serves a useful purpose depends on one’s point of view, 
but it certainly indicates that these kinds of stories are subject to validation in ways 
that are less formal than either the doctor’s office or even the publishing house.   To 
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apply my early argument in a different context, if there is sufficient incentive to tell a 
particular kind of story to achieve a desired result in the doctor’s office, then it also 
stands to reason that if there is sufficient incentive to tell a particular kind of story in 
a social context, then it is likely that people will tell those stories as well, which re-
casts the personal story as primarily an exercise in social positioning and 
identification rather than as an individual story about an experience. 
 This kind of suspicion seems especially problematic for any kind of scholarly 
project based in progressive values because it raises a question that is particularly 
difficult to answer wisely: when is the normative story a “reliable” personal account 
and when is it an example of false consciousness?  Surely there must in fact be such a 
thing as false consciousness, as how else can scholars account for the fact that 
pressures of various stripes encourage certain kinds of stories to be told?   And then 
there is the question of individual autonomy—whatever arguments may be made 
about how certain kinds of arguments do political work for certain groups, isn’t there 
a point at which individuals should retain some authority in the telling of their own 
lives?   
 I have deliberately postponed discussion in the chapter an issue that I expect 
will be somewhat contentious, namely the complicated circumstances surrounding 
Gender Identity Disorder as a “mental disorder.”  Transgendered individuals do not 
ordinarily consider themselves “sick,” or “mentally ill” even if they have intentionally 
sought a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder in order to obtain hormones or 
surgery; “disability” is occasionally discussed as a possible strategy to obtain services 
but it isn’t a meaningful form of personal identification in the same way that it is for 
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others who experience other kinds of illnesses or disabilities. Susan Stryker explains, 
“In spite of its being an official psychopathology, “treatments” for Gender Identity 
Disorder are not covered by health insurance in the United States because they are 
considered “elective,” “cosmetic,” or even “experimental.”  This is a truly 
inexcusable double bind—if being transgendered is not considered 
psychopathological, it should be delisted as a mental disorder; if it is to be considered 
psychopathological, its treatment should be covered as a legitimate healthcare 
need.”208    
 Transgender identification and activism is usually more closely (albeit 
uncomfortably) tied to lesbian/gay or queer activism, under the generic “LGBT” 
acronym.  This examination implicitly considers what identification with disability 
might mean for transgendered people.   Hopefully it is obvious that I am making a 
point about the legitimacy of the process of assigning pathology to these experiences 
and the inherent problem of assuming that personal or social identification should 
occur along the lines of a diagnosis.  My suggestion is not that transgendered people 
should think of themselves as mentally ill and therefore disabled, rather that the 
medical regulation of certain kinds of thoughts and behaviors are similar enough that 
both the disability studies/disability rights project and the LGBT rights project might 
consider what alliances are possible.       
 Again, David Valentine makes an insightful point: 
“… I examine claims about “inclusion” to think about the historical 
and contemporary meanings that have enabled transgender-identified 
and gay and lesbian activists to simultaneously come to an agreement 
on a recognition of shared histories while insisting on their differences.  
The analysis of inclusion I undertake here is focused on the processes 
                                                 
208 Susan Stryker, Transgender History (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2008), 14-15. 
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whereby certain categories are produced as having certain kinds of 
boundaries in the first place, so that some people may see themselves 
as being included or excluded from them.  Thus, “inclusion” for me is 
not simply a positive political act but an object of analysis itself, for it 
already assumes a coherence to the working categories of these 
politics.” 209  
Valentine’s point about certain categories being produced with certain kinds of 
boundaries is important here, as it is what keeps “transgendered” separate from 
“disability,” or more properly, some as-yet-unformed category comprised of “all 
those shaped by normative ideas about bodily experience and thus subject to 
‘professional’ regulation.”  The conventions of identification (as transgendered, as 
disabled, etc.) in the personal story have become more effective means of policing 
what the personal story should say in service of activism than a reliable description of 
experience.   
 
 
                                                 
209 Valentine, Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category, 175. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 Whose Story Is It Anyway? seeks to broaden the current academic disability 
studies conversation and address the absence of a significant discussion on 
madness/mental illness.  While its central focus has been to examine how the cultural 
authority of medicine works to “flatten” discourse on the experience of 
madness/mental illness into standardized narratives of illness, it has had two equal 
goals: to assess and evaluate strategies for the political enterprise of the disability 
rights project, and to contribute to the intellectual exchange and practices that 
constitute disability studies.   
 Two major insights stand out.  First, this research argues for a redirection of 
disability studies scholarship away from a focus on identity and toward more tangible 
objects of analysis, most especially the “policies” and practices that define and 
enforce the categories of “normal” and “pathological.”  It is useful to think of the 
diagnostic criteria in the DSM and the WPATH Standards of Care as policies and 
practices in this context, as they provide a virtually unique example of the ways in 
which an authoritative body can make judgments about the value of difference and 
then impose those judgments on a disempowered group (disempowered in this 
specific context, at least).   Unlike many kinds of difference, where the most powerful 
means of reproducing power differentials are diffuse and not coming from a single 
authority, disability has a large number of very specific kinds of entities that make 
policy-like decisions with considerable practical impact; e.g., the Social Security 
Administration determines eligibility and the rates of benefits for those who can’t 
work as a result of disability, employee health insurance policies determine what sorts 
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of treatments or support will be covered (which can determine what sort of health 
care an individual can obtain); businesses and  employers make policy-like decisions 
about accessibility and accommodations, and the Food and Drug Administration has 
policies and regulations about the development, testing, manufacture and distribution 
of various drugs.  All of these “policies” represent concrete points of decisionmaking 
about the valuation of physical and mental difference, and each has an attendant set of 
practices for implementation that can impose further control on people’s lives.210  
Second, this research stands as an argument for the need for the humanities to engage 
other disciplines, most especially the “hard” sciences and the constellation of 
disciplines involved with health care, in a far more vigorous way than they have often 
done in recent years—again, for reasons related both to intellectual integrity and the 
quality of scholarship and to efficacy in promoting a progressive political agenda.   
 My research takes a pragmatic approach to both activism and scholarship and 
argues that for humanities scholarship in general, and for disability studies in 
particular, the time has come when explorations into identity yield less new insight, 
pound for pound, than explorations in other kinds of scholarly directions, most 
especially in the kinds of policies and practices outlined above.  In no way does this 
challenge the need to include a diversity of perspectives in scholarship or to neglect 
issues of identity when they can continue to offer useful insight; rather, it speaks to 
the principle of diminishing returns.211 Continuing to subdivide the categories of 
identity into more particular pieces (e.g., Victoria Brownmiller’s insistence on a 
                                                 
210 To a large extent, this situation is the result of the ongoing association of disability with illness. 
211 My argument to move away from a focus on identity is an effort to expand the field and increase a 
diversity of perspectives: one of my greatest frustrations with the disability studies project is that it 
often feels too inwardly focused.  Self-reflexivity is enormously important and useful to an extent, but 
too much can breed insularity. 
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racially diverse group of working-class disabled lesbians) will no doubt yield some 
kind of new insights, but this dissertation research argues that there may be a point 
after which insisting on collecting a fully representative demographic sample may not 
actually provide very many really new ideas, and in fact can work to the opposite.212  
In the context of this study, the latter statement dovetails with the recognition that 
“personal” stories of a presumably unique individual experience can come to be 
standardized, and that a wide sampling of stories can in fact end up being essentially 
many copies of the same story.   
 On the identity side of the equation, that conclusion suggests that more refined 
tools are needed for assessing what kinds of personal stories are likely to yield 
substantial new insight and what stories are less likely to do so, or perhaps better 
ways in trying to account for the process of standardization.  For instance, the work in 
this study, especially the portions in Chapters Four and Five that describe the 
standardization of personal narratives, indicate that timing and/or novelty may be 
important in obtaining personal narratives that are less mediated by dominant 
narratives on the subject.  Likewise, it also suggests that scholars looking at an 
emerging body of published literature on the experience of, say, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, should anticipate that these narratives may be informed by each 
other and should plan to consider this as a variable in his or her analysis.  As noted in 
Chapter Four, the question of exactly how such narrative forms come to be 
standardized would be a fascinating project.  To what extent is this standardization 
                                                 
212 This point refers primarily to the development of new intellectual approaches to thinking about 
power and difference, which has been my primary concern throughout this study.  However, there may 
be a useful distinction to be made between scholarly contributions to theory and scholarly 
contributions to evidence. 
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the result of commercial publication and the intentional manipulation of such 
accounts (by either author or editor) into products for sale?  To what extent does the 
particular medium of the trade-published book affect the process?  At the time that 
this project was conceptualized, blogging was not as well-established a 
communications medium as it is now, and blogging also adds new questions.  If, say, 
a new kind of “transient mental illness” (such as the “fugue states” that provoked 
urban working-class European men to suddenly go traveling for months at a time 
before “waking”) were to emerge and accounts of this phenomena were to appear first 
in the blogosphere, would such narratives become standardized in the same way? 
 This research also serves as a reminder that there are circumstances in which 
scholars can and should act as critics within their cause, and here I offer two 
examples. First, I offer the example of absence.  I contend that scholars bear a 
particular responsibility to make it possible to ask as many kinds of questions as 
possible, and to remember that it is possible for certain kinds of ideas to be foreclosed 
(including, for all practical purposes, in this study) when a scholarly agenda is driven 
by any particular kind of ideology, including popular activism.  A tyranny of the 
majority of the scholar-activists involved in a social justice project is still a tyranny of 
the majority, and can effectively foreclose ideas that are just too radical or 
controversial to be acknowledged.  For instance, the disability rights movement and 
groups like Not Dead Yet have long crusaded against legalizing euthanasia, which 
they feel has and will be used in the service of the outright murder of people with 
disabilities, as well to bully people with disabilities to “choose” death, which from 
their perspective amounts to nearly the same thing.  A philosophical difficulty arises, 
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however, when a person determines that he or she wants to die.  The primary 
response from the disability rights/disability studies project has been to use that sort 
of circumstance as an example and opportunity to argue against the disempowerment 
and the lack of satisfying living circumstances that some people with disabilities are 
forced to endure.  Another response, however, argues that people with disabilities 
should receive the same psychiatric care as non-disabled people, and that a desire to 
die should be considered as evidence of depression and treated accordingly.  Such an 
argument can and will work to re-pathologize the experience of depression (or at least 
a possible component of it), as it is clearly intended to do.  My point is that there is 
such a strong social taboo against suicide that the idea that a person might want to die 
without being depressed is simply unthinkable in this context. Whether this seems 
like a good idea is not the point; my concern is that this is an impossible conversation 
to have in the context of  this particular activism-driven research agenda, and the 
absence of the possibility of discussion potentially forecloses new avenues of thought.        
 Second, there are more straightforward and practical reasons that scholars 
should approach memoirs of madness/mental illness with some skepticism and care.  
While all memoirs are necessarily representations, rather than reflections of 
experience, these may need to be approached as particularly difficulty and slippery.   
It is not that illness renders these personal stories unreliable, but instead that they are 
vehicles through which the dominant cultural narratives of depression-as-illness 
legitimize themselves using modernist narratives of scientific process.  Authors (or at 
least those who want to publish a “successful” book) have little choice; the only way 
to be culturally reconstituted as fully human and a credible witness is to embrace the 
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medical model, testify to the pathology of the experience, and then distance 
themselves from it through some variation of “recovery.”  Telling a different kind of 
story would be the proverbial tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, but 
signifying nothing.   
  This observation is corroborated from another angle by an incident that 
occurred in the preparation of this study.  In reading my drafts, and hearing my 
expressions of frustration at finding it difficult to talk about the experience of 
depression in its larger sense (i.e., what would have been called melancholy in 
another time and place) without referencing the contemporary clinical ideas of 
depression-as-illness, my dissertation advisor, John Caughey, mentioned that he was 
reminded of some of his own work on imaginary social worlds, published twenty-five 
years earlier, and suggested that I might want to take a look.213  In particular, he 
suggested that I look at a chapter examining social relations in hallucinations and 
delusions.  Although I had read the work years earlier, my re-reading of the chapter 
was a complete surprise.  An anthropologist, Caughey took an ethnographic approach 
to madness/mental illness, examining patients’ perspectives as well as the doctors’, 
and his work included commentary on a case study of a woman who had visions and 
saw ghosts.  In traditional diagnostic terms, he argued, Mrs. M. had all the classic 
symptoms of a paranoid schizophrenic, and would have certainly been diagnosed as 
such by any psychiatrist on the ward he was studying, and committed.214    
 However, this didn’t happen.  Mrs. M’s mother took her to a card reader and 
spirit medium in hope of finding some answers about her daughter’s visions.  The 
                                                 





medium offered a different kind of explanation for her strange experiences, that Mrs. 
M. was not crazy but was making contact with the spirit world.  Mrs. M. undertook 
spiritual study, became a trance medium herself, and eventually received considerable 
local recognition for her talents in this arena.  “If she is ‘schizophrenic,’” he wrote, 
“she is a highly successful, happy, socially well-adjusted schizophrenic.”215 
Caughey’s central point was that the context of the social world determines what 
imaginary social relationships will be valued, and that particular comment was 
somewhat playful.   Nevertheless, I was astonished that he would dare say that—and 
in a tenure book, no less—because twenty-five years later, the context is so 
dramatically different.  Now, the modernist universalism of biological psychiatry 
seems so entrenched that to offer the story of a happy trance medium as a challenge to 
the pathologization or the diagnostic category of paranoid schizophrenia, even with 
some level of jest, seems inconceivable.   Today, to challenge the dominant medical 
model of biological psychiatry and its insistence on certain experiences as being 
understood exclusively as pathological would seem to require a completely 
irreproachable example—literally, somebody with the status of hero, such as 
Abraham Lincoln.   
 My point in recounting this story is to illustrate that a real shift has taken place 
in the extent to which the medical model of biological psychiatry is dominant, and 
conversely, the extent to which there are viable models for resistance.  Caughey was 
able to talk about other kinds of social worlds as other possibilities; his comparison 
elevated the social world of trance mediums to a level of legitimacy that it could “talk 
back” to psychiatry, so to speak.  Although Caughey uses psychiatry’s own criteria to 




re-establish Mrs. M. as a credible witness, describing her as “highly successful,” 
“happy,” and “socially well-adjusted,” he does not feel the need to offer any other 
particular qualifications for her experience and his argument to challenge psychiatry 
and psychiatrists.   Psychiatrists, in Caughey’s argument, may be able to exercise 
control over other people in certain circumstances, but they are fundamentally just 
people who have certain perspectives. Therefore, whereas Caughey was able to treat 
the question of the validity of psychiatry’s definitions of madness/mental illness as 
one that was open to at least some debate, today, that argument seems closed.216  The 
dominance of medical authority and the popular perception of scientific knowledge as 
absolute is now so complete that those who write about their experiences with 
madness/mental illness must testify to the pathology of the experience and the 
validity of the medical model in order to borrow back enough cultural authority to be 
reconstituted as credible witnesses to their own experience.  The entire context of 
engagement has shifted; biological psychiatry has so effectively deployed modernist 
narratives of scientific progress and absolute validity that controls the terms on which 
any discussion may occur.  It seems to me that, in this particular arena at least, the 
disability rights project has lost ground over the last twenty-five years.  
 That, in turn, suggests that the strategies for resistance need to change.  The 
disability studies project’s emphasis on identity and inclusion, born from a civil rights 
era-type consciousness, simply does not translate as a strategy for resistance in the 
madness/mental illness arena because there is such a broad popular acceptance of 
                                                 
216 Concern with cultural rather than biological explanations of mental illness continues in the work of 
some psychological anthropologists.  See, for example, Roland Littlewood and Simon Dein, eds., 
Cultural Psychiatry and Medical Anthropology: An Introduction and Reader (London; New 
Brunswick, NJ: Athlone Press, 2000). 
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medical models of madness/mental illness, even among those who experience it 
firsthand.  Therefore, this research suggests that other approaches, namely those that 
deconstruct and critique the policy-shaping structures that directly affect people’s 
lives, may be more successful in the long term in promoting new ideas in both 
scholarship and social change, not only as pertain to madness/mental illness, but for 
disability studies as a whole.  People are not likely to demand change unless they 
perceive that a real problem exists, so it is up to scholarship to illuminate the 
problem.  Given that there are so many ways to illustrate generally that science is not 
absolute, and specifically that biological psychiatry is much less “scientific” and 
much more political than it purports to be, I argue that the disability rights/disability 
studies project should instead focus on showing how the biological psychiatry system 
works to perpetuate and protect its own authority, at the expense of those it claims to 
help.     
 This study (excluding the literature review) offers examples of three kinds of 
arguments that address medical discourses, their implementation in their immediate 
context, and their implications for broader popular discourses.  The first type is the 
one that Joshua Wolf Shenk argues quite eloquently  in Lincoln’s Melancholy, in 
which he contests the interpretation of the experience of depression as uniformly 
pathological and instead suggests that the experience is more complex and may in 
fact have certain “good” features.  The second is my revival and application of 
Thomas Szasz’ critique, in which he argues that the idea of mental illness represents a 
degradation of scientific rigor because the criteria for establishing a diagnosis of 
mental illness are behavioral rather than physiological, and no somatic evidence of 
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pathology can be demonstrated.  This, in short, is a refutation of the validity of the 
idea of “mental illness” on intellectual grounds, a charge that this notion of illness 
lacks sufficient evidence according to general principles and standards of scientific 
practice.  The third is my broadly Marxist examination of the WPATH Standards of 
Care for Gender Identity Disorder of the way in which the medical industry, broadly 
interpreted, is careful to protect the line between “medical professional” and 
“patient,” to preserve the appearance of medical authority even when there is little 
credible evidence of real expertise, and to obscure financial relationships behind 
rhetorics of professional responsibility.    
 More broadly, this study argues that it is not only desirable but is in fact 
absolutely necessary for the humanities to actively engage other disciplines, 
especially those in science and medicine.   As described above, this study has 
attempted to provide examples of how a humanities-based disability studies project 
might profitably redirect its efforts.  But my argument for engagement is much larger 
than that; it is a contention that one of the reasons that the dominant narrative of 
biological psychiatry has become so powerful is because the humanities have failed to 
fully engage and critique modernist narratives of scientific progress in their practical 
embodiments.  Instead, I believe, disciplines in the humanities have tended to fold 
into themselves, perhaps engaging other humanities or social science disciplines in 
exploring postmodern ideas as they have materialized in those areas, but leaving the 
hard sciences largely untouched.  
 I argue for the humanities to engage science, technology, engineering and 
math (STEM) disciplines, which I interpret here to include medicine, for multiple 
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mutual benefits.  First, I contend that there is a pressing  need for a humanities-based 
critique and counterbalance to the activities being pursued in STEM fields, a need 
that has begun to be engaged by scholars in science studies.  A vigorous philosophy 
of science activity (e.g., an expansion of science studies) will help to productively 
critique and strengthen thinking about the application of  these fields, and to increase 
scrutiny on the way that science-related activities are being performed and supported, 
much as a friendly argument with a good opponent will sharpen and refine one’s own 
ideas.  Second, the potential usefulness of external critique goes in both directions, 
and can serve equally to hone the thinking of scholars in the humanities. Third, and 
most important, a vigorous engagement of the STEM fields would help to address the 
problematic popular acceptance of “Science” as having absolute, universal validity—
what I understand to be the reason that the dominant model of biological psychiatry 
has enjoyed such an enormous expansion in power and authority. 
 For the disability rights project in general, and for people with illness-related 
disabilities in particular, this contribution has the potential for enormous utility.  The 
more that science and medicine are approached as political constructions, rather than 
discoveries, the greater the potential for them to be interrogated accordingly and for 
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